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Weapons of Mass Destruction

Richard Betts on the New Threat

Bosnia: No Exit?

CHARLES BOYD • GIDEON ROSE

Experimenting with Drugs

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NATO Expansion: The Bill

AMOS PERLMUTTER • TED GALEN CARPENTER

Is China Democratizing?

MINXIN PEI

And Melvyn Goldstein on the Dalai Lama

WINTER BOOKS

Shashi Tharoor on India, *Josef Joffe* on Genscher, *David Fromkin* on Nationalism, *Laurie Garrett* on Plagues, *and David Rothkopf* on the Triumph of Markets

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1998
VOLUME 77, NUMBER 1

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Everybody wants to believe that expanding NATO won't cost much, but they are wrong. Extending military guarantees is a big, and expensive, step.

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Greece is adopting a more internationalist outlook, and Turkey will have to follow suit if it wants to be part of Europe. Business ties between the two are a good start.

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The Polish elections may signal the dawning of a political force in Central and Eastern Europe—Christian democracy, with emphasis on both words.

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Making Bosnia Work *Charles G. Boyd* 42

The Dayton Accord is a bold attempt to create a nation in the face of ethnic hatred and fear, and it just may succeed—but only if U.S. troops stay and the coalition overseeing the peace puts the security of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats before their integration. For now, each group feels safe only with their own kind, and their self-created partition should be allowed to stand while the trauma of war fades. Material need and the desire for profit may bring the three peoples together in time. Meanwhile, the international community must rectify the gross disparity between the reconstruction aid and military supplies flowing to the Muslims and the crumbs and punitive attitude that are the Serbs' lot.

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Despite disagreements over troops in Bosnia, all sides want an exit strategy. That concept, however, dating back only to the ignominious U.S. withdrawal from Somalia, has nothing to do with military requirements and everything to do with post–Cold War politics. Exit strategies harm a mission's chances of success, and had they been required the United States would not have defended the armistice after the Korean War, kept the peace on the Sinai Peninsula after Camp David, or undertaken NATO. The real question is not when American troops will be out, but why they are going in.

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Foreign minister in some of the most pivotal years of the Cold War, Hans-Dietrich Genscher became a master of equivocation. Unfortunately, as an author, he still is.

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William Odom's reliance on tanks and bombers is Cold War thinking. The U.S. military will need a more flexible force to meet the challenges of the future.

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The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.*

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

Cost estimates for NATO expansion are little more than wishful thinking based on Pollyannaish security scenarios.

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NATO's Expensive Trip East

The Folly of Enlargement

Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter

Advocates of NATO enlargement speak in nebulous terms about promoting cooperation and stability throughout Europe. They downplay NATO's military significance, portraying the organization as primarily a political association for the post–Cold War era. But NATO is first and foremost a military alliance intended to protect its members from attack. If NATO moves eastward as planned, admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic by the end of the decade, the United States and the other current members will undertake new and potentially far-reaching security obligations, a point that seems to elude proponents of NATO enlargement when the issue of financial cost is addressed.

There have been three major studies of enlargement's cost—one by the Congressional Budget Office in 1996, another by scholars at the RAND Corporation in the same year, and a February 1997 Pentagon report to Congress. Even NATO is preparing its own cost estimate, narrowing the definition of enlargement's expenses to only those additional costs that will be common to all members, primarily communications, air defense, and other infrastructure upgrades. NATO's military leaders apparently believe that expansion can be accomplished for a maximum of $2 billion—and perhaps as little as $1.3 billion—over ten years. That is less than one-tenth of the Pentagon's estimate, and one-fortieth of the CBO's lowest figure.

The three earlier studies are more complete than the NATO effort, including not only the common costs, but also the cost of modernizing new members' military forces. Still, they reached optimistic conclusions about the total cost and the portion that the United States will have to pay. All three studies are flawed—although the upper-end estimates in the CBO report are based on plausible assumptions. The RAND and Pentagon figures are little more than wishful thinking based on Pollyannaish security scenarios. They ignore long-accepted conclusions about the requisites of providing credible security commitments to vulnerable front-line states.

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Their assumption that American taxpayers will bear only a small percentage of enlargement's costs is even more dubious, for it ignores severe financial constraints and adverse political factors affecting both new and current European members of NATO.

THREE PRICES, ONE PRODUCT

The CBO report argues that "it is difficult to determine what NATO would need to do to provide an adequate defense for the Visegrad [Central European] nations. In the current environment, NATO can probably spend as much or as little as it likes to undertake expansion." The CBO's analysts explore the probable costs of five options, from the least ambitious—helping a new member defend itself against a border skirmish or a limited attack by a regional power—to four more ambitious options that focus on the possible threat posed by a resurgent Russia. These include projecting NATO air power or German-based ground forces eastward to defend the Central European states; moving stocks of equipment; and stationing a limited number of NATO forces forward. The CBO's cost estimates for the five options over a 15-year period, 1996 to 2010, range from $61 billion to $125 billion. Of that total, the United States should expect to pay between $5 billion and $19 billion.

The cost calculations in the RAND study are based on hopeful assumptions about Europe's strategic environment. The study's authors, Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, who were among the original proponents of NATO expansion, contend that enlargement's costs will be "modest" for several reasons. Most notably, "NATO enlargement is not currently threat-driven; rather it is part of an overall strategy of projecting stability and unifying Europe." The strategic requirements of enlargement are moderate "and will remain so barring a future deterioration in Europe's strategic environment." They argue further that an enlarged NATO can meet its requirements by upgrading Central European defenses and by preparing current NATO forces for projecting power to the region in case of crisis. "There is no requirement today for deploying large numbers of NATO combat forces in those countries," a happy situation that they observe "will help contain costs." Although they provide a spectrum of estimates ranging from $10 billion to $110 billion, they emphasize that the probable range is $30 billion to $52 billion over 10 to 15 years.

The Pentagon's report is equally upbeat. It is revealing, albeit surprising coming from the Department of Defense, that all of the major justifications cited for NATO's expansion are political and economic; military and strategic considerations are scarcely mentioned. The Pentagon insists that "enlargement will yield benefits for the United States, NATO and Europe" because adding the Central and Eastern European states to the alliance will foster democratic reforms and stability. Indeed, it "will benefit Russian security and the security of other former Soviet states."

All this will be done for a veritable pittance: "The direct enlargement costs are estimated to average $700-900 million annually, for a total of around $9-12 billion between 1997 and 2009." Restructuring new members' forces would add $10 billion to $13 billion, and improving members' regional reinforcement capabilities would add another $8 billion to $10 billion, for a total of $27 billion to $35 billion. The Pentagon report's total cost estimate,

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therefore, is the rosiest of the three.

THE DIFFERENCE IS RUSSIA

There are several reasons for the wide range of cost estimates in the three studies. Political considerations probably affected the Pentagon report's methodology. That was certainly implied by a U.S. official's off-the-record comment following the report's release: "Everybody realized the main priority [of the Pentagon estimate] was to keep costs down to reassure Congress, as well as the Russians . . . There was a strong political imperative to low-ball the figures."

The three analyses also reflect different strategic assumptions. A crucial premise of the low RAND and Pentagon estimates is that NATO is an alliance without an enemy. Indeed, that was President Bill Clinton's refrain at the May 1997 signing in Paris of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Since there is no enemy, it follows that there is no need to build or deploy additional forces, despite NATO's expanded territorial jurisdiction. There is an internal contradiction in that argument, however. If there is no credible threat, either short-term or long-term, to the security of the Central and Eastern European nations, why expand NATO? The rote response is that enlargement is designed to guard against instability. But citing instability as the primary problem facing post–Cold War Europe begs the question of who is likely to cause it. The Russophobia openly expressed by Central and Eastern European leaders and the implied promise to expand NATO membership in the next round to countries bordering Russia strongly suggest that advocates of enlargement have a particular adversary in mind.

The CBO's analysts are more candid about the strategic rationale for enlargement. They considered Russia at least a potential adversary and consequently produced a more realistic, and higher, estimate. Yet even that assumption is too conservative. Alliance leaders are already contemplating a second round of invitations to join the organization as early as 1999. The costs of incorporating the backward states and armies of such countries as Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia into NATO—not to mention providing a credible defense of the Baltic republics—will be staggering. If those factors are considered, even the high-end CBO estimate of $125 billion might well have to be doubled.

The three RAND scholars contend that the CBO's estimates "are mostly driven by a postulated NATO strategy of preparing for war against Russia." In contrast, their own approach "is anchored in the premise of avoiding confrontation with Russia, not preparing for a new Russian threat." That comes perilously close to wishing a problem out of existence. To be sure, Russia is not the only conceivable threat to the security of the Central European states. Hungary, in particular, could have problems with three neighbors—Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia—over the treatment of Hungarian minorities in those countries. Nevertheless, if a serious military threat emerges, it is almost certain to come from Russia. The RAND analysts have a tremendous incentive not to consider that possibility, for even a partially recovered Russia could deploy sizable military assets on its western frontier (and perhaps in Belarus as well). The costs of countering that development and providing NATO's new members with effective, credible protection would hardly be modest.

The RAND and Pentagon analysts are not the only ones ignoring the Russia

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problem. William Odom, former head of the National Security Agency, recently argued that "if NATO desires, it can expand at trivial costs. Spain's joining NATO in 1982 imposed no significant costs on the alliance." But no power even remotely posed a direct security threat to Spain. There was and is little prospect of a Moroccan or Tunisian force landing on the Iberian coast. Given the history of Russia's relations with its neighbors, the same kind of quiescent security environment cannot be counted on in Eastern Europe.

Like the RAND study, the Pentagon report provides no analysis of the probable strategic deployment of Russian forces during the critical 15-year period following the first round of enlargement. The optimists argue that today's Russia is weak, its military forces are in disarray, and its economic modernization does not allow for Soviet-era military expenditures. Those assumptions are foolish, both politically and strategically. Russia's political future is uncertain. Even if the optimists were correct, why would a reformed and democratic Russia relinquish its aspirations to be a great European power? Liberal democratic states are not immune to concerns about defense and deterrence, and they are sometimes even inclined to pursue military expansion in an anarchic and unpredictable international system.

FOOTING THE BILL

The three studies' estimates of cost allocations among new and existing alliance members are as divergent as their estimates of the total cost of enlargement. Once again, the CBO's is the most realistic.

The CBO contends that U.S. costs might be manageable, "but only if the Visegrad nations themselves bear a substantial portion of the costs of expansion." According to the CBO, the Visegrad states would be expected to pay 70 percent of the costs, the United States, other current members, and NATO's Security Investment Program contributing 10 percent each. The CBO cautions, however, that "existing NATO members may be reluctant to provide" their share of the costs of expansion.

Even the CBO's estimates of burden-sharing seem unduly optimistic. The belief that the new members should be able to absorb costs of close to $42 billion between 1996 and 2010 overlooks the International Monetary Fund's rules and the Maastricht Treaty's expectations. The IMF requires former Warsaw Pact states to invest in economic infrastructure, and the Maastricht Treaty will accept members only on the basis of their conformity to its rigorous fiscal standards. Hungary and the Czech Republic are already experiencing serious budget crunches and are seeking ways to cut spending to meet IMF demands. Where, then, will the money come from to expand their military budgets?

The projected cost allocations in the CBO study, though, are paragons of realism compared with the RAND study's assumptions. The RAND scholars fancifully conclude that America's share of the cost of their preferred $42 billion force projection strategy would range from just $420 million to $1.4 billion. But that estimate is contingent on "how large a role Washington wants to play politically and militarily in East-Central Europe and in Europe as a whole." The Pentagon report concludes similarly that the United States would have to contribute approximately $200 million annually, and that the cumulative total would not exceed $2 billion. These estimates don't even pass the straight face test.

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Of all the assumptions in these studies, the most questionable is that new members will absorb most of the expenses. The CBO estimates that for the new members to bring their military forces up to NATO standards, they would have to increase their combined defense spending from the present 2.2 percent of GDP to about 3.6 percent of GDP. There is no evidence of public support in those countries for undertaking such a burden, even if it were theoretically affordable. U.S. Information Agency polls taken in 1995 and 1997 found that a majority of respondents in the prospective member countries opposed membership in NATO if it entailed increasing military spending at the expense of social programs.

Prospects for generous funding by the current European members of NATO are no better. Most of those countries have slashed their military spending, in some cases even more than the United States, since the end of the Cold War. Nowhere in the RAND or Pentagon studies do the authors explain why such pronounced trends will be reversed to fund NATO's enlargement. There is in fact every reason to believe that there would be pervasive public resistance in Western Europe to any proposal to boost military spending. Indeed, the public in several countries seems preoccupied with thwarting efforts to trim their bloated welfare programs, as the victory of the French Socialists in the spring 1997 parliamentary elections demonstrated.

It is naive to assume that there will be sufficient public support for increased military outlays to bring the Central European states into NATO's fold. One would not envy the political prospects of any Western European government that made such a proposal while attempting to cut popular domestic entitlements. Given the financial crunch afflicting Western Europe, the conclusion reached by Walther Stuetzle, a former senior defense planner for the German government, may well prove accurate: "So who will pick up the tab? I think that it will have to be the United States."

A DANGEROUS BLUFF

Most proponents of new NATO missions in Eastern Europe act as if there is little prospect that the mutual defense promises embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will ever have to be honored, even as they insist that those security commitments will deter aggression and enhance the region's stability. Expansion based on such an assumption is little more than an irresponsible bluff that Russia, given its extensive political, economic, and security interests in Eastern Europe, might someday be tempted to call.

The only way to minimize the likelihood of such a challenge would be to deploy robust NATO forces in the vulnerable front-line states. But the RAND scholars, the Pentagon analysts, and other enlargement supporters blithely assume that no such deployments will be necessary. According to their logic, the mere paper declaration of protection by the United States and the existing NATO members will be sufficient. This is not strategy, but a worrisome case of self-delusion that may end up costing the United States more than dollars and cents.

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Greece and Turkey

Can They Mend Fences?

Marcia Christoff Kurop

Relations with Turkey remain the ultimate test of Greece's ability to chart a foreign policy that best serves its interests rather than simply inflames old passions over the two countries' disputes in the Aegean Sea and on the island of Cyprus. Their long-standing hostility, marked by mutual suspicion and distrust, is of more than parochial concern given the strategic importance of the region, lying at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe. Compared with Greece's past regional controversies, its disputes with Turkey are more vast and complicated—political problems in essence, but political problems underscored and overwhelmed by historical bad blood, incessant second-guessing of motives, and high-pitched rhetoric that plays well in each side's press. These two countries, for all their past intermingling and cross-cultural ties, are simply different animals, psychologically and politically.

In time, the prospects for improving relations may grow because of positive developments on the Greek side. A change of government, a new awareness of the benefits of European integration, and improved relations with Balkan neighbors all contribute to a more constructive Greek attitude.

Since the election of Kostas Simitis as prime minister in January 1996, the somewhat aggressive image and tenor of contemporary Greek politics, embodied by the late prime minister, Andreas Papandreou, have changed, and with them many obstructive aspects of the country's domestic and foreign policy. Simitis, not without criticism or controversy, has tried to rid Greek politics of the charismatic, sometimes brazen type of leadership that saw domestic and foreign policy veer precariously between populist sentiment and long-term strategic interests. At last Greece may have grown into political maturity, which would serve its goal of gaining a more secure foothold in Europe.

For the first time Greece understands that it is part of Europe and that its political and economic success is wholly dependent

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Marcia Christoff Kurop is currently at work on a book on Muslim intellectuals. She is a former special correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal Europe* based in Sofia, Bulgaria, and Thessaloníki, Greece, and U.N. Correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor.*

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on the extent to which it chooses to cultivate its relationship with the European Union. This realization has alleviated Greece's pronounced insecurity over its dual European and Balkan identity, which bred a defensive, sometimes antagonistic attitude toward its regional neighbors and an "illegitimate child" status within the EU. The two pillars of the European orientation are Greece's commitment to the Maastricht Treaty's standards for economic convergence and its attempts to foster better regional ties.

Such new thinking has appeared on several fronts. Greece's two main political parties, Simitis' Panhellenic Socialist Movement and New Democracy, representing, respectively, the mainstream left and right of Greek politics, have generally aligned their domestic and foreign policy platforms. Opposition to Simitis is confined to a small parliamentary bloc of Papandreou die-hards and has consisted mainly of criticism of current economic austerity measures and the prime minister's more liberal outlook toward Turkey. The appointment of younger, multilingual cabinet members such as Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos also reflects the European push of the Simitis government. Pangalos represents an internationally minded new view of Turkey, even in the midst of the two countries' deteriorating relations. "We Greeks," Pangalos said early last year, "must get over the old knee-jerk reaction that if something is bad for Turkey, it is good for us."

Long the recklessly manipulated tool of the country's politicians, the Greek economy has improved greatly. A new austerity program to bring it within Maastricht guidelines has lowered inflation in two years from 12 percent to 6 percent, while the growth rate has held steady at about 3 percent. Government interventionism has not been abandoned, but there is broad awareness that a free-market economy must replace the combined legacy of ubiquitous bureaucratic involvement and an entrenched black market estimated at 30 percent of the economy.

Under Simitis, Greece has improved relations with Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, tempering the reputation it gained during the disintegration of Yugoslavia as the "bully of the Balkans." Just six years ago Greece was a prominent obstructer of Macedonia's emergence as a state. Today it is the largest foreign investor in Macedonia and neighboring Bulgaria. Greece has signed a 20-year "special ties" agreement with Albania and contributed a large force to the U.N.-sponsored humanitarian relief effort in the wake of Albania's economic collapse and civil breakdown early last year. As for Serbia and the Serbian entity in Bosnia, Greece has noticeably cooled the economic and political relationship that developed over the course of the Bosnian war. Greece's newfound detachment represents a lessening of fears that Turkey will resurrect destabilizing balance-of-power designs on the Balkans through ties to Muslim and Turkish populations in the region.

The outstanding obstacle to Greece's more concentrated economic and political attention to Europe remains its differences with Turkey. For example, Greece still spends $3 billion on defense, mostly in the Aegean, the most per capita of any NATO member. At the summer NATO summit in Madrid last year, the two countries indulged in goodwill diplomatic gestures. But subsequent bellicosity, primarily over Cyprus, prompted NATO

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

chief Javier Solana to personally calm tensions between the two countries in early October. The continuing hostility fuels the kind of nationalist zeal Simitis is eager to defuse.

ROUGH WATERS IN THE AEGEAN

In the Aegean Sea, the two countries differ over airspace regulations, island sovereignty, and rights to oil and gas on the continental shelf. Contentiousness over these issues is heightened by international legal rulings that are irritatingly noncommittal and therefore endlessly disputed. Since prospecting in the region came under dispute between the two sides in the early 1970s, it has been perennially referred to the International Court of Justice, which has never leaned strongly to one side or the other. Turkey has consistently avoided such mediation. In 1975 it assembled a non-NATO force, the Fourth Aegean Army, for stationing along the Anatolian coast facing the Greek islands. Then in 1976 it issued oil exploration licenses in a contested region of the eastern Aegean and sent a research vessel, *Sismik I,* to prospect for oil. When some of the prospecting took place near the Greek islands of Lemnos and Lesbos, Greece protested and requested U.N. intervention. The world body told the two countries to work it out between themselves. And the International Court of Justice rejected Greece's request for mediation, arguing that Turkey's prospecting was not a violation of Greece's territorial rights.

In 1987 Greece announced it would take control of the Canadian North Aegean Petroleum Company, which had exploited the Prinos oil field off the Greek island of Thásos. The company had earlier made plans to prospect outside Greece's territorial waters—an uncontroversial move in Turkey's view as long as the company was under Canadian control. But after the Greek announcement, Turkey issued permits to the state-owned

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Turkish Petroleum Corporation for oil exploration outside Turkey's territorial waters, again off the islands of Lesbos and Lemnos, and also offshore from Samothrace. Prime Minister Papandreou responded by warning that Greek armed forces would "teach the Turks a hard lesson." Turkey reacted by declaring that any Greek attempt to harass a Turkish research vessel would meet with retaliation. The controversy was defused when Prime Minister Turgut Özal restricted the research to Turkish territorial waters and Papandreou returned the issue to the International Court of Justice. It has languished there ever since.

FOREVER CYPRUS

On Cyprus, the continuing standoff between the Greek and Turkish communities is coming under additional stress from the Greek Cypriot government's efforts to join the EU and its scheduled acquisition of $425 million worth of Russian medium-range surface-to-air missiles. These developments represent a profound shakeup of the island's slumbering 20-year status quo. Cyprus' missile purchase, as well as its recent defense pact with Greece, are signs of a government that is eager to consolidate its military position along with its likely political position within the EU. Whether Cyprus enters as half a country or not, the Greek Cypriot government enters as the only recognized government on the island, and a wealthy one at that. Turkey, as the sponsor and sole recognizer of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has said that deployment of the missiles and Greek Cypriot entrance into the EU before Turkey would be grounds for war and further "integration" of the northern sector of the island with Turkey.

Both sides are vying for the attention of the United States, now seen as the main broker on the island. Turkey hopes that a favorable American attitude will reinforce its near-sovereign status on the north end of Cyprus and sway the EU to enlarge Turkey's association beyond its customs union, which Turkey entered in 1996. Greece worries both that the United States will lean toward Turkey's position and that the EU is moving toward implicit acknowledgment of an official status for the Turkish Cypriot government.

Greek Cypriot officials also worry that the U.N. reunification plan drafted in 1993 implicitly recognizes Turkish Cypriot self-rule even while outwardly supporting Greek Cypriot claims to overall sovereignty. The proposal for a "bi-communal, bi-zonal federation" of north and south—allowing for separate flags, separate foreign policies, the presence of Greek or Turkish troops on each side of the island, as well as separate, community-based voting majorities in the proposed legislature—is viewed by Greeks, in the words of the scholar Van Coufoudakis, as the "de jure recognition of a de facto partition."

The other, more unwieldy dimension of the Cyprus issue concerns U.S. strategic objectives in the area, which Greece reads as aligned with Turkey's objective of monitoring activities in the Middle East. Greek officials point to Turkey's purported interest in a fortified base on northern Cyprus or elsewhere in the Mediterranean. And they look askance at Israeli-Turkish cooperation, which includes a military alliance, a joint venture to develop long-range missiles, and Israel's agreement to modernize 54 Turkish F-4 jets. Of further concern are Turkey's demands to participate in a just-announced Israeli-Cypriot-

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Italian consortium to build an $80 million undersea Mediterranean telecommunications cable, and the construction next to a major Turkish military base of a Mediterranean port at Ceyhan that would link up with an oil pipeline through Turkey from Central Asia and possibly Russia. Ironically, Turkey is wooing Russia at a time when Greece is delaying a project that would pipe Russian oil through Bulgaria to a Greek port.

Despite the differences and irritations, Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos has supported Turkey's candidacy for EU membership, saying last March that "Turkey certainly belongs to Europe." Pangalos' remarks heightened international attention to Greek-Turkish relations and shifted the sensitive issue of Turkey's "Europeanness" to Western Europe, a move intended to relieve Greece of what it has seen as its role as a buffer state against Western Europe's "Eastern" fears and prejudices. The foreign minister's rhetorical gesture also kept alive discussion of Turkey's possible EU membership so that Turkey would not grow resentful and refuse to negotiate with Greece. Pangalos simply announced the obvious: Greece's political and economic interests would be more easily served by a Turkey in the EU than a Turkey outside it. Pangalos was also recognizing Turkey's pivotal position for the United States on the Black Sea, adjacent to Central Asia and the Middle East.

WOOING THE UNITED STATES

Greece has seen its international role as a bridge, but sometimes as a barrier, between East and West and between Europe and the Balkans. Greece does not want to be pigeonholed in that role, and it is fearful that might happen because of the United States' awareness of Turkey's strategic importance. For the future, Greece sees its strongest political prospects to be in the EU and its most reliable security arrangements to be with the United States.

Thus Greece is looking to enhance its ties with the United States, emphasizing its consistent support of U.S. policy and international law and its domestic stability, the latter being notably absent in Turkey. Still, stabilizing, if not resolving, differences with Turkey is a prerequisite if Greece is to achieve its larger foreign policy objectives.

To that end, a nonaggression pact between Greece and Turkey overseen by the United States should be considered. Implicitly, the two countries' NATO membership is understood to be the guarantor of their nonaggression. However, a specific nonaggression pact would relieve NATO of having to reproach one side or the other in the process of mediating between them. In the past, such mediation has elicited words of defiance from both sides.

Thinking regionally, Greece is well equipped to play a significant role in eastern Mediterranean security arrangements, something that NATO has identified as a crucial concern. Greece is currently engaged in a five-year, $8 billion upgrade of its defense forces. Greece already has excellent base facilities, as it demonstrated during the Lebanese civil war when the U.S. base at Hellinikon was used as the primary Middle East evacuation center. Nea Makri in Marathon shelters a Mediterranean communications center, as well as a large fleet of NATO submarines. The Souda Bay air base in Crete is a supply facility for the U.S. Sixth Fleet and has been a center for monitoring Libya.

What's more, despite recent agreements on European security and arms reduction,

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the potential for open conflict in the eastern Mediterranean is closer to the surface than ever before. First, there is a huge quantity of armaments there that lies outside the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. And U.S., former Soviet, and European naval armed forces remain outside CFE provisions. Moreover, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria all possess ballistic missiles of varying range and accuracy and are seeking to acquire better systems.

As for energy and oil supplies, assurances in the region are even more important and call for a strong Greek naval presence. Supplies coming through the Suez Canal remain a vital concern, as does the potential opening of a pipeline from Iraq to Syria. The eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf form a single entity with Turkey and Egypt providing a continental and maritime bridge between Europe and the Middle East. Of the materiel needed to support coalition operations in the Persian Gulf during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 90 percent arrived via the Mediterranean.

Development of Greek-Turkish economic relations may be the most important element in the long-term improvement of relations between the two countries. Economic relations have not taken off to the extent one would expect given the markets and relatively cheap goods available on either side. Still, there are signs that such endeavors are about to grow, as evidenced during two meetings of Greek and Turkish businesspeople in November and December hosted, respectively, by U.S. Cyprus envoy Richard Holbrooke and former Undersecretary of State Matthew Nimetz. Most important, the relationship between upper-echelon business elites in Turkey (the powerful Koc and Sabanci groups, which already have some dealings with Greece in the cement trade) and Turkish military leaders is very close. A strong business relationship with Greece would encourage Turkish business leaders to press for better political relations with their neighbor. The consequences would be as swift as they would be positive. For what Greece wants from Turkey above all else is some sign that they can at last do business together.

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Christian Democracy Resurgent

Raising the Banner of Faith in Eastern Europe

Adrian Karatnycky

Throughout its tumultuous modern history, Poland has been a bellwether of change in Eastern Europe. In 1956, unrest among Polish workers signaled growing discontent in post-Stalinist Eastern Europe; in 1980, the birth of the Solidarity trade union began the unraveling of the Soviet bloc; and in 1989, Poland spearheaded Eastern Europe's rejection of communism as a Solidarity-led government took power.

Last September, when Polish voters ousted a coalition of ex-communists and sealed the comeback of Solidarity, they may have established another landmark—the emergence of Christian democracy as a significant political force in Central and Eastern Europe. The election brought in a right-of-center dramatically different from Western European counterparts, many of which have evolved into secular movements. The Polish Christian democrats have little desire to separate their politics and their religious beliefs. They appeal explicitly to voters' Roman Catholic religious identity and announce their own adherence to "Christian values" that encompass the sanctity of human life at conception; the need for moral instruction, including through the educational system; and the belief that the economy and work are part of God's design for humanity. They are staunch loyalists in the camp of the Polish pope, John Paul II—whose turn away from the welfare state and endorsement of the free market gave impetus to Solidarity's decision to form a coalition government with the backers of economic liberalism. Developments in Poland parallel a resurgence of Christian democracy in other Central and Eastern European countries with Catholic majorities or significant Catholic minorities. And a revitalized Christian democracy may have resonance farther west in Europe—at any rate, the pope hopes so. During his pilgrimage to Poland last summer, John Paul linked the post–Cold War reunification of Europe to the reassertion of its Christian roots.

BUILDING ON FAITH

On September 21, 1997, the Solidarity Electoral Action bloc (AWS) captured a majority of seats in the Polish Senate and came relatively close in the lower house. In mid-October the AWS and the liberal,

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market-oriented Freedom Union agreed to form a government anchored by a stable parliamentary majority. One reason for the reversal in the fortunes of right-of-center forces after their electoral defeat in 1993 was the Solidarity trade union's crafting of a broad-based coalition of nationalist, conservative, liberal, and populist parties. But the AWS would not have won over voters without a message that unified a broad spectrum of groups.

Marian Krzaklewski, founder and leader of the AWS bloc and chairman of the Solidarity trade union, established that connection through his appeal to Catholic tradition under the banner of Christian democracy. The first paragraph of the AWS campaign manifesto declared: "We can build a modern, just, and self-sustaining sovereign state; a state founded on patriotic and Christian values, on love and freedom. These values have formed our core identity for a thousand years." The appeal to religious identity was at the core of Krzaklewski's electoral strategy.

To understand the AWS, one must understand its founder, a 47-year-old academic with a doctorate in computer science. Krzaklewski joined Solidarity in 1980 and helped organize its branch at the Silesian regional affiliate of the Polish Academy of Sciences. During the 1980s he worked in the banned union's underground network, and in 1990 he was elected chairman of the national Solidarity union, succeeding Lech Wałęsa. Krzaklewski's home, the Silesian coal country, is a deeply religious region whose miners are drawn to tradition and characterized by stubbornness. Their suspicion of outsiders made Silesia a hotbed of opposition to communist rule, especially after the imposition of martial law in December 1981. For someone from the intelligentsia like Krzaklewski to win the miners' trust was possible only because he shared their intensely felt anticommunist and Catholic beliefs.

In a campaign autobiography, *Time for Action,* Krzaklewski writes of his debt to the Catholic Church. He evokes the heroism of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, a tribune of resistance to communist oppression, and places the church's social thought at the center of Solidarity's ethos. Krzaklewski infuses his Christian democratic politics with transcendent importance:

> A struggle is being played out over what values will triumph; it is a struggle of values on which Poland has always based its existence. But this struggle is not being waged solely for the good of Poland, but for the good of Europe and the entire world. Is it possible that Poland will decide the fate of a new evangelization?

By 1993 Krzaklewski had left his mark on Polish politics, but when Solidarity returned to power in 1997 it was with a different orientation and different partners. Back in 1993, Krzaklewski and Solidarity's parliamentary allies, pressed by workers unhappy with the rigors of market reform, brought down the free-market government of Hanna Suchocka, ushering in four years under the ex-communist left. Today, however, two architects of the economic "shock therapy" that Solidarity once disparaged, Freedom Union chairman Leszek Balcerowicz and former Prime Minister Suchocka, are, respectively, deputy prime minister and justice minister in the AWS-led government. This remarkable political reconciliation results from two factors: acknowledgment by many workers that Balcerowicz's approach created a vibrant economy with annual

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growth of more than 5 percent, and the evolution in the Catholic Church's thinking about the free market.

MIXING RELIGION AND POLITICS

Pope John Paul II's 1981 encyclical *Laborem Exercens* (On Human Work) was sympathetic to a social democratic third way between market capitalism and socialism. Influenced by his teachings, Eastern Europe's Christian democratic movements in the early years of the post-communist transformation resisted rigorous market reforms. By the time the pope penned his 1991 encyclical *Centisimus Annus,* however, his thinking had changed.

In part, this was because the pope had witnessed the stagnation of state-dominated economies in the Soviet bloc and observed the new dynamism of free-market economies. In an interview in November, the religious scholar and social scientist Michael Novak of the American Enterprise Institute suggested that early in his papacy John Paul "thought of capitalism as impersonal and material." Then, however, "it began to occur to him that capital can also be human capital, resting on skill and initiative." In Novak's view, by the early 1990s the pope had "created a new middle ground, based on a free economy, a free polity, and a moral sphere rooted in liberty." "The free market," John Paul asserted in *Centisimus Annus,* "is the most efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs." He also shifted ground on the welfare state, declaring, "By intervening directly and depriving society of its responsibility, the Social Assistance State leads to a loss of human energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies . . . dominated by bureaucratic . . . thinking."

The pope's new vision made it much easier for Christian democrats throughout Central and Eastern Europe to move away from their support for a large state role in economic life and join forces with free-market liberals. One sees the results in the governing coalition in Poland and other recent alliances in the region.

A key event in the Polish center-right's victory was the pope's fifth visit to his native country in May and June, just three months before the election. More than six million Poles attended the papal Masses and listened to John Paul's homilies. In his hometown of Cracow, more than 1.5 million gathered to hear him. Unlike on his 1991 visit, the pope neither sounded overtly partisan nor berated his fellow Poles for "excessive consumerism." While the pilgrimage focused criticism on Poland's left-backed liberal abortion laws, John Paul's main emphasis was the reinvigoration of Poland's Christian traditions. Krzaklewski and the AWS received a boost from the visit, and in the following months plastered Poland with posters depicting the pope's pilgrimage.

In mounting the comeback, the AWS adopted many of the tactics of the American right. Like American conservatives, it benefited from the support of Christian radio broadcasters. It organized "right to life" marches jointly with the Catholic Church. It also built grassroots networks by mobilizing around referendums. In 1996 Solidarity and its right-of-center allies worked on behalf of a referendum that would have forced a new wave of privatizations and distributed stock to millions of ordinary citizens. That referendum won 94 percent support but failed because of low turnout. In early 1997 Krzaklewski led an unsuccessful

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church-backed campaign for a "no" vote on a referendum that ended up approving a secular constitution by a slender majority. Such campaigns did not gain their immediate objectives, but they got Solidarity and right-of-center parties working together, and functioned as test runs for the September 1997 elections.

The AWS's first days in power revealed a moderately conservative agenda. The coalition named as prime minister Jerzy Buzek, a chemistry professor who was Krzaklewski's academic mentor. Buzek, a political moderate, is highly regarded across the broad spectrum of Polish anti-communists for his service in the 1980s as leader of Solidarity's underground network in Upper Silesia. The elevation of Buzek, a member of Poland's 90,000-strong Lutheran community, ensures that Krzaklewski—who heads the AWS bloc in parliament and retains the chairmanship of the Solidarity trade union—will remain the country's premier Catholic politician.

The shaping of a modern, centrist Christian democratic identity for the AWS is complicated by far-right forces within the bloc. Most problematic are 20 members of parliament backed by the traditionalist Radio Maryja, named after the Virgin Mary. The highly popular station, which has a national reach, mixes a fundamentalist Catholic and nationalist message with a measure of economic populism. Radio Maryja endorsed candidates who support the "Christianization" of Poland's public education system (while most AWS deputies would like to ensure religious instruction in public schools), back a complete ban on abortion, and want to see what they say is Poland's expressly Catholic nature proclaimed in the constitution. These conservatives, however, may have limited room for maneuver. The Catholic Church has distanced itself from Radio Maryja's radical agenda and, if necessary, will press the zealous fundamentalists to cooperate with the AWS government. Moreover, the new governing AWS–Freedom Union majority is likely, on its own, to move in the direction of some fundamentalist demands by tightening Poland's liberalized abortion laws and strengthening religious instruction in the schools.

Nor is tension inevitable in the ruling coalition between the Christian AWS and the secular Freedom Union, as some analysts have suggested. In fact, the Freedom Union has Christian democrats within its ranks, notably former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. And in 1996 two-thirds of the Freedom Union's bloc in the lower house of parliament joined a losing attempt to thwart passage of a bill liberalizing Poland's strict abortion laws.

ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE

The new cooperation between liberal and Christian democratic parties in Eastern Europe, along with the success of free-market policies in the region, helps explain why broad-based center-right coalition movements are again winning elections and taking power away from the ex-communist left. Then, too, throughout Central and Eastern Europe and possibly beyond, Catholic values appear to have fresh relevance among people who feel that statist socialism created a spiritual vacuum.

In Romania, events are unfolding along the lines of the Polish pattern. The ruling Democratic Convention, voted into power in November 1996, is a coalition of the center-right dominated by the National Peasants' Christian Democratic Party.

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

ARCHIVE PHOTOS

Marian Krzaklewski in Częstochowa, site of Poland's holiest shrine

The new Christian Democratic–backed prime minister, former Bucharest Mayor Victor Ciorbea, like Poland's Krzaklewski, began his post-communist political career in 1989 as a trade union leader.

In Hungary, polls conducted last October showed significant support for culturally conservative political movements. The nationalist Independent Smallholders' Party, with 20 percent support among voters, is seeking to establish an electoral bloc with the Christian Democratic People's Party. Equally significant, other leading parties of the center-right, including the former governing Hungarian Democratic Forum, are seeking to position themselves as heirs to a Christian democratic conservative tradition. Even Fidesz, a party established by secular liberals under the age of 30 (which has 27 percent support, versus 30 percent for the Socialist Party), is sounding conservative themes. Fidesz has embraced values-oriented politics that are likely to be reinforced by the recent entry into its ranks of parliamentarians from the Christian Democratic People's Party.

In Slovakia, a broad-based coalition modeled on Romania's Democratic Convention and Poland's AWS recently formed under the leadership of Ján Carnogurský's Christian Democratic Party. Polls in October showed the new Slovak Democratic Coalition running ahead of authoritarian Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar's governing Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.

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In Lithuania, a resurgent centrist Christian Democratic Party is cooperating with the ruling nationalist Homeland Union–Conservative Party, which espouses traditional Catholic values and has a Christian democratic wing.

During his trip last summer, the pope delivered a homily in the Polish city of Gniezno before the presidents of five predominantly Catholic countries—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia—and two with large Catholic communities, Germany and Ukraine. In a clear attempt to invigorate a Christian democratic revival throughout Europe, John Paul emphasized:

> There will be no European unity unless there is a community of the spirit. This most basic foundation of unity was bequeathed Europe by Christianity, through its Gospel, through its understanding of man, and its contribution to the evolution of the works of men and nations . . . The framework of European identity is built on Christianity. And the current absence of spiritual unity emerges primarily from the very crisis of Christian self-awareness.

The spiritual hunger that attracts voters to political parties oriented toward religious values is not confined to the former communist world. In the United States, politics has been influenced since 1980 by the resurgence of faith-based activism. And a growing interest in religious faith may help explain the unexpectedly large crowds during the pope's visit to France in August. The grand ambition of Marian Krzaklewski—the victory of religion in a struggle of values in Poland, in Europe, and around the world—does not seem so far-fetched. Events in Poland may reverberate far beyond the country's borders, a harbinger of reinvigorated Christian democracy in Eastern Europe. That would be as important a development in modern European history as the emergence of Christian democratic parties in postwar Italy and Germany.

The nature of the new Eastern European Christian democracy is not settled, but it appears to be moving in a centrist direction without surrendering the language of faith-based values. It promises to be an unusual hybrid, embodying the political moderation of postwar Western European Christian democratic movements while retaining a close link to Catholic doctrine on social and cultural issues. By appealing to tradition, Eastern European Christian democracy is creating a stable frame of reference for people who have experienced wrenching economic and political change. At the same time, Christian democracy is extinguishing the appeal of ultranationalist parties, which had drawn support from electorates suffering the anomie of social transformation.

Is a search for greater meaning under way throughout the West? Is a new center-right coalescing? The evidence is not conclusive. But the resurgence of Christian democracy suggests that new political patterns are emerging in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. If so, Marian Krzaklewski's quiet Christian democratic revolution may portend something as significant as the democratic revolution launched in 1980 by a Polish shipyard worker named Lech Wałęsa.

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Language Follows Power

The Linguistic Free Market in the Old Soviet Bloc

Marshall R Singer

Along with political and economic domination, a great power exerts tremendous cultural influence over its colonies or satellites. Language offers a particularly dramatic illustration, as with the linguistic quilt the French and the British stitched across Africa. When empires decline, so does their cultural sway, including the use of their language. For insight into changing power relations after communism's fall, listen to what the former Soviet bloc is speaking.

People's attachment to language and the culture it embodies—or resentment of them, in the case of a conqueror's tongue and culture—runs deep. But whether the motivation is emotional or pragmatic, ardent nationalism or the desire to get along, any language people choose for themselves and their children is a function of their perception of that language's standing in the world and of the relative importance of the nation or nations that use it.

As Moscow's power waned across the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, and on the periphery of empire, so did the linguistic hold of Russian. Six years after the demise of the U.S.S.R., among the 15 erstwhile republics and 20 countries of the old Soviet bloc, Russian is the official language only in Russia and—after the referendum on the June 1997 union treaty with Russia—in Belarus, where it has equal status with Belarusan. By comparison, almost four decades after the collapse of the British and French empires, English or French is still one of the official languages in more than half the former dependencies, and many use *only* English or French.[1]

Moreover, as the newly independent and the once nominally but now genuinely autonomous states turn to powers other than Russia for their economic, military, and other needs, their citizens are increasingly speaking those powers' languages, along with their own native

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tongues. Russian is no longer the language that elites and people concerned with getting ahead are encouraging their children to study. English is, followed by German, with French often a distant third. Language use serves as a barometer of the severity of the Soviet collapse, the attraction of Europe, and the allure of English, which is emerging as the contemporary lingua franca of the West and large reaches of the rest of the world.

THE REPUBLICS TURN THEIR BACKS

Russian was never thought of as an international language until the Soviet Union came to be considered a superpower during the Cold War. In czarist Russia, aristocrats and educated people spoke French, frequently as their only language. Pushkin learned Russian from his nanny; his parents spoke to him solely in French.

From the time of their incorporation into the Russian empire, all the lands that later became Soviet republics had Russian as at least one of their official languages. Sometimes the Soviet government made efforts to support the native languages; more often it suppressed them. But although Russian was mandatory in schools in the Soviet Union, its adoption was far from wholehearted. In half the republics, less than 50 percent of the population learned to speak it. Often it was more the language of the cities than the countryside. Party officials, local managers of factories and collectives, and people tied to the modern sectors of the economy had to know it, but not necessarily farmers. Russian was spoken most in the richest republics and least in the poorest. In many of the republics where knowledge of Russian was and is widespread, the proportion of ethnic Russians in the population was high or (as in Belarus and Ukraine) the national language was very similar to Russian.

As Moscow's hold weakened, nationalism arose throughout the Soviet Union, encouraging among the non-Russian nationalities a rejection of everything Russian. The effect was especially pronounced in the areas of language and culture, says Tatiana Marchenko, a senior fellow at the Russian Academy of Science. "The Russian language is disappearing from the lives of the younger generations" outside Russia, she observes. She points to the diminishing number of schools and universities where instruction is in Russian.[2]

The same holds true for book publishing and television. While overall releases of new books were down everywhere in the last years of the Soviet Union because of paper shortages and price increases, publication of native-language books rose, according to Marchenko. Between 1986 and 1990,

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[1]It is true that in many former colonies English or French was the only language spoken in all parts and thus has been used to hold the country together after independence. Russian does not play a similar role in any of the non-Russian former republics. Also, all the states of the Soviet bloc and the republics of the U.S.S.R. were states (of sorts) before the Russians arrived.

[2]Tatiana Marchenko, "The New Social and Cultural Situation and the Ouster of Russian-Speaking Population from the Former Union Republics," in *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics,* ed. Emil Payin et al., Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 147.

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except in Ukraine and Belarus, the number of foreign-language texts published also increased—at least 300 percent in Moldavia (now Moldova), Azerbaijan, and Kazakstan, 150 percent in the Central Asian republics, and 20 to 30 percent in Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia. For books translated from Russian into native languages, startling reductions were reported between 1986 and 1990 in the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics and in Moldova; in Lithuania, Marchenko says, translations of Russian children's books fell 95 percent over the same period. In television, airtime once assigned to Russian-language broadcasts is now devoted to broadcasts in national languages. But because Russian TV is frequently better than the programming in local languages, recent polls show that many people in the former republics favor at least some hours of Russian programming.

THE TIES THAT BIND LEAST

While Russian was never the official language of any of the countries of Eastern Europe, it was the second language, spoken in the higher government, military, and intellectual circles. Most schools in Eastern Europe taught Russian as a second language, but students frequently learned it the way American students learn foreign languages: they took courses, but most could never really speak it. It was a different story, though, if they were planning to study in the Soviet Union or had hopes of rising to the top of the Communist Party or the government. Then they had to be fairly fluent in Russian.

In countries such as Afghanistan, Cuba, and Vietnam, on the periphery of the Soviet sphere but still under heavy Russian influence, the percentage of Russian-speakers was lower but still significant.[3] Military and Communist Party officials, technicians, and others were taught or picked up the language during training in the Soviet Union or in working with Soviet advisers. Chinese President Jiang Zemin learned Russian well enough as a student and as a trainee at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in the heyday of international communism in the 1950s that Boris Yeltsin complimented him on it during Jiang's trip to Russia last November.

The data now coming in suggest that the countries that were least politically tied to the Soviet Union and had the fewest ethnic and cultural links with Russia most easily gave up the Russian language. When former Soviet bloc countries are ranked by the number of post-secondary students they send to Russia to study, 14 of the top 15 turn out to be former Soviet republics—some with very large ethnic Russian populations—while the bottom 10 are all either Eastern European or peripheral countries.[4]

English and German are displacing Russian as the second language across the Soviet bloc, for historical but even more for practical reasons like access to

[3]"Peripheral" countries also include Finland, Mongolia, and Iran, all invaded by Russia at one time or another, and North Korea.

[4]*UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1996,* Lanham: UNESCO and Bernan Press, 1997.

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business and professional opportunities. German's roots in Eastern Europe are deep. In the Baltic states, it was the language of education and of sophisticates from the Middle Ages until World War I. German was the official language throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire during its half-century of existence from 1867 to 1918. Language follows trade, and in Central Europe during the interwar years, Germany was far and away the leading trade partner of virtually every country. Today Germany is again the top trade partner of the Eastern European nations (except Slovakia, whose major partner is the Czech Republic, with which it was until recently united). Most of these countries have a strong desire to join the European Union (EU) under the joint leadership of Germany and France. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are to be considered for membership in 1999, with Estonia and Slovenia next in line. Data from the Munich branch of the Goethe Institute, which promotes German language and culture, show that German is the most widely studied foreign language in primary and secondary schools in five former Soviet bloc countries, three of which were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Of the 20 million people around the world learning German today, two-thirds are in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

But it is English that has become the common language for Eastern Europe and the Soviet bloc, as it already was for large areas of the rest of the world. English is the most widely studied foreign language in eight of the 16 countries the Goethe Institute examined, including Russia, and is the runner-up wherever it is not first. This has much to do with the fact that the United States is the sole remaining superpower. It dominates trade in many regions. It is the major supplier of arms (with English operations manuals) and training (conducted in English, if held in America) for the militaries of the world. California's Silicon Valley produces the world's most advanced computer technology, and English sites on the World Wide Web, many of them American, outnumber those in all other languages combined by an estimated 20 to 1. If a young person wants to study at a university in the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, India, Nigeria, or many other countries, she or he had better be fluent in English. Aside from all this, because English is so widely spoken as a second language, people believe that if they know it, they can get around almost anywhere they would want to go. They are not far wrong.

A RUSSIAN EDUCATION

Another indicator of the decline in Russian power and in the perceived importance of learning Russian is the number of foreign students choosing to study in Russia. Before the Soviet Union's collapse, Russian universities and technical schools, combined with government scholarships, drew the best students from the other republics. Moreover, students from Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc came on Soviet scholarships or grants from their own communist governments or were sponsored by relatives who were high-ranking officials. If these youths were to assume posi-

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tions of influence in the communist world, their backers believed, they had to learn Marxist economics and imbibe the Soviet viewpoint—preferably in Moscow or Leningrad. Students, recognizing Russia's importance in their world, aspired to do just that. No figures are available from communism's apogee, but anecdotal evidence indicates the number of foreign students studying in the Soviet Union was very large. Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow was set up for the sole purpose of accommodating students from Eastern Europe and the developing world.

There is some data from the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for 1989, when dissolution of the empire was just beginning, and much more for the 1990s. (The most recent available figures are from 1994 or 1995, depending on the country or region.) In 1989, there were 20,926 students from Africa studying in Russia; by 1994/95 the number had fallen to 3,762. Asia sent 31,600 students in 1989 and 5,900 in 1994/95, South America 3,400 in 1989 and 522 in 1994/95. Among the few individual countries for which UNESCO has data going back to 1989, Bulgaria sent 4,146 students that year and just 134 in 1994/95, the number of Polish students dropped from 2,221 to 130 over the same period, while the former East Germany sent 1,255 in 1989, compared with 96 from united Germany in 1994/95. From year to year, the falloff in the flow is dramatic. Twenty-five former Soviet bloc countries sent fewer students to Russia in 1994/95 than in 1993, while only two sent a handful more. Of the 11 countries that sent more than half their students studying abroad to Russia, all are former republics, and many have large concentrations of ethnic Russians.

Patrice Lumumba University is still functioning, but not because of government scholarships or communist solidarity. Education is cheap in Russia compared with the United States, and it is not easy to get into British, French, or Japanese universities. While a Russian education may not be as good and is not as prestigious, it is better than anything most Third World and some Eastern European students can get at home.

But if they can find a way, Eastern European families and those from elsewhere in the Soviet bloc increasingly send their children west to study business administration, computer science, medicine, and other technical subjects in which Western countries are perceived to excel. Perhaps several hundred thousand students from the former Soviet sphere are studying in Germany, other Western European countries, or the United States. Some students go elsewhere for linguistic, religious, or historical reasons, but they are the exceptions.

After the initial rejection of Russia and its language, the last few years have witnessed some movement in the opposite direction, notably in Belarus. Eastern European countries producing goods that are not competitive in Western markets may well turn back to Russia; such trade has increased in the last few years. Countries not invited to join NATO or the EU or that otherwise feel slighted by the West may look more kindly on Russia. But if the economic, military, and political power of the EU and NATO continues to

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expand in the former Soviet bloc, while Russia's declines, the use of Russian will also decline.

The relationship between power and language is summed up by the experiences of Quoc Khoi, a Vietnamese man who made an appearance in a May 7, 1995, *New York Times* article:

> Quoc Khoi carries the history of Vietnam on the tip of his tongue. As foreign powers have come and gone, Mr. Khoi, who is now in his fifties, has learned French, then Japanese, then English, then Russian. Vietnam is on its own now, and Mr. Khoi is again riding the linguistic wave of history: He is making his living teaching English.

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The New Threat of Mass Destruction

Richard K. Betts

WHAT IF MCVEIGH HAD USED ANTHRAX?

DURING THE Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were the centerpiece of foreign policy. Nuclear arms hovered in the background of every major issue in East-West competition and alliance relations. The highest priorities of U.S. policy could almost all be linked in some way to the danger of World War III and the fear of millions of casualties in the American homeland.

Since the Cold War, other matters have displaced strategic concerns on the foreign policy agenda, and that agenda itself is now barely on the public's radar screen. Apart from defense policy professionals, few Americans still lose sleep over weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After all, what do normal people feel is the main relief provided by the end of the Cold War? It is that the danger of nuclear war is off their backs.

Yet today, WMD present more and different things to worry about than during the Cold War. For one, nuclear arms are no longer the only concern, as chemical and biological weapons have come to the fore. For another, there is less danger of complete annihilation, but more danger of mass destruction. Since the Cold War is over and American and Russian nuclear inventories are much smaller, there is less chance of an apocalyptic exchange of many thousands of weapons. But the probability that some smaller number of WMD will

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be used is growing. Many of the standard strategies and ideas for coping with WMD threats are no longer as relevant as they were when Moscow was the main adversary. But new thinking has not yet congealed in as clear a form as the Cold War concepts of nuclear deterrence theory.

The new dangers have not been ignored inside the Beltway. "Counterproliferation" has become a cottage industry in the Pentagon and the intelligence community, and many worthwhile initiatives to cope with threats are under way. Some of the most important implications of the new era, however, have not yet registered on the public agenda. This in turn limits the inclination of politicians to push some appropriate programs. Even the defense establishment has directed its attention mainly toward countering threats WMD pose to U.S. military forces operating abroad rather than to the more worrisome danger that mass destruction will occur in the United States, killing large numbers of civilians.

The points to keep in mind about the new world of mass destruction are the following. First, the roles such weapons play in international conflict are changing. They no longer represent the technological frontier of warfare. Increasingly, they will be weapons of the weak—states or groups that militarily are at best second-class. The importance of the different types among them has also shifted. Biological weapons should now be the most serious concern, with nuclear weapons second and chemicals a distant third.

Second, the mainstays of Cold War security policy—deterrence and arms control—are not what they used to be. Some new threats may not be deterrable, and the role of arms control in dealing with WMD has been marginalized. In a few instances, continuing devotion to deterrence and arms control may have side effects that offset the benefits.

Third, some of the responses most likely to cope with the threats in novel ways will not find a warm welcome. The response that should now be the highest priority is one long ignored, opposed, or ridiculed: a serious civil defense program to blunt the effects of WMD if they are unleashed within the United States. Some of the most effective measures to prevent attacks within the United States may also challenge traditional civil liberties if pursued to the maximum. And the most troubling conclusion for foreign policy as a whole is that reducing the odds of attacks in the United States might require pulling back from involvement in some foreign

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conflicts. American activism to guarantee international stability is, paradoxically, the prime source of American vulnerability.

This was partly true in the Cold War, when the main danger that nuclear weapons might detonate on U.S. soil sprang from strategic engagement in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to deter attacks on U.S. allies. But engagement then assumed a direct link between regional stability and U.S. survival. The connection is less evident today, when there is no globally threatening superpower or transnational ideology to be contained—only an array of serious but entirely local disruptions. Today, as the only nation acting to police areas outside its own region, the United States makes itself a target for states or groups whose aspirations are frustrated by U.S. power.

FROM MODERN TO PRIMITIVE

When nuclear weapons were born, they represented the most advanced military applications of science, technology, and engineering. None but the great powers could hope to obtain them. By now, however, nuclear arms have been around for more than half a century, and chemical and biological weapons even longer. They are not just getting old. In the strategic terms most relevant to American security, they have become primitive. Once the military cutting edge of the strong, they have become the only hope for so-called rogue states or terrorists who want to contest American power. Why? Because the United States has developed overwhelming superiority in conventional military force—something it never thought it had against the Soviet Union.

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated the American advantage in a manner that stunned many abroad. Although the U.S. defense budget has plunged, other countries are not closing the gap. U.S. military spending remains more than triple that of any potentially hostile power and higher than the combined defense budgets of Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba.

More to the point, there is no evidence that those countries' level of military professionalism is rising at a rate that would make them competitive even if they were to spend far more on their forces. Rolling along in what some see as a revolution in military affairs, American forces continue to make unmatched use of state-of-the-art

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weapons, surveillance and information systems, and the organizational and doctrinal flexibility for managing the integration of these complex innovations into "systems of systems" that is the key to modern military effectiveness. More than ever in military history, brains are brawn. Even if hostile countries somehow catch up in an arms race, their military organizations and cultures are unlikely to catch up in the competence race for management, technology assimilation, and combat command skills.

The primary risk is that enemies might trigger catastrophes in American cities.

If it is infeasible for hostile states to counter the United States in conventional combat, it is even more daunting for smaller groups such as terrorists. If the United States is lucky, the various violent groups with grievances against the American government and society will continue to think up schemes using conventional explosives. Few terrorist groups have shown an interest in inflicting true mass destruction. Bombings or hostage seizures have generally threatened no more than a few hundred lives. Let us hope that this limitation has been due to a powerful underlying reason, rather than a simple lack of capability, and that the few exceptions do not become more typical.

There is no sure reason to bet on such restraint. Indeed, some have tried to use WMD, only to see them fizzle. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin nerve gas in Tokyo in 1995 but killed only a few people, and some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 laced their bomb with cyanide, which burned up in the explosion (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in the perpetrators' possession). Eventually such a group will prove less incompetent. If terrorists decide that they want to stun American policymakers by inflicting enormous damage, WMD become more attractive at the same time that they are becoming more accessible.

Finally, unchallenged military superiority has shifted the attention of the U.S. military establishment away from WMD. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were the bedrock of American war capabilities. They were the linchpin of defense debate, procurement programs, and arms control because the United States faced another superpower—

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one that conventional wisdom feared could best it in conventional warfare. Today, no one cares about the MX missile or B-1 bomber, and hardly anyone really cares about the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In a manner that could only have seemed ludicrous during the Cold War, proponents now rationalize the $2 billion B-2 as a weapon for conventional war. Hardly anyone in the Pentagon is still interested in how the United States could use WMD for its own strategic purposes.

What military planners are interested in is how to keep adversaries from using WMD as an "asymmetric" means to counter U.S. conventional power, and how to protect U.S. ground and naval forces abroad from WMD attacks. This concern is all well and good, but it abets a drift of attention away from the main danger. The primary risk is not that enemies might lob some nuclear or chemical weapons at U.S. armored battalions or ships, awful as that would be. Rather, it is that they might attempt to punish the United States by triggering catastrophes in American cities.

CHOOSE YOUR WEAPONS WELL

UNTIL THE past decade, the issue was nuclear arms, period. Chemical weapons received some attention from specialists, but never made the priority list of presidents and cabinets. Biological weapons were almost forgotten after they were banned by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Chemical and biological arms have received more attention in the 1990s. The issues posed by the trio lumped under the umbrella of mass destruction differ, however. Most significantly, biological weapons have received less attention than the others but probably represent the greatest danger.

Chemical weapons have been noticed more in the past decade, especially since they were used by Iraq against Iranian troops in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and against Kurdish civilians in 1988. Chemicals are far more widely available than nuclear weapons because the technology required to produce them is far simpler, and large numbers of countries have undertaken chemical weapons programs. But chemical weapons are not really in the same class as other weapons of mass destruction, in the sense of ability to

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inflict a huge number of civilian casualties in a single strike. For the tens of thousands of fatalities as in, say, the biggest strategic bombing raids of World War II, it would be very difficult logistically and operationally to deliver chemical weapons in necessary quantities over wide areas.

Nevertheless, much attention and effort have been lavished on a campaign to eradicate chemical weapons. This may be a good thing, but the side effects are not entirely benign. For one, banning chemicals means that for deterrence, nuclear weapons become even more important than they used to be. That is because a treaty cannot assuredly prevent hostile nations from deploying chemical weapons, while the United States has forsworn the option to retaliate in kind.

In the past, the United States had a no-first-use policy for chemical weapons but reserved the right to strike back with them if an enemy used them first. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force last April, requires the United States to destroy its stockpile, thus ending this option. The United States did the same with biological arms long ago, during the Nixon administration. Eliminating its own chemical and biological weapons practically precludes a no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons, since they become the only WMD available for retaliation.

Would the United States follow through and use nuclear weapons against a country or group that had killed several thousand Americans with deadly chemicals? It is hard to imagine breaking the post-Nagasaki taboo in that situation. But schemes for conventional military retaliation would not suffice without detracting from the force of American deterrent threats. There would be a risk for the United States in setting a precedent that someone could use WMD against Americans without suffering similar destruction in return. Limiting the range of deterrent alternatives available to U.S. strategy will not necessarily cause deterrence to fail, but it will certainly not strengthen it.

The ostensible benefit of the CWC is that it will make chemical arms harder to acquire and every bit as illegal and stigmatized as biological weapons have been for a quarter-century. If it has that benefit, what effect

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will the ban have on the choices of countries or groups who want some kind of WMD in any case, whether for purposes of deterrence, aggression, or revenge? At the margin, the ban will reduce the disincentives to acquiring biological weapons, since they will be no less illegal, no harder to obtain or conceal, and far more damaging than chemical weapons. If major reductions in the chemical threat produce even minor increases in the biological threat, it will be a bad trade.

One simple fact should worry Americans more about biological than about nuclear or chemical arms: unlike either of the other two, biological weapons combine maximum destructiveness and easy availability. Nuclear arms have great killing capacity but are hard to get; chemical weapons are easy to get but lack such killing capacity; biological agents have both qualities. A 1993 study by the Office of Technology Assessment concluded that a single airplane delivering 100 kilograms of anthrax spores—a dormant phase of a bacillus that multiplies rapidly in the body, producing toxins and rapid hemorrhaging—by aerosol on a clear, calm night over the Washington, D.C., area could kill between one million and three million people, 300 times as many fatalities as if the plane had delivered sarin gas in amounts ten times larger.[1]

Like chemical weapons but unlike nuclear weapons, biologicals are relatively easy to make. Innovations in biotechnology have obviated many of the old problems in handling and preserving biological agents, and many have been freely available for scientific research. Nuclear weapons are not likely to be the WMD of choice for non-state terrorist groups. They require huge investments and targetable infrastructure, and are subject to credible threats by the United States. An aggrieved group that decides it wants to kill huge numbers of Americans will find the mission easier to accomplish with anthrax than with a nuclear explosion.

Inside the Pentagon, concern about biological weapons has picked up tremendously in the past couple of years, but there is little serious attention to the problem elsewhere. This could be a good thing if nothing much can be done, since publicity might

[1]U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 54.

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only give enemies ideas. But it is a bad thing if it impedes efforts to take steps—such as civil defense—that could blunt nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks.

DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL IN DECLINE

AN OLD vocabulary still dominates policy discussion of WMD. Rhetoric in the defense establishment falls back on the all-purpose strategic buzzword of the Cold War: deterrence. But deterrence now covers fewer of the threats the United States faces than it did during the Cold War.

The logic of deterrence is clearest when the issue is preventing unprovoked and unambiguous aggression, when the aggressor recognizes that it is the aggressor rather than the defender. Deterrence is less reliable when both sides in a conflict see each other as the aggressor. When the United States intervenes in messy Third World conflicts, the latter is often true. In such cases, the side that the United States wants to deter may see itself as trying to deter the United States. Such situations are ripe for miscalculation.

For the country that used to be the object of U.S. deterrence—Russia—the strategic burden has been reversed. Based on assumptions of Soviet conventional military superiority, U.S. strategy used to rely on the threat to escalate—to be the first to use nuclear weapons during a war—to deter attack by Soviet armored divisions. Today the tables have turned. There is no Warsaw Pact, Russia has half or less of the military potential of the Soviet Union, and its current conventional forces are in disarray, while NATO is expanding eastward. It is now Moscow that has the incentive to compensate for conventional weakness by placing heavier reliance on nuclear capabilities. The Russians adopted a nuclear no-first-use policy in the early 1980s, but renounced it after their precipitous post–Cold War decline.

Today Russia needs to be reassured, not deterred. The main danger from Russian WMD is leakage from vast stockpiles to anti-American groups elsewhere—the "loose nukes" problem. So long as the United States has no intention of attacking the Russians, their greater reliance on nuclear forces is not a problem. If the United States has an interest in reducing nuclear stockpiles, however, it is.

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The traditional American approach—thinking in terms of its own deterrence strategies—provides no guidance. Indeed, noises some Americans still make about deterring the Russians compound the problem by reinforcing Moscow's alarm.

Similarly, U.S. conventional military superiority gives China an incentive to consider more reliance on an escalation strategy. The Chinese have a long-standing no-first-use policy but adopted it when their strategic doctrine was that of "people's war," which relied on mass mobilization and low-tech weaponry. Faith in that doctrine was severely shaken by the American performance in the Persian Gulf War. Again, the United States might assume that there is no problem as long as Beijing only wants to deter and the United States does not want to attack. But how do these assumptions relate to the prospect of a war over Taiwan? That is a conflict that no one wants but that can hardly be ruled out in light of evolving tensions. If the United States decides openly to deter Beijing from attacking Taiwan, the old lore from the Cold War may be relevant. But if Washington continues to leave policy ambiguous, who will know who is deterring whom? Ambiguity is a recipe for confusion and miscalculation in a time of crisis. For all the upsurge of attention in the national security establishment to the prospect of conflict with China, there has been remarkably little discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in a Sino-American collision.

Deterrence requires knowledge of who has launched an attack.

The main problem for deterrence, however, is that it still relies on the corpus of theory that undergirded Cold War policy, dominated by reliance on the threat of second-strike retaliation. But retaliation requires knowledge of who has launched an attack and the address at which they reside. These requirements are not a problem when the threat comes from a government, but they are if the enemy is anonymous. Today some groups may wish to punish the United States without taking credit for the action—a mass killing equivalent to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Moreover, the options the defense establishment favors have shifted over entirely from deterrence to preemption. The majority of those who dealt with nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War adamantly opposed developing first-

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strike options. Today, scarcely anyone looks to that old logic when thinking about rogues or terrorists, and most hope to be able to mount a disarming action against any group with WMD.

Finally, eliminating chemical weapons trims some options for deterrence. Arms control restrictions on the instruments that can be used for deterrent threats are not necessarily the wrong policy, but they do work against maximizing deterrence. Overall, however, the problem with arms control is not that it does too much but that it now does relatively little.

From the Limited Test Ban negotiations in the 1960s through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s, arms control treaties were central to managing WMD threats. Debates about whether particular agreements with Moscow were in the United States' interest were bitter because everyone believed that the results mattered. Today there is no consensus that treaties regulating armaments matter much. Among national security experts, the corps that pays close attention to START and Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations has shrunk. With the exception of the Chemical Weapons Convention, efforts to control WMD by treaty have become small potatoes. The biggest recent news in arms control has not been any negotiation to regulate WMD, but a campaign to ban land mines.

The United States' Cold War partner in arms control, Russia, has disarmed a great deal voluntarily. But despite standard rhetoric, the United States has not placed a high priority on convincing Moscow to divest itself of more of its nuclear weapons; the Clinton administration has chosen to promote NATO expansion, which pushes the Russians in the opposite direction.

The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty remains a hallowed institution, but it has nowhere new to go. It will not convert the problem countries that want to obtain WMD—unless, like Iraq and North Korea in the 1980s, they sign and accept the legal obligation and then simply cheat. The NPT regime will continue to impede access to fissile materials on the open market, but it will not do so in novel or more effective ways. And it does not address the problem of Russian "loose nukes" any better than the Russian and American governments do on their own.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

DESPITE ALL the new limitations, deterrence remains an important aspect of strategy. There is not much the United States needs to do to keep up its deterrence capability, however, given the thousands of nuclear weapons and the conventional military superiority it has. Where capabilities are grossly underdeveloped, however, is the area of responses for coping should deterrence fail.

Enthusiasts for defensive capability, mostly proponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative from the Reagan years, remain fixated on the least relevant form of it: high-tech active defenses to intercept ballistic missiles. There is still scant interest in what should now be the first priority: civil defense preparations to cope with uses of WMD within the United States. Active defenses against missiles would be expensive investments that might or might not work against a threat the United States probably will not face for years, but would do nothing against the threat it already faces. Civil defense measures are extremely cheap and could prove far more effective than they would have against a large-scale Soviet attack.

During the Cold War, debate about antimissile defense concerned whether it was technologically feasible or cost-effective and whether it would threaten the Soviets and ignite a spiraling arms race between offensive and defensive weapons. One need not refight the battles over SDI to see that the relevance to current WMD threats is tenuous. Iraq, Iran, or North Korea will not be able to deploy intercontinental missiles for years. Nor, if they are strategically cunning, should they want to. For the limited number of nuclear warheads these countries are likely to have, and especially for biological weapons, other means of delivery are more easily available. Alternatives to ballistic missiles include aircraft, ship-launched cruise missiles, and unconventional means, such as smuggling, at which the intelligence agencies of these countries have excelled. Non-state perpetrators like those who bombed the World Trade Center will choose clandestine means of necessity.

A ballistic missile defense system, whether it costs more or less than the $60 billion the Congressional Budget Office recently estimated would be required for one limited option, will not counter these modes of attack. Indeed, if a larger part of the worry about WMD these days is about their use by terrorist states or groups, the odds are higher that

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sometime, somewhere in the country, some of these weapons will go off, despite the best efforts to stop them. If that happens, the United States should have in place whatever measures can mitigate the consequences.

By the later phases of the Cold War it was hard to get people interested in civil defense against an all-out Soviet attack that could detonate thousands of high-yield nuclear weapons in U.S. population centers. To many, the lives that would have been saved seemed less salient than the many millions that would still have been lost. It should be easier to see the value of civil defense, however, in the context of more limited attacks, perhaps with only a few low-yield weapons. A host of minor measures can increase protection or recovery from biological, nuclear, or chemical effects. Examples are stockpiling or distribution of protective masks; equipment and training for decontamination; standby programs for mass vaccinations and emergency treatment with antibiotics; wider and deeper planning of emergency response procedures; and public education about hasty sheltering and emergency actions to reduce individual vulnerability.

Stockpiling gas masks and antibiotics could reduce the death toll.

Such programs would not make absorbing a WMD attack tolerable. But inadequacy is no excuse for neglecting actions that could reduce death and suffering, even if the difference in casualties is small. Civil defenses are especially worthwhile considering that they are extraordinarily cheap compared with regular military programs or active defense systems. Yet until recently, only half a billion dollars—less than two-tenths of one percent of the defense budget and less than $2 a head for every American—went to chemical and biological defense, while nearly $4 billion was spent annually on ballistic missile defense.[2] Why haven't policymakers attended to first things first—cheap programs that can cushion the effects of a disaster—before undertaking expensive programs that provide no assurance they will be able to prevent it?

One problem is conceptual inertia. The Cold War accustomed strategists to worrying about an enemy with thousands of WMD, rather than foes with a handful. For decades the question of strategic defense

[2]John F. Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1997, pp. 3-20.

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was also posed as a debate between those who saw no alternative to relying on deterrence and those who hoped that an astrodome over the United States could replace deterrence with invulnerability. None of these hoary fixations address the most probable WMD threats in the post–Cold War world.

Opposition to Cold War civil defense programs underlies psychological aversion to them now. Opponents used to argue that civil defense was a dangerous illusion because it could do nothing significant to reduce the horror of an attack that would obliterate hundreds of cities, because it would promote a false sense of security, and because it could even be destabilizing and provoke attack in a crisis. Whether or not such arguments were valid then, they are not now. But both then and now, there has been a powerful reason that civil defense efforts have been unpopular: they alarm people. They remind them that their vulnerability to mass destruction is not a bad dream, not something that strategic schemes for deterrence, preemption, or interception are sure to solve.

Civil defense can limit damage but not minimize it. For example, some opponents may be able to develop biological agents that circumvent available vaccines and antibiotics. (Those with marginal technical capabilities, however, might be stopped by blocking the easier options.) Which is worse—the limitations of defenses, or having to answer for failure to try? The moment that WMD are used somewhere in a manner that produces tens of thousands of fatalities, there will be hysterical outbursts of all sorts. One of them will surely be, "Why didn't the government prepare us for this?" It is not in the long-term interest of political leaders to indulge popular aversion. If public resistance under current circumstances prevents widespread distribution, stockpiling, and instruction in the use of defensive equipment or medical services, the least that should be done is to optimize plans and preparations to rapidly implement such activities when the first crisis ignites demand.

As threats of terrorism using WMD are taken more seriously, interest will grow in preemptive defense measures—the most obvious of which is intensified intelligence collection. Where this involves targeting groups within the United States that might seem to be potential breeding grounds for terrorists (for example, supporters of Palestinian militants, home-grown militias or cults, or radicals with ties to Iran, Iraq, or Libya), controversies will arise over constitutional limits on invasion of

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FRANCES ROBERTS/NYT PICTURES

Better safe than sarin: New York City conducts a nerve gas attack drill, November 9, 1997

privacy or search and seizure. So long as the WMD danger remains hypothetical, such controversies will not be easily resolved. They have not come to the fore so far because U.S. law enforcement has been unbelievably lucky in apprehending terrorists. The group arrested in 1993 for planning to bomb the Lincoln Tunnel happened to be infiltrated by an informer, and Timothy McVeigh happened to be picked up in 1995 for driving without a license plate. Those who fear compromising civil liberties with permissive standards for government snooping should consider what is likely to happen once such luck runs out and it proves impossible to identify perpetrators. Suppose a secretive radical Islamic group launches a biological attack, kills 100,000 people, and announces that it will do the same thing again if its terms are not met. (The probability of such a scenario may not be high, but it can no longer be consigned to science fiction.) In that case, it is hardly unthinkable that

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a panicked legal system would roll over and treat Arab-Americans as it did the Japanese-Americans who were herded into concentration camps after Pearl Harbor. Stretching limits on domestic surveillance to reduce the chances of facing such choices could be the lesser evil.

IS RETREAT THE BEST DEFENSE?

NO PROGRAMS aimed at controlling adversaries' capabilities can eliminate the dangers. One risk is that in the more fluid politics of the post–Cold War world, the United States could stumble into an unanticipated crisis with Russia or China. There are no well-established rules of the game to brake a spiraling conflict over the Baltic states or Taiwan, as there were in the superpower competition after the Cuban missile crisis. The second danger is that some angry group that blames the United States for its problems may decide to coerce Americans, or simply exact vengeance, by inflicting devastation on them where they live.

If steps to deal with the problem in terms of capabilities are limited, can anything be done to address intentions—the incentives of any foreign power or group to lash out at the United States? There are few answers to this question that do not compromise the fundamental strategic activism and internationalist thrust of U.S. foreign policy over the past half-century. That is because the best way to keep people from believing that the United States is responsible for their problems is to avoid involvement in their conflicts.

Ever since the Munich agreement and Pearl Harbor, with only a brief interruption during the decade after the Tet offensive, there has been a consensus that if Americans did not draw their defense perimeter far forward and confront foreign troubles in their early stages, those troubles would come to them at home. But because the United States is now the only superpower and weapons of mass destruction have become more accessible, American intervention in troubled areas is not so much a way to fend off such threats as it is what stirs them up.

Will U.S. involvement in unstable situations around the former U.S.S.R. head off conflict with Moscow or generate it? Will making NATO bigger and moving it to Russia's doorstep deter Russian pressure on Ukraine and the Baltics or provoke it? With Russia and China, there is less chance that either will set out to conquer Europe or Asia

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than that they will try to restore old sovereignties and security zones by reincorporating new states of the former Soviet Union or the province of Taiwan. None of this means that NATO expansion or support for Taiwan's autonomy will cause nuclear war. It does mean that to whatever extent American activism increases those countries' incentives to rely on WMD while intensifying political friction between them and Washington, it is counterproductive.

The other main danger is the ire of smaller states or religious and cultural groups that see the United States as an evil force blocking their legitimate aspirations. It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified for so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam. Cold War triumph magnified the problem. U.S. military and cultural hegemony—the basic threats to radicals seeking to challenge the status quo—are directly linked to the imputation of American responsibility for maintaining world order. Playing Globocop feeds the urge of aggrieved groups to strike back.

Is this a brief for isolationism? No. It is too late to turn off foreign resentments by retreating, even if that were an acceptable course. Alienated groups and governments would not stop blaming Washington for their problems. In addition, there is more to foreign policy than dampening incentives to hurt the United States. It is not automatically sensible to stop pursuing other interests for the sake of uncertain reductions in a threat of uncertain probability. Security is not all of a piece, and survival is only part of security.

But it is no longer prudent to assume that important security interests complement each other as they did during the Cold War. The interest at the very core—protecting the American homeland from attack—may now often be in conflict with security more broadly conceived and with the interests that mandate promoting American political values, economic interdependence, social Westernization, and stability in regions beyond Western Europe and the Americas. The United States should not give up all its broader political interests, but it should tread cautiously in areas—especially the Middle East—where broader interests grate against the core imperative of preventing mass destruction within America's borders.

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Making Bosnia Work

Charles G. Boyd

A REPORT FROM THE FIELD

LAST SUMMER, during the early stages of the debate on troop withdrawal, I returned to Bosnia for the first time in more than two years. Clinton administration officials were crafting talking papers describing the many achievements under the November 1995 Dayton Accord, while critics were busy marshaling evidence that an integrated, multiethnic Bosnian state was as far away as ever. Supporters of the administration's policy, with an eye on the congressionally imposed June 1998 cutoff date for funding of U.S. troops, were claiming that progress, though substantial, was still fragile and could be maintained only with the continued presence of U.S. forces. Some skeptics with a deep understanding of historical ethnic animosities in the Balkans were sharpening the case for partition. The problem, centuries in the making, was not about to be fixed in a length of time Americans would be willing to stay. For them, the smell of quagmire was in the air.

During late August and September, I reimmersed myself in the Bosnia affair. Inside the new Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina—whose constituent parts are the Federation, a Muslim-Croat entity that is really two entities, and the Republika Srpska, or Serb Republic—I interviewed a large number of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, from presidents to taxi drivers and many in between. I met with senior military and diplomatic officials from the major countries of the coalition responsible for the implementation of Dayton and a wide range of key players from the international community engaged in various aspects of the implementation process. My goal was to take a fresh look at a

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landscape so polarized and fractured by internal hatreds and external manipulation as to be a virtual kaleidoscope of contradictory representations. Everyone has an agenda, and navigating through them all in an effort to make some sense of the whole was a formidable challenge.

WHAT DAYTON WROUGHT

IT IS OFTEN stated, incorrectly, that the Dayton Accord stopped the fighting in Bosnia. What it did, with the aid of 60,000 U.S. and coalition troops, was freeze in place an uneasy cease-fire and prevent a resumption of hostilities. With 34,000 troops on the ground, still well armed and possessed of robust rules of engagement, the peace is holding. Yet virtually no one familiar with Bosnia believes that peace will endure after June if the coalition force is withdrawn. People who participated in crafting the accord, as well as many who almost certainly have not read the document, assert with equal conviction that failure to implement it will surely result in a resumption of war. That assertion has a ring of truth, since not only is Dayton the centerpiece of U.S. policy but no alternatives seem to be under consideration. Yet during my recent Bosnia visit it became clear to me that continuing to implement the agreement in the current manner also may lead to a resumption of war or, at the very least, a protracted mission for the coalition troops who will have to hold this unhappy land together by force. For there to be any reasonable chance of sustaining the Bosnian state in its present form, the United States and its coalition partners will have to significantly alter their approach to implementation.

Dayton was a brilliantly negotiated agreement to support a dubious objective: the creation of a nation where no common sense of national community existed, so as to provide an economically viable entity in which the Muslim population of Bosnia could not only survive but flourish. That required inclusion of two ethnic groups, the Serbs and the Croats, who did not then and do not now wish to live as minority peoples in a state dominated by the larger Muslim group. Both agreed to do so under pressure from the international community and their brethren in Serbia and Croatia, but only under terms that left central control in the new state weak and the ethnic minorities with considerable autonomy.

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Nevertheless, principal negotiator Richard Holbrooke's achievement was remarkable and resulted in an agreement that, even against long odds, can yield long-term peace—but not if the emphasis in implementation remains on integration of the factions rather than their security. Military aspects of the accord are being implemented successfully partly because a robust Stabilization Force (SFOR) demands and gets compliance from all parties on matters for which it is responsible, but also because the coalition's mission of separating the antagonists reflects the desires of the antagonists themselves. Conversely, integration through implementation of civil elements of the accord, such as refugee return, is being attempted by a plethora of governments, international organizations, and even nongovernmental organizations, with no single leader who has the authority to require compliance from anyone on anything. Moreover, it depends on cooperation by three parties with little inclination to cooperate; indeed, two of the parties to Dayton worked hard to ensure that their entities would be as free as possible from domination by the third. Their lack of interest now in helping the central government function effectively should come as no surprise.

Yet given the investment of U.S. prestige in the current multiethnic construct, the alternative in Bosnia—partition—would be difficult to adopt. Such a reversal of U.S. policy would incur credibility costs heavier than this administration would be willing to pay. Partition would also result in a more substantive problem than embarrassment for the Clinton administration. Two of the three entities would not be economically viable if they were completely independent. After a partition, only the Bosnian Croats would prosper, and then only because they would probably be absorbed by Croatia. This is the most likely outcome for Herzegovina in any event, after "a decent interval" following U.S. withdrawal. Indeed, according to figures from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, nearly 30 percent of Bosnian Croats have left the republic since the Dayton Accord was signed. Most of those departing are minorities from Muslim-dominated central Bosnia who are resettling in the Croatian Krajina in areas left vacant by Croatian cleansing of 200,000-plus Serbs during the closing stages of the war in 1995.

Bosnian Serbs would be less welcome as refugees in the Serb-dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a nation struggling for economic survival and much less acceptable than Croatia as a trade

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

BLACK STAR

Tomorrow's victims?: Serbian refugees in Bosnia, 1995

partner in the rest of Europe. Republika Srpska's collapsed economy is a problem the Yugoslav Republic does not want or need, and Europeans, generally tolerant of Croatia's nationalist impulses, would almost certainly balk at Yugoslav absorption of Srpska even if Belgrade were so inclined. Bosnian Serbs have nowhere else to go. Muslims, initially with

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the most to gain in a prospective multiethnic state, now are increasingly frustrated as they see how resistant both minority factions are to real integration. Some Muslim politicians speak openly—though not to Americans—of a partitioned state in which they would control 65 percent of the land and have guaranteed access to the Adriatic Sea. Implicit in this concept is a resumption of war, since there would be no other means of acquiring the territory.

Dayton was a brilliantly negotiated accord to support a dubious objective.

The other reason a formal partition is unwise is that it is unnecessary. Partition is what exists in Bosnia today. Dayton outlined a central government sufficiently weak that the minorities could maintain the autonomy essential to their sense of security. But Dayton did not explicitly acknowledge the right of the minorities to govern themselves, and in implementing the accord, the United States in particular continues to deny that right in principle. The longer that right is not acknowledged, the more suspicious Bosnian Croats and Serbs become that the real motive of the United States is to force their subordination in a Muslim-dominated unitary state—the precise issue over which the war was fought in the first place.

There is no reason three ethnic sub-states cannot live within the borders of one state, self-governing in all but the few elements of government it is in everyone's interest to have handled centrally. But that can only happen if all parties are convinced they are autonomous, secure, and not disadvantaged relative to the others. Traveling around Bosnia today, it is clear that several aspects of Western policy are having the opposite effect.

EQUALIZING AID

CLINTON ADMINISTRATION officials proudly describe the $5.1 billion International Donors Reconstruction Program and what it has accomplished so far in restoring economic life to Bosnia. Sarajevo, it is true, is bustling and so to a lesser extent are many other towns in the Federation. But none of the revitalization is taking place in the Serb sector. Some farming is evident in the countryside there, but virtually no economic activity is visible in the towns. Unemployment is said to be 90 percent.

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The reason for the disparity is obvious: of the aid distributed to date, 98 percent has gone to the Federation and 2 percent to the Republika Srpska. When I asked the reason for the inequitable distribution, the answer generally given, at least by U.S. officials, was "Serbian noncompliance with Dayton." But compliance with Dayton is a flexible notion. Mayors in Srpska, I was told, had to certify in writing their support for multiethnicity (a politically suicidal act for most) before being considered eligible for aid. Yet that requirement was not applied in Muslim and Croat regions with equally cleansed ethnic populations. A U.S. official in Sarajevo said the verbal instructions from Washington were simple: no aid to the Republika Srpska unless Washington said otherwise. My observations confirmed this assertion.

Some U.S. officials defended the denial of aid to Serbs, claiming that support would only reinforce the hard-line Serbian Democratic Party leadership in their capital at Pale and solidify their ethnically cleansed gains, or reward their noncompliance with Dayton's provisions. Presumably no such benefits would accrue to the Croat or Muslim leadership in their similarly cleansed areas.

Embedded in U.S. policy and its implementation seems to be a spirit of righteous retribution directed against the Serbs, reminiscent of the Allied approach to Germany after the First World War. Given Serb responsibility for starting the war in Bosnia, such sentiment is understandable. But, as in 1918, economic devastation is less likely to produce contrition than resentment and a determination to get even next time. U.S. aid and reconstruction policy is creating an imbalance between the Federation and the Republika Srpska that is clearly destabilizing and highly unlikely to contribute to a lasting peace. The resolution of this Bosnian conflict should not make a next one inevitable.

REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT

Resettlement of minorities in rural Bosnia is resisted about equally by the majority groups in the three respective sectors, although Muslim cities such as Sarajevo and Tuzla, secure in their dominance, are less resistant to minority settlers. Notwithstanding anecdotal evidence about this or that Croat woman who wants her pre-war Muslim neighbor to return, there seems to be a clear consensus that the hatred

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generated by the war must fade before any real mixing of the groups can take place without resistance. Even refugees who return to majority areas are unwelcome, branded as cowards who fled in time of danger. Those who received compensation for their return are resented for that reason as well. Only a small fraction of the anticipated refugee returns this year will actually be attempted. Those who have come back to live as minorities in another ethnic group's area are heavily outnumbered by those who have fled Dayton's freshly drawn boundaries, which left them as new minorities. In short, there are now at least 70,000 fewer people living in ethnically mixed areas than when the accord was signed. Finally, many now living abroad are happy to continue doing so, and host nations such as Germany have come under pressure not to force their return.

Muslims are widely believed to be carrying out a long-range resettlement plan that would return Muslim majorities to such key locales as Brčko, Doboj, Sanski Most, and the strategic heights at Gajevi. That fear only serves to intensify the resistance to refugee return; therefore, any large-scale resettlement of minorities will have to be forced. This is a labor-intensive task for SFOR, and not without increased risk. Force levels probably cannot be reduced if this mission is continued or expanded, and success would be doubtful after the troops' eventual departure.

Train and Equip

The Train and Equip program was developed for the stated purpose of enabling the Federation, in particular the Muslims, to defend against potential Serb offensives should the peace process fail. It has had a spectacular impact. Modern equipment, sophisticated training methods including computer-driven battlefield simulation, and ample operations and maintenance funding have boosted the Federation's military strength and confidence. Meanwhile, the Dayton Accord has required the Serbs to reduce their military equipment to a level generally below that of the Federation, and what is left sits largely unused for lack of training funds and spare parts.

Train and Equip was born of political expediency, not military necessity. It was the Muslims' price for accepting terms at Dayton

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they believed they could have bettered on the battlefield in August 1995, and a triumph for a few key U.S. senators who had long been thwarted in their desire to lift the wartime arms embargo they believed hurt Muslims. America's European allies were uniformly opposed to the program at the outset, and all I questioned remain so today. There was a consensus, nearing unanimity, among those I interviewed that if NATO withdraws, fighting will resume; and the Muslims, confident and spoiling for a rematch, will almost certainly initiate it. Ironically, after supposedly arming the Muslims so they could defend themselves in our absence, we may now have to stay, if only to prevent them from restarting the war. Nothing the United States is doing in Bosnia today is so clearly destabilizing or unlikely to foster an enduring peace as this program.

Yet the program has taken on a life of its own, propelled by the congressional requirement that launched it, the bureaucratic momentum that sustains it, and the business it brings to the American contractor that executes it. Although the formal program is scheduled to end by the fall of 1998, with so many vested interests involved, continuation in some form is likely. Moreover, Iran is ready to resume informal arms transfers to the Bosnian Muslims similar to those secretly sanctioned by the United States in 1994-95.

WAR CRIMES

THERE IS strong agreement in the international community that those indicted for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia by the international tribunal at The Hague should be brought to justice there. But when I asked who should do the capturing? what are the risks? would taking former Serb leader Radovan Karadžić into custody make Serbs more or less paranoid about accepting the principles of Dayton? the consensus broke down.

If it sets its sights on capturing the less famous among the indicted, such as the two sought in the operation in Prijedor in July, SFOR can probably operate without undue risk. The Prijedor action was popular with the press and in the international community. Its popularity with the other ethnic factions is less clear, but it is probably safe to say that when the indicted is also known to be involved

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in current criminal activity such as black marketeering or protection rackets, his departure will not be mourned.

At the level of Radovan Karadžić, the picture becomes cloudier. Certainly Karadžić has opposed advancement of the Dayton process, although it is not clear that his removal would lessen the power or intransigence of the Serbian Democratic Party. Nonetheless, he should go, if only because then he could no longer serve as the scapegoat for Dayton's slow civil implementation.

The military and intelligence professionals to whom I spoke were unanimous in their assessment that Karadžić is well protected and getting to him would entail considerable risk. They are not reluctant to attempt it, but want decision-makers to understand that it is not likely to be a bloodless operation. And while it would be multinational, the hard part would be carried out by Americans.

Even if Karadžić was arrested with no loss of SFOR lives, the effect on the Serb people would be a serious concern. With Karadžić's popular-

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ity rating at 79 percent (according to the best polling data we have), already paranoid Serbs would hardly be confident that they could find security in a peace accord engineered by people who destroyed their most famous leader. As with so many other issues, what drives Serbs' behavior is their historically rooted sense of injustice and persecution. A cab driver in Banja Luka asked me the same question as current Srpska President Biljana Plavsić: "Why should only Karadžić go to The Hague? Why not [Croatian President Franjo] Tudjman and [Bosnian Federation President Alija] Izetbegović?" Many Serbs believe that the indictment process is political because so many more Serbs than Croats or Muslims have been indicted. Whether or not those suspicions are correct is almost irrelevant. If that is the perception, that is what Serbs will act on. If the process is to have the healing effect its proponents claim, it must be seen as fair, and for that to happen it must be explained in a much more plausible way than it has been thus far.

When asked by U.S. Information Agency pollsters what they feel are the most urgent issues facing their country, Croats, Muslims, and Serbs have consistently ranked bringing war criminals to justice near the bottom. No more than six percent of the members of any faction regarded the issue as important. It would seem that the whole business is much more important to Washington and London than to Bosnia.

POWER STRUGGLE IN SRPSKA

THE BATTLE for power in Srpska between President Plavsić and former President Karadžić is not central to long-term peace in Bosnia, although the United States is treating it as if it were. Rather, it is a symptom of the central problem: the uncertainty of minorities about their right to national identity and self-determination.

Everything we know about Plavsić points to the conclusion that she is as extreme in her nationalism as Karadžić but is skillfully playing the Dayton card to gain U.S. support against him. By taking sides in that internal struggle, the United States has convinced many Serbs that its intent is to split Srpska into two parts—one centered in Banja Luka, the other in Pale—thus fatally

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weakening it. Distaste for the abominable Karadžić should not require making a pact with a different devil. Both leaders have been made to seem legitimate on the political stage in Srpska because they play to the people's uncertainty about retention of their national identity and their right to self-determination. If those two rights were explicitly acknowledged, radical nationalists like Karadžić and Plavsić would lose their principal source of appeal and quickly become irrelevant.[1]

THE ARIZONA MARKET

ALONG SFOR's Route Arizona, on the inter-entity border between Doboj and Tuzla, a market has emerged spontaneously since the Dayton Accord went into effect. Located just off the main road in a five-acre field, it consists of some semipermanent wooden stands that are open daily. In this thriving free-market enterprise, they sell everything from goats to Mercedes-Benz automobiles. Black-market gasoline, cigarettes, prostitutes, and AK-47s are available, if that is what the buyer wants, but the heart and soul of the market is building materials and home improvement items like sinks, heaters, roof tiles, tools, and hardware. Most shoppers are in search of items to improve their families' lives.

Because of its location, the Arizona market is patronized primarily by Serbs and Muslims, but Croats as well come from afar to buy things they need or to sell their wares. The ethnic hatred all share is put aside in the interests of need and economic gain, both powerful counteractive agents when it comes to prejudice. Bosnian Serb and Muslim police routinely patrol the marketplace, and there has been no known confrontation between the two forces. Shoppers and vendors return to their respective ethnic areas, where they feel most secure, when business is done.

In the microcosm the Arizona market represents may lie a clue to building a functioning multiethnic society in Bosnia. At least for now,

[1]Just as national uncertainties drive Serbs into the arms of nationalists like Karadžić, Muslims, too, with fading prospects for a multiethnic unitary state, are adopting more openly nationalist positions. The two largest factions of Izetbegović's Party of Democratic Action are now pro-partition.

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people feel secure only when surrounded by their own kind. But as economic opportunity invites interaction, these same people will gradually become confident that they can live again in a mixed society. Bosnia can survive as a state in a loose confederation if the international community, led by the United States, explicitly acknowledges the right of the ethnic factions to live among their own and govern themselves. Once people's sense of national identity is secured, the appeal of radical nationalist politicians will evaporate and a reasonable politics and economics can emerge.

If NATO withdraws, fighting will resume, and Muslims will almost certainly start it.

Three aspects of U.S.-driven Dayton implementation stand out as the most obviously harmful to the prospects for peace. All seem based in a desire for retribution against the Serbs because of their role in the Bosnian conflict's origins. These three must be reversed as quickly as possible.

First, the United States should take the lead in correcting the grossly inequitable distribution of reconstruction aid for Bosnia (98 percent to the Muslim-Croat Federation, 2 percent to Republika Srpska), which is producing a disparity between the entities that heightens the already intense ethnic animosity in Bosnia.

Second, the coalition should put less emphasis on getting refugees back into their former homes or regions, since it puts them and those assisting their return in greater peril. Hatreds on all sides are still too fresh to make this Dayton objective a worthwhile goal anytime soon.

Third, the coalition partners should halt the Train and Equip program, which has led to a growing military superiority for the Federation that is deeply destabilizing and, ironically, may impede the U.S. withdrawal it was supposed to assist. Congress, which legislated the program and is apparently unaware of its ramifications, should call for an immediate assessment by the U.N. of the military balance between the Federation and the Republika Srpska. It can then revise the legislation that mandates Train and Equip so as to reflect current realities on the ground.

Moreover, decreased emphasis on the pursuit of popular, high-level war criminals like Karadžić and former Serb military leader

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Ratko Mladić is also imperative. While technically feasible and immensely satisfying in Washington and some European capitals, this policy has at least even odds of producing a backlash among Bosnian Serbs that will make them more resistant to the Dayton process and the concept of a multiethnic Bosnia. Until the Hague tribunal gains credibility as a judicial rather than a political institution, no healing will result from capturing those indicted for war crimes.

NATO must remain engaged in Bosnia to prevent the resumption of hostilities, but will do so only if the United States stays as well. The size of the remaining force must be determined by its role: if it will be used to keep the peace as a true "Stabilization Force," it can be reduced; if it will be used as a proactive civil "Implementation Force," it will need to be increased. An exit strategy should set the following conditions at a minimum: more advanced and balanced reconstruction in all areas, no matter which ethnic group predominates; essential elements of a central government that actually function; and an electoral process in which no one political party controls the media in any entity. Achieving these conditions will take at least two or three more years if Dayton implementation policy is altered, and much longer if not.

Today people feel secure only among their own, but economic opportunity will invite interaction.

Such an alteration in course cannot be undertaken by the administration alone; Congress must participate. Yet the basic step of an agreement on keeping U.S. troops in Bosnia beyond June is by no means assured as of this writing. While the administration has recently improved communication with Capitol Hill on the issue, members of Congress, twice burned by expectations of withdrawal, are reluctant to sign on to a continuing troop commitment when they see little real progress or a plausible exit strategy.

Restoration of congressional confidence begins with acknowledgment by the administration that its policy requires change. Dialogue between the most senior administration and congressional officials can then proceed to develop adjustments that both branches can support. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, who has gained credit on the Hill for seeking bipartisan understanding

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of the situation in Bosnia, is well positioned to take the lead on the administration's behalf.

If, however, Washington and its allies continue to force the peoples of Bosnia to live with those they hate and fear and to share power with their sworn enemies, and if they continue to push economic and military disparity on the Serbs, who are already deeply uneasy about the advantages and intentions of the other factions, they will ensure continued hostility and suspicion in Bosnia and a resumption of the conflict once coalition forces are withdrawn. That war will not be in spite of our efforts, but because of them.

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The Exit Strategy Delusion

Gideon Rose

STRATEGIC VOGUE

COME JUNE, the American troops helping to maintain peace in Bosnia are scheduled to come home. Recently, however, some senior administration officials have begun murmuring about staying on longer. "A consensus is developing," says Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "that there will be or should be some form of U.S. military presence" after the current force leaves. "If we pull out on an arbitrary deadline," says the architect of the 1995 Dayton Accord, Richard Holbrooke, "the situation in Bosnia will become chaotic, eroding the achievements so far." Such talk does not sit well with Congress, where many were hostile to the original mission and outraged at its first extension last year. The stage is set for a battle this spring over U.S. policy in Bosnia.

The administration and Congress do seem to agree on one important issue: any new Bosnia mission must have an "exit strategy." In her confirmation hearings, Albright assured Senate questioners that she "would never advise using American forces . . . where there is no exit strategy." In his confirmation hearings, Secretary of Defense William Cohen explained that before deploying troops he would ask questions such as, "Do we have a so-called exit strategy? We know how to get in. How do we get out?" In 1996 then-national security adviser Anthony Lake even crafted an explicit "exit strategy doctrine," which had as its centerpiece the principle, "Before we send our troops into a foreign country we should know how and when we're going to get

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them out." Congress has mandated an exit strategy for any new Bosnia deployment. The extent to which the concept has become conventional wisdom was underlined when Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) rebuked the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, for what he saw as the Bosnia policy's missing ingredient: "Usually, we don't go into things without an exit strategy, as you know, General."

In fact, there is nothing usual about exit strategies; the concept's current vogue has little to do with time-honored verities of military intervention, and much to do with the politics of post–Cold War foreign policy. Borrowed from the business world, the term was not applied to foreign or military policy before 1993, and became part of the vernacular only during the withdrawal from Somalia later that year. Its current popularity epitomizes the new national quest for intervening on the cheap, with the troops home for Christmas—or better yet, Thanksgiving.

In the past, policymakers often gave little thought to the specific objectives and potential endings of their foreign adventures, with chaotic results. But the idea of a formal exit strategy, with its anti-interventionist bias and stress on rigid public planning, is misguided in theory and unhelpful in practice. Instead of obsessing about the exit, planners should concentrate on the strategy. The key question is not how we get out, but why we are getting in.

Opposing exit strategies does not necessarily mean favoring the waste of American blood and money in endless futile attempts to impose order or create harmony in Bosnia or anywhere else. The main reason to jettison the concept is because it lumps together several important issues that are best handled separately. The first question is when open-ended military commitments might actually make sense, and the answer is that it depends on the American interests at stake and the policy options available. The second question is how interventions can be closed out smoothly, and the answer is that they should leave some kind of stable order behind. The third question is how overcommitment can be avoided, and the answer is through selective intervention rather than the imposition of time limits. Finally, the fourth question is how unexpected developments should be handled, and the answer is according to well-developed contingency plans.

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THINK STRATEGY, NOT EXIT

IF YOU ask most politicians what an exit strategy is, they will look at you blankly, because they consider the answer obvious: a plan to bring American troops home from some mission abroad. The simplicity of this definition reveals the concept's political, as opposed to intellectual, origins: it is a response to perceived popular impatience with messy foreign entanglements. It follows that interventions should be designed to be painless and self-limiting. Assurances to that effect should be offered to Congress and the public as a precondition for authorization, and initial plans should be followed strictly as events unfold. "Mission creep" should not be allowed because it leads to "quagmires."

The insistence that troops should never be deployed unless an administration can tell Congress and the public in advance just how long the mission will last, how much it will cost, and precisely how it will end represents a Somalia corollary to the Vietnam syndrome in American foreign policy. This is why the call for exit strategies fits so neatly into updated versions of the Pentagon's restrictive post-Vietnam conditions for using force, articulated by Caspar Weinberger in 1984 and supplemented by Colin Powell a few years later. However, the concept has major drawbacks.

By definition, the term biases discussion in favor of foreign military commitments that can be terminated easily and against those that appear more open-ended. By making an exit strategy a prerequisite for the deployment of troops, neoisolationists preempt consideration of some worthwhile operations, allowing a general rule rather than specific arguments to do their work for them. Some of the missions that would have failed to meet such a standard include American participation in NATO, the post–armistice defense of South Korea, the post–Camp David peacekeeping in the Sinai, and the post–Gulf War containment of Iraq—not to mention the stated U.S. intention to maintain 100,000 troops in Asia. Indeed, an exit strategy in Asia would contradict the very purpose of the American presence there.

By emphasizing lockstep adherence to original plans and precise cost and time estimates, the idea of an exit strategy contributes to a false notion that military interventions are mechanical tasks like building a new kitchen, rather than strategic contests marked by friction and

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uncertainty. The military interventions under discussion these days may not resemble standard conventional wars, but the more ambitious ones are nevertheless marked by potentially hostile environments and the threat or use of force by all parties. In such situations it is absurd to bind U.S. forces to a fixed timetable or demand guaranteed outcomes as a precondition for action.

By emphasizing the public aspects of intervention planning, exit strategies elevate broad short-term popular approval above all else, including operational effectiveness. For most military interventions, to publicize whatever exit strategy one does have is to provide a how-to manual for any local actor seeking to play the spoiler. Trumpeting advance plans for withdrawal may ensure that the American public can control the actions of its government. But it does so at the expense of hampering the government's ability to respond flexibly to the situation that prompted the intervention in the first place.

THE LONG HAUL

DEPENDING ON the interests involved and the relative merits of other policy options, it sometimes makes sense to deploy troops when there is no realistic prospect of bringing them home soon. Two of many potential current examples are the deployments in the Persian Gulf and the Sinai Peninsula. In the Gulf, the United States maintains a large military presence in order to contain Iraq, enforce the post–Gulf War sanctions, and preserve stability in a region of vital interest. This commitment is very expensive, unpleasant for all of the American forces, and fatal for some, like those killed in the 1996 bombing of an American barracks in Saudi Arabia. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has acted up, the United States has rushed still more troops to the region to make him back down, or struck at targets within his territory. Future Iraqi provocations might call for a truly serious military response, which would mean risking the lives of American aircrews and perhaps others.

Yet there is no exit strategy in the Gulf. Nobody knows how long the deployment will last. (A similar force has been in South Korea more than four decades.) Nevertheless, the deployment makes sense because the alternatives are worse. Diplomacy or economic sanctions

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by themselves, not backed up by credible military threats, will not keep Iraq contained. Trying to finish the job by eliminating Saddam seems attractive to some, but the United States has no idea how to do it at a reasonable cost. And eschewing responsibility for Gulf security by withdrawing U.S. forces would leave Saddam unconstrained and the weak, oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council vulnerable to their predatory neighbors.

Meanwhile, in the Sinai Peninsula, a few American troops help implement the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt as part of the Multinational Force and Observers. They have been there since 1982, participating in a traditional peacekeeping mission separating two former enemies and policing the border between them. And they will likely stay there for years to come. Yet most agree that this mission makes a great deal of sense. There are few risks to these soldiers save sunstroke, and the deployment does not cost much, especially when compared with the benefits it provides to an important region where no new headaches are needed.

The point of these examples is not that American troops should regularly be sent abroad and left there, but rather that U.S. interventions need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. In Bosnia and elsewhere, the main factors to consider are the importance of U.S. interests and the relative merits and costs of different ways of advancing them. Such analysis is not made easier by a slogan that preempts it by definition.

REACHING THE END STATE

IF THE United States is not willing to stay for the long haul, a critical concern in intervention planning must be how to lock in success after a mission's initial operations are finished, which is what many exit strategy devotees have in mind. This should not really be thought of as "exiting," but as "transitioning." The latter term focuses attention not simply on how to bring U.S. troops home but on how to move smoothly from the intervention's final operations to what the military calls an "end state." As those in Congress who wanted to arm the Bosnian Muslims correctly argued, some kind of order must be left behind to prevent an intervention's accomplishments from fading away. Preparations for that order should be part of the original mission.

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One reason transition planning has been neglected is that it is often devilishly complex, requiring a linkage between what Clausewitz called the "grammar" of military operations and the "logic" of political objectives. Another reason lies in the temperament of political leaders, who generally like to improvise and delay decisions until the last moment so as to retain maximum flexibility—ignoring the fact that postponing choices often generates more constraints. Still another reason for the neglect stems from policymakers' frequent overemphasis on the immediate negative possibilities of an intervention rather than the benefits over the longer term.

Nevertheless, withdrawing American forces from an intervention such as Bosnia will probably produce chaos on the ground unless one of three alternatives is ready to maintain order: a follow-on force, a single competent local political entity, or a clear division and stable balance of power among local factions. Paving the way for at least one of these must be a central part of an intervention's overall strategy. If for domestic political reasons an American follow-on force is not in the cards, then either a foreign force or a local solution must be arranged. If the United States does not want to stay for the long term and the three options above have little chance, then the United States should not intervene in the first place.

The transition phases of an intervention need not be simple or abrupt; often a gradual reduction of the outside presence works best, with each successive force charged with tackling a different type of problem until a local political structure is ready to stand on its own. Moreover, there is little reason for transition plans to be announced publicly or tied to a hard timetable. Publicity and rigidity could work against success by tipping one's hand to opponents, allowing them to develop countermeasures.

DEADLINE DIPLOMACY

MANY PEOPLE who talk about exit strategies are chiefly concerned with preventing American strength and prestige from being squandered in foreign jungles or mountains. Lake's "exit strategy doctrine," for example, was offered as a way of dealing with messy post–Cold War situations that seemed to merit our attention but did not threaten vital security interests. In these cases, he argued, a sensible, middle-of-the-road path would be for the United States to make only a good-faith

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effort to attack problems, rather than a commitment to solving them. Explicit time limits on American deployments would give foreigners a brief window of opportunity to reach for a better future while avoiding difficult entanglements for the United States should they fail. Deadlines would serve as boundaries for American efforts and spur local parties to take responsibility for their own societies.

Deadlines for withdrawal turn American troops into lame ducks.

The problem with this approach is that overzealous attempts to devise, publicize, and enforce limitations on American deployments can undermine an intervention's effectiveness. Deadlines for withdrawal turn American troops into lame ducks. They do not prod local thugs to settle their differences, but rather encourage them to wait until the Americans go home. A publicized limitation strategy based on costs rather than time would have the opposite effect, prompting local opponents to rise up rather than lie low, while signaling to them just what damage they need to inflict to get the Americans to close up shop. The likely consequence of embracing Lake's exit strategy doctrine, in short, would be the accumulation of several foreign commitments at a time, few of which turn out satisfactorily. The Clinton administration eventually realized this, so it decided not to face the consequences of abandoning Bosnia after a year, or even two and a half.

If Lake's answer was flawed, his question—how to avoid overextension without retreating from the world entirely—was legitimate. Two other answers look more promising. The first is to develop strict limits not on interventions' cost or duration, but rather on their objectives. This would mean keeping open the possibility of intervening widely in places such as Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, and elsewhere, but only if the interventions were limited to pursuing goals that could be accomplished with relatively simple or tidy means, such as traditional peacekeeping, maritime blockades, or no-fly zones. The other alternative is to undertake very few interventions, yet commit to doing what it takes to see them through. This would mean choosing to accept real responsibility for bringing order to certain trouble spots while leaving others alone—doing Haiti or Bosnia, say, but not both. Either of these courses is preferable to good-faith efforts because they avoid the domestic and international humiliation of backtracking.

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MEASURING SUCCESS AND FAILURE

STILL OTHERS think of exit strategies as plans for what to do when an intervention does not follow its expected course. Prompted by the experience in Somalia, recent discussion has focused almost exclusively on one scenario, dramatic failure, and one response, withdrawal. This is unfortunate because responsible contingency planning involves more than simply pointing out the exit. Initial failure, for example, can theoretically be met with either withdrawal or escalation, and there can be happy surprises as well as sad ones.

If policymakers should avoid public pronouncements on an intervention's expected cost and duration, they should certainly specify their expectations on these and other matters privately, because that is the only way to establish yardsticks for assessing an intervention's progress. Without such yardsticks, it is impossible to make intelligent decisions about whether to stay the course, withdraw, or escalate. If events follow the timetable originally conceived—as in, say, the 1994 Haiti mission—the intervention will flow logically from its original operations into its transition strategy, and there will be no need to resort to contingency plans. If something unexpected happens, on the other hand, officials may need to make a fundamental change of course. It is here that contingency planning becomes necessary.

An intervention's original plans will include two kinds of assumptions. The first involves the nature of the problem and the feasibility of different solutions—what led to a crisis, for example, or which local political forces are too strong to exclude from a settlement. These assumptions undergird the intervention's basic strategy, dictating what the objectives are and how they can be achieved. The second type of assumptions are narrower, encompassing how factors like the weather, logistics, and local conditions will affect the mission's implementation. If these secondary assumptions are too pessimistic, success will come more quickly and smoothly than expected; if they are too optimistic, the intervention's progress will be slower and bumpier than hoped. Either way, the general strategy of the intervention should not be changed, and commanders and officials on the ground should be given substantial leeway to respond to the situation as they see fit.

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If the primary assumptions turn out to be wrong, on the other hand, then senior policymakers need to rethink the mission from the bottom up. In Vietnam, for example, policymakers should have recognized much sooner that aerial attacks and other demonstrations of American resolve would not dissuade the North Vietnamese from trying to take over the South. Instead of spending the mid-1960s gradually escalating the American war effort, officials should have forced themselves to choose between withdrawal or substantial escalation. In Somalia, American policymakers should have recognized long before the firefight in Mogadishu that the humanitarian crisis could not be resolved without addressing the country's political anarchy, which would prove too much for a weak U.N. force to handle. Instead, they were forced out after a bloody confrontation sapped U.S. domestic support. Conversely, if—as in the Persian Gulf War—operations go far more smoothly than expected, policymakers should seriously consider whether it makes sense to strive for more than was originally planned.

STRATEGY, POLITICS, AND BOSNIA

In Bosnia, as in other cases, administration officials have trouble addressing these issues frankly in public. When they are raised, it is usually when the administration is trying to persuade or maneuver Congress into supporting a particular mission. Talks between the executive and legislative branches during the run-up to a major deployment often resemble a game of political chicken rather than a true exchange of ideas. Officials who believe in a military mission that Congress is leery of face wrenching questions, such as how to balance substantive and political concerns, how many compromises to accept, and whether to go forward with a flawed intervention rather than none at all. Still, in the end, the wisest course for an administration is to be as candid as possible—to plan thoroughly and realistically, lay out the true choices involved, and try to build a consensus based on the merits of the case. This is not what the Clinton administration has done on Bosnia.

Despite the heroic efforts of the negotiators at Dayton, the resulting agreement did not clear a path toward a stable end state. Rather than lower its objectives or eschew intervention, the administration decided to plow ahead and embraced a time limit on the Implementation

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Force (IFOR) deployment as the answer to its problems. This was either naive, disingenuous, or a gamble, and it has not worked.

The administration repeatedly claims that it has no intention of stationing American troops in Bosnia indefinitely. Yet it has not laid the groundwork for any other acceptable outcome. The Dayton Accord seemed to suggest that foreign troops would eventually hand off to a single competent local political entity, the government of a reconstituted Bosnia. But progress toward this objective has been slow, and does not yet justify a turnover. How about a clear division and stable balance of power among different local factions—in other words, a partition? This is what many so-called realists have been arguing for, and what many cynics thought Dayton was secretly about, with its deferral of certain idealistic goals, like pursuing war criminals and resettling refugees, and acceptance of land gained by ethnic cleansing and aggression. But Clinton administration officials have stated adamantly that they consider partition unacceptable because it would be unjust, set a terrible example for the region, and lead to future conflict. Hence the administration has been left with no options other than chaos or some kind of follow-on force. It has tried to toss the hot potato to the Europeans, but they have tossed it right back, saying that they will not stay without the Americans—"one out, all out." So American troops took part in IFOR and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and will likely be a part of whatever the next one is called too.

Bosnia was the poster child for Lake's exit strategy doctrine.

As for limitation, Bosnia was supposed to be the poster child for Lake's exit strategy doctrine, the place where tough love would force the wayward locals to see the error of their ways or be left to their sorry fate. It was okay to send American troops there because they would absolutely, positively be home in a year. The president said, "If we leave after a year, and they decide they don't like the benefits of peace and they're going to start fighting again, that does not mean NATO failed. It means we gave them a chance to make their peace and they blew it." Dayton negotiator Richard Holbrooke said, "We are not going to leave behind a force" after the one-year limit. "We think a year is sufficient. If a year doesn't work, two, three, or five years won't do either." Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman John Shalikashvili said, "I

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cannot imagine circumstances changing in such a way that we would remain in Bosnia" beyond one year.

At the end of the year the troops did come home, but a new deployment was sent out to take their place, and the love did not look so tough. SFOR carried a time limit too: "It is now the intent for the mission to end in June of 1998," said Shalikashvili, "and shortly thereafter for the troops to withdraw." But observers were already skeptical; one prominent columnist suggested that the deployment be called "Operation I Really Mean It This Time." Even Shalikashvili admitted to confusion, testifying that "everyone I've talked to has been unable to explain to me what it is that is going to happen during the period of time that would make the conditions at the end of [the SFOR deployment] worth taking the risk of bringing in a new force."

If the time limits on the Bosnia intervention have been disregarded, other limits—such as what the American forces are charged with doing—have been much more closely observed. This is apparently because the administration believes that trying to achieve ambitious goals on the ground might cause casualties. It has, therefore, left itself open to the charge, as one observer acidly put it, that the Bosnia deployment resembles nothing more than the moon landings, with the principal objective being to send men far away and bring them back safely.

As for contingency planning, the administration has taken great pains to avoid any unpleasant surprises, and the American troops have actually been safer in Bosnia than they would have been conducting routine training exercises. The administration has skillfully taken advantage of this fact to disarm its critics and bolster the case for a longer deployment. But this may prove too clever by half because it accomplishes little of lasting value while leaving the mission vulnerable to a quick loss of support should anything go wrong.

It seems fair to assume that despite the hopes of some in the administration, re-creating a unified Bosnia is beyond U.S. capabilities in the near future. But a withdrawal of foreign forces under present circumstances would probably precipitate a tragic and humiliating renewal of fighting and damage NATO's cohesion. And it seems unlikely that a purely European follow-on force will materialize as a deus ex machina. The real choice for the United States in Bosnia seems to be between remaining there indefinitely in pursuit of Dayton's ambitious

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goals or moving toward a morally unpleasant but practical settlement that might permit most of the outside forces to leave before the millennium. The latter is looking increasingly attractive, but this is not because open-ended commitments are always inadvisable. It is because the Clinton administration has yet to make a strong case to Congress or the nation why its current half hearted pursuit of the goals of the Dayton Accord is worth such a commitment. The disparity between what the administration claims is at stake and what it is prepared to do is confusing. When Secretary Cohen was a senator, he put the issue squarely: "If you feel that the mission is worthy enough to make the commitment, then you shouldn't put a time frame to it." In Bosnia, as with other interventions, the focus should not be on developing exit strategies, but on articulating precise American interests and coming up with ways to advance them.

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Is China Democratizing?

Minxin Pei

IGNORANCE AND REALITY

A KEY factor influencing America's China policy and dividing American opinions is the evolution of the Chinese political system. Critics of the Clinton administration's China policy argue that, despite two decades of market reforms, the Chinese political system has not only remained repressive and undemocratic but has become a threat to the world's democracies. Pointing to Beijing's political repression, religious persecution, alleged proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, and unfair trade practices, they call for a hard-line response.

China's refusal to make substantive concessions on human rights has made it difficult for the administration to defend its stance. Clinton has been unable to offer evidence that engagement has yielded results on human rights, nor has he made a persuasive case that the Chinese political system is evolving in a more open direction. The administration's defense that current China policy is in the United States' long-term strategic interests has proved a poor match for ideological and passionate attacks from members of Congress and the media. Daily headlines and routine allegations of Beijing's misdeeds have battered the policy.

A major cause of the raging debate on U.S. China policy is lack of understanding of the profound political changes in China over the last two decades. In the past, ignorance of Chinese political realities has led to erroneous assessments of China's prospects, and it is now endangering China policy in Clinton's second term. As Beijing's third-generation leaders, exemplified by President Jiang Zemin, have fully assumed

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power, the United States must reexamine the Chinese political system and develop a more realistic evaluation of its potential for progress.

In American public discourse, political reform has a narrow meaning: democratization. American politicians and news media measure the progress of political reform in other countries against a single yardstick—the holding of free and open elections. But while democratization may be one element of reform, it is not the only one, especially in countries lacking the most rudimentary institutions of governance.

Both in the West and in developing countries, history shows that political reform has three essential components: establishment of norms governing elite politics; restructuring of basic institutions governing relations among parts of the state, such as the division of power among the government's different branches; and strengthening of the institutions of political participation. Countries that follow that sequence are also better bets to consolidate reform and to experience less instability because the success of one reform makes the next more likely.

The Chinese political system Deng Xiaoping inherited in 1978 resembled a Hobbesian world. No norms governed elite politics. Its key governmental institutions, especially the legal system and the bureaucracy, had been seriously damaged by the economic and political turmoil of the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. There were no institutions of political participation; under Mao Zedong, mass political campaigns and mob violence had been the main forms of participation. Deng was faced with rebuilding China's wrecked political system and reforming its backward economy at the same time.

KINDER AND GENTLER POLITICS

TODAY, TWO decades after Deng started his reforms, most observers view the Deng era as a period of rapid economic reform without commensurate political—especially democratic—reform. But several important political reforms began during those years. Deng's leadership saw progress in the reestablishment of norms governing elite politics as well as tentative steps toward restructuring the institutions of the Chinese state, despite the absence of democratization.

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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), especially its elite, was badly bruised by Mao's dictatorial rule. Soon after Deng consolidated his power, one of his top priorities was to restore order to the party. A three-time victim of the power struggle, Deng had a keen understanding of the personal insecurity of the ruling elite. In systems such as Stalinist Soviet Union and Maoist China, even at the highest levels, defeat in a power struggle carried an infinite price. Elite politics was characterized by ferocity and intrigue, as rivals would rather risk all than lose all.

The Chinese Communist Party was badly bruised by Mao's dictatorial rule.

Deng appeared to understand that no amount of reform could immunize an authoritarian ruling party from internal strife in the absence of an open and competitive succession process. His efforts focused instead on ensuring a minimum level of personal security for the ruling elite so that defeat would be less dire. The written rules regulating intraparty politics were spelled out in a landmark document entitled *Some Principles on the Party's Internal Politics* in February 1980, and provided some basic rights for CCP members. It is difficult to determine whether these rights were protected in practice, but there is evidence that elite politics in the Deng era became "kinder and gentler."

Two of Deng's successors, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, fell in power struggles, but the effects of their falls were cushioned. Their personal security and material privileges were protected. Nearly all the losers were eased out of their posts to lessen the impact on the regime's stability. None of the power struggles led to a massive internal purge like those under Mao. Rather, the victors co-opted most of the followers of the defeated leaders.

Another significant reform implemented under Deng's rule was the mandatory retirement of party and government officials. Although China's term limits have attracted little attention abroad, they have probably had the most far-reaching effect of any reform on the composition and outlook of the ruling elite. Beginning in 1982, the retirement age of ministers, provincial party secretaries, and governors was set at 65 and their deputies' at 60. A two-term limit has also been imposed on all party and government positions. As it was designed to do, the combination of a strict retirement age and the two-term limit has prevented the

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perpetuation of individuals' power and accelerated the ascent of the next generation. Almost instantly, it transformed a ruling elite dominated by poorly educated, aging revolutionaries into one composed mostly of middle-aged technocrats.

TABLE 1

PROFILE OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

YEAR	1982	1987	1992	1997
AVERAGE AGE	59.1	55.2	56.3	55.9
COLLEGE EDUCATED	55.4%	73.3%	83.7%	92.4%

SOURCE: Author

Until 1982, the average age of ministers and vice ministers in the State Council was 64. Only 37 percent of the members were college-educated. After implementation of the mandatory retirement system in late 1982, the average age of ministers and vice ministers dropped to 58, and 52 percent were college-educated. The membership of the Central Committee has also reflected the impact of the mandatory retirement system (see Table 1). In 15 years, the members' average age declined from 59 to 56, while the proportion of college-educated members rose from 55 to 92 percent. The ruling elite in Chinese provinces underwent a similar transformation (see Table 2). In 1982, the average age of provincial party secretaries and governors was 62; it was cut to 55 in 1983 and has remained under 55 ever since. During the same period, the proportion of college-educated provincial leaders rose from 20 percent in 1982 to 79 percent in 1996.

The data in Tables 1 and 2 are evidence that the mandatory retirement system is working. It will likely prevent the ossification of the ruling elite and the emergence of personal fiefdoms. The relatively high rate of elite turnover in China under Deng was in sharp contrast to the former Soviet Union, especially under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, whose policy of "stability of cadres" caused political and economic stagnation in the 1970s and early 1980s. Table 3 compares the rate of reelection for full members of the Central Committees of the Chinese Communist Party under Deng and the

TABLE 2

PROFILE OF PROVINCIAL LEADERS

YEAR	1982	1983	1988	1996
AVERAGE AGE	62	55	53	55
COLLEGE EDUCATED	20%	43%	62%	79%

SOURCES: Liao Gailong, ed., *Handbook of Major Political Events in China*; Ho Ping, *The New Lords of the People's Republic of China*.

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TABLE 3

REELECTION RATE OF FULL MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CCP AND CPSU AT PARTY CONGRESSES

YEAR	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986
U.S.S.R.	49%	80%	80%	89%	87%	59%
YEAR	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997	
CHINA	51%	38%	41%	54%	43%	

SOURCES: Author; Thane Gustafon and Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev's First Year," *Problems of Communism* (May/June 1986), p. 4.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev. In the latter, between 80-89 percent were reelected at each party congress. In fact, the former Soviet Union did not have a similar mandatory retirement system until Mikhail Gorbachev established one in June 1988, which set the retirement age at 70. In China, only about half the full members of the CCP Central Committee could expect reelection at a party congress.

Deng's mandatory retirement system is also a subtle mechanism to reduce intra-regime conflict. As he pointed out in the early 1980s, one of the party's key mistakes in the 1950s was its failure to establish a mandatory retirement system. The CCP and the government were clogged with first-generation revolutionaries in their late fifties who were unwilling to give up power and frustrated the political ambitions of younger leaders. A victim of the Cultural Revolution, Deng witnessed Mao's exploitation of younger elites' frustration for his own advantage. Deng's mandatory retirement age made promotion more predictable for the young and ambitious, reducing their incentive to engage in political conspiracies to advance their careers.

Mandatory retirement has also homogenized the elite. The combination of a college education and age limits has created a ruling elite with a similar social experience and political outlook. Debilitating generational conflict—a regular feature of Mao's regime—has all but disappeared. Gone, too, is the bitter ideological debate that plagued Chinese politics in the early 1980s.

Deng took other steps to manage conflict at the top. To prevent the rise of ideologues on the left and the right, Deng adopted limited competition for party offices. Introduced in 1987 under the pretense of broadening intraparty democracy, the reform mandated that the number of candidates for delegate to the party congress exceed the number of positions by 20 percent. Likewise, the number of candidates for full

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membership and candidate membership in the Central Committee must exceed the number of slots by 5 percent and 12 percent, respectively.

While these measures had a negligible effect on intraparty democracy, they prevented the rise of radical liberals and conservatives within the CCP. The 5 to 20 percent of candidates who fail to get elected or reelected are usually controversial figures. An unintended consequence was the failure of most children of the first-generation leaders (known as the "princelings") to get elected to the party congress or become eligible for membership on the Central Committee. Once feared to be sure successors to their parents' power, the "princelings" disappeared as a political force in the mid-1990s. Deng's reforms also appear to have contributed to the recent stable transition of power from Deng's generation to Jiang's group. The post-Deng ruling elite seemed able to compromise on key policy and personnel matters, and a widely anticipated power struggle failed to materialize.

KEEPING UP

WHILE MANY communist party leaders who had experienced personal tragedies under Mao shared an interest in rewriting party rules to prevent the rise of another dictator, there was little agreement on how to restructure the state without reducing the power of the CCP. Political reforms at this level were technically complex and generated conflicts with vested interests within the government. Nevertheless, such reforms were urgently needed with China's dual transition to a less centralized political system and from a command to a market economy. Both transitions required a redefinition of power among the parts of the state. Without such a recasting of roles (preferably codified in the constitution), political decentralization would inevitably lead to increasing friction within the state apparatus, while market-oriented reforms would eventually encounter the institutional bottleneck of the old political system.

The challenges of political reform facing the post-Mao Chinese leaders were unfamiliar to Western industrial democracies. In the West, the constitutional framework and political institutions conducive to the development of an industrial market economy had been established before economic takeoff. The clear division of power

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among the different parts of the state increased the security of property and enabled the enforcement of contracts. Moreover, the West's economic climb proceeded slowly, allowing its countries' political systems time to make institutional adjustments. This was not true for China. The Chinese political system at the close of the 1970s lacked the necessary institutions for a market economy, such as the rule of law and a clear definition of power within the state. Unlike the West, China faced the challenge of restructuring its political institutions and modernizing its economy simultaneously.

The rapid pace of China's economic development exacerbated friction between the central and provincial governments and between the state and society. A telling index of the scale and speed of socioeconomic change in China is the fact that, while it took the United States 47 years to double its per capita income, it took China only 9; in fact, China has quadrupled its per capita income in the last 18 years. It took the United States 50 years to reduce the share of the labor force engaged in agriculture from 70 percent to 50 percent; China accomplished the same change in 17 years. But behind these successes lie massive socioeconomic dislocation, a rapid shift in values and beliefs, and mounting pressures on the political system to tackle new problems that would overwhelm polities with more mature institutions.

Facing the dilemma of maintaining political order while promoting economic reform, the Chinese leadership has been trying to muddle through. While proclaiming the supremacy of the CCP, Beijing has permitted limited institutional reforms that, if fully implemented in the future, will have a far-reaching impact on the division of power in China. Two deserve special attention: the gradual strengthening of the National People's Congress, China's legislature, and the extensive reforms to the legal system.

CHINA'S CAPITOL HILL

ONE OF the most important political developments of the Deng era was the rise of the National People's Congress (NPC) from a rubber stamp to a potential challenger to the CCP's monopoly of power. In recent years, the NPC has asserted its prerogatives as China's supreme lawmaking body. Although it has not directly confronted the CCP on

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key legislative proposals, members of the NPC now sponsor their own bills, actively debate and amend proposed legislation, and occasionally hold up or vote against important bills. Having the power to confirm or reject the CCP's nominees for senior executives, the NPC recently embarrassed the party by casting a large number of negative votes. During the March 1995 session, a third of the deputies publicly opposed the nomination of a Politburo member for vice premier. Signaling their dissatisfaction with rising crime and corruption, 32 percent of NPC deputies voted against the annual report of the Supreme Court, and 40 percent gave a thumbs-down to the annual report of the supreme procurator in the March 1997 session.

In the provinces, the rift between the legislature and the CCP is more visible in personnel matters. Limited competitive "selections" were introduced in the provinces in 1988, which allowed deputies of provincial people's congresses to nominate their own candidates to compete with the CCP's choices. Although provincial legislatures routinely confirmed the CCP's nominees for governorships and vice governorships, deputies in local people's congresses sometimes rejected the nominations of senior provincial officials and chose write-in candidates instead. According to figures from 20 provinces, 15 percent of the write-in candidates were elected to senior provincial positions.

The growing independence of the NPC has given the institution more credibility. A poll in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in late 1994 found that citizens increasingly viewed the NPC as a channel for expressing their grievances. When asked whom they would approach to lodge a complaint, 22 percent said the deputies of the People's Congress, an increase from 13 percent in 1988.

The NPC has benefited from the general trends of political evolution under way since the late 1970s. The decentralization of power within the regime allowed the NPC to claim a legitimate role in legislation. The appointment of several political heavyweights as chairmen of its Standing Committee gave the NPC extra bargaining power within ruling circles. The situation is similar in the provinces, as many retired provincial party secretaries and governors assumed the chairmanships of provincial people's congresses. Of the chairmen of the 30 provincial congresses in 1996, nine were former first CCP secretaries, three were former governors, and eleven were deputy CCP secretaries. The rapid growth of the NPC's

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permanent professional staff from fewer than 20 in 1978 to more than 2,000 in 1990 has greatly enhanced the institution's technical ability to write legislation.

The profile of the deputies serving the in NPC has changed since 1978 as well. The number of nonparty deputies rose slightly between 1978 and 1993. The average deputy selected in 1993 was relatively young (53 years old) and well educated (69 percent had college degrees). More important, the combined representation by soldiers, peasants, and workers, who provided the base of support for the CCP, declined from almost 62 percent in 1978 to less than 30 percent in 1993. Meanwhile, intellectuals and government officials jumped from 28 percent to 50 percent of the congress, reflecting the enhanced status of professionals and technocrats under Deng.

LAW AND ORDER

ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT development was the set of legal reforms launched by the regime to prevent a repeat of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and lay the legal foundations of a market economy. The NPC passed 175 laws between 1978 and 1994, and local people's congresses enacted another 3,000. On paper, Chinese laws borrow extensively from Western legal doctrines, concepts, procedures, and terminology. Undeterred by the poor enforcement of the law (only half the legal judgments in commercial disputes are enforced), an increasing number of Chinese citizens and businesspeople have turned to the legal system to protect their property and personal rights.

Chinese courts have experienced a rapid rise in three types of cases: commercial litigation over contract disputes, administrative litigation against the government, and civil litigation. From 1986 to 1996, commercial litigation cases increased 387 percent, lawsuits against the government 12,483 percent, and civil lawsuits 212 percent. Judging by opinion polls from the mid-1990s, a relatively strong sense of rights, especially property rights, among the Chinese people appears to be assisting legal reform. In a 1993 poll of 5,455 respondents in six provinces, 78 percent agreed with the statement, "Private property is sacred and must not be violated," and 77 percent disagreed with the statement, "In a lawsuit involving an individual and a collective entity, the judgment

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should favor the latter." When asked "whether the police could continue to detain a person for the sake of public safety even though they were unable to determine his guilt," 47 percent opposed detention, and only 28 percent supported it.

The legal system will continue to grow as an institutional rival to the CCP. Current trends suggest that limited legal reforms will even accelerate. The implementation of an extensive body of law has not only created an institutional legal framework but has benefited important groups—private entrepreneurs, foreign investors, an expanding middle class—who would likely resist any reversal of the trend.

Another favorable factor is the rapid growth of a professional legal community. The number of lawyers in China rose from 31,000 in 1988 to 90,000 in 1995. Although the 1,625 private law firms in 1995 accounted for only 22 percent of all law firms, their growth in recent years has been impressive, averaging 500 annually in 1994 and 1995 and accounting for about 70 percent of the new law firms formed. Not only does this signal the rising independence of the legal community, but the for-profit nature of these firms may spur them to advocate their clients' rights aggressively.

The legal system is likely to become a critical arena in which the CCP's authority can be indirectly challenged and checked before the initiation of competitive elections. Unlike a competitive election or multiparty system, which would threaten the CCP's rule, gradual legal reforms pose no immediate danger to the party's power and may even serve some of its short-term interests. But as legal institutions develop, Beijing's program of limited legal reform has the potential to evolve from a system of law into a rule of law.

REVISING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

THE MOST challenging aspect of political reform in post-Mao China was the restructuring of relations between the state and society and the establishment of institutions of democratic participation. Progress in democratic reform was conspicuously lagging, with the exception of semi-open village elections. But relations between the government and its people have changed dramatically. A new social contract seems to have emerged, whose essence is the redefinition of the scope

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of the state's power and of citizens' freedom. Although never explicitly articulated, the new social contract abolished most curbs on the personal and economic freedom of ordinary citizens in exchange for their tacit acceptance of the CCP's authority. Although the formula of "personal freedom for CCP authority" was repeatedly challenged by the dissidents and nearly overturned during the nationwide democracy movement in the spring of 1989, it seems to have stuck, at least temporarily, in the 1990s.

The data on political repression are evidence of the enforcement of this contract. In the Deng era, the government significantly reduced its repression while maintaining pressure on a relatively small community of determined dissidents who defied the formula. Although the CCP's strategic shift from mass to selective repression has produced a dramatic drop in the general level of repression, it has not gained the regime any credit with the international community because its new strategy has targeted the most visible dissidents, such as Wei Jingsheng, who have been embraced by Western media and politicians. Table 4 shows overall trends for political repression in China. The higher the proportion of political prisoners in the jail population, the more severe political repression is assumed to be.

Table 4's data, collected by leading Chinese sociologists from Shaanxi province in northwestern China, show that the Chinese prison system before Deng resembled Stalin's gulags. Between 1953 and 1975, some 26 to 39 percent of the prison inmates were classified as counterrevolutionaries. The percentage of counterrevolutionaries in the national prison population dropped from 13 percent in 1980 to 0.5 percent in 1989. "Counterrevolutionary" crimes were legally abolished last year. Official figures reported that as of early 1997, Chinese jails housed 2,026 inmates convicted of "crimes of endangering national security," representing 0.46 percent of the prison population.

WHY NO DEMOCRACY?

DESPITE CHINA'S notable progress in restoring elite norms, establishing legal institutions, and maintaining a new social contract, its leaders have strongly resisted democratic reforms. This resistance stems from their fear for China as well as for their own positions, and from knowledge of the party's weakness.

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Chinese leaders are acutely aware of the present system's fragility. The power and roles of the different parts of the state remain poorly defined, and political institutions designed to resolve conflicts remain inadequate or nonexistent. Opening up the political process to mass democratic participation is viewed as a recipe for chaos.

Judging from the Soviet experience, China's anxiety is not completely unjustified. It is commonly believed that Mikhail Gorbachev's fatal error was starting with political reform instead of economic reform. But this interpretation of the Soviet collapse misses the most important point: Gorbachev's political reform strategy was flawed in itself because he opened up politics to democratic participation before he could implement, let alone consolidate, constitutional reforms that would establish the institutions to govern democratic participation. Thus, the first priority of the political forces his democratic reforms unleashed was not to find common ground within a constitutional framework but to overthrow the existing system. Chinese leaders fear they would risk a Soviet-style collapse if they initiated democratic reforms before reinvigorating current constitutional institutions.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES IN PRISONS IN SHAANXI PROVINCE

YEAR	PERCENTAGE
1953	39.1
1957	34.5
1961	34.8
1965	31.7
1968	34.3
1975	26.1
1979	11.5
1981	5.2
1983	1.9

SOURCE: Lu Xueyi and Li Peilin, eds., *China's Social Development Report.*

Then, too, Chinese leaders recognize the organizational decline of the CCP. While it is the world's largest political party, with 3.4 million grassroots party cells and 58 million members in 1997, it is hardly the soundest. Politically, the scars of Tiananmen have not healed, and when they do they will challenge the CCP's internal unity and may force a reassessment of Deng's legacy. The CCP is also governing a society radically different from the one at the end of the Cultural Revolution—a society much less dependent on the state and the party, more open to new values, and less susceptible to traditional ideological appeals.

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More important, market reforms have begun to erode the CCP's organizational integrity in various economic sectors. A top party official admitted in 1994 that 35 percent of the workshops in state-owned enterprises did not have a single CCP member. The party has been unable to establish a significant presence in the emerging private sector. According to a 1994 survey of 3,092 foreign joint ventures or wholly-owned firms in 34 economic development zones, the CCP had set up party cells in only 704 firms. Among the 2.78 million semiprivate township-village enterprises in 1995, the CCP had an organized presence in only 8.6 percent. It was even less successful in penetrating domestically owned private firms. A 1995 survey of 2,500 in Zhejiang province showed that less than one percent had party cells. Among the 70,000 rural joint-stock firms, 77 percent did not have a single CCP member.

Chinese leaders are aware of the present system's fragility.

The most serious crisis faced by the CCP, however, is the decay of its rural organizations. The dismantling of the people's communes from 1980 to 1982 dealt a severe blow to the CCP in the countryside. On paper, the CCP has 26 million members in 900,000 rural party cells. In reality, the CCP rural organization is in disarray. Official data show that 8 percent of the village party cells "could not function" or "had collapsed" and that 60 percent were "mediocre."

Chinese workers' new mobility and the new labor market have contributed to this decline. Economic liberalization has created unprecedented opportunities for rural residents, while social liberalization has lifted restraints on leaving a job and moving around China. Tight budget constraints have kept the CCP from allocating more resources to its rural organizational infrastructure, making careers inside the party less attractive. Today a village CCP chief is paid 1,000 yuan, about $120, a year. Most young, capable CCP members have left villages for jobs in cities. The ones who remain behind are older, poorly educated, and less knowledgeable about the market economy. Official statistics from 1995 show that only 12 percent of the party village chiefs were under 35 and that half the party members in rural areas were illiterate or had only an elementary school education. A study by the CCP's Organization

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Department in Hubei, Anhui, Shanxi, and Qinghai provinces in 1995 showed that a large majority of CCP village chiefs were old-fashioned farmers incapable of leading villagers in a market economy.

The CCP's decline is a leading source of tension in rural areas. If it continues, it will further reduce the party's ability to secure the support of the peasantry, and therefore to govern. Already it has been blamed for widespread corruption, lawlessness, and disputes between the party and the peasants. Official surveys in 1995 in the less-developed provinces Guizhou and Sichuan reported that relationships between local officials and the masses were "tense" and "relatively tense" in 60 to 70 percent of the counties and districts. In numerous instances, angry peasants have murdered local officials or burned their houses.

Despite small signs of progress, Beijing will continue to resist democracy.

In the short run, the CCP's decay in the villages makes it harder for it to govern. The ruling party in fast-growing authoritarian regimes must establish a solid base of support among conservative peasants and mobilize them to counter the democratic opposition in urban areas, especially during semicompetitive elections. Reliable rural support gives the party considerable security and obviates the need to resort to brute force against the opposition. In the long run, the CCP's lack of rural support will make it difficult for it to manage democratic reforms.

Thus the Chinese leadership will continue to resist democracy. Their top priority is to strengthen the party and continue cautious political reforms that will enhance the state's ability to manage the challenges created by China's rapid economic development. Beijing is more likely to push reforms that will improve China's legal and representative institutions. Recent changes in Beijing suggest that its leaders may be moving in that direction. President Jiang Zemin's recent proclamation on "rule according to law" may indicate the leadership's commitment to legal reform. The tax system implemented in 1994 ushered in a new era of relations between the central government and the provinces. Additional economic initiatives, such as integration of the national market, privatization of state-owned

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enterprises, health care programs, pensions, and welfare reforms, are expected to define this relationship further.

But the acceleration of political reform should not be expected to result in a rapid expansion of democratic participation. Until Chinese leaders feel confident about the durability of their political system, they are unlikely to open it to popular participation. In the meantime, they may initiate minor democratic experiments at the grassroots level, such as the expansion of semi-open elections to small towns.

Such small steps toward democratization will not impress American critics. Even though a U.S. policy of engagement will be the most critical external factor for China's political reform, the Clinton administration and its successors will continue to have great difficulty convincing the public that their policy is producing the desired effects on China's political evolution.


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The Dalai Lama's Dilemma

Melvyn C. Goldstein

THE TIBET QUESTION

THE CONFLICT over the political status of Tibet vis-à-vis China has reached a critical juncture in its long history. The exiled Dalai Lama finds himself standing on the sidelines unable to impede or reverse changes in his country that he deplores, and the frustration engendered by this impotence has seriously heightened the danger of violence.

As a classic nationalistic dispute, the Tibet question pits the right of a people, Tibetans, to self-determination and independence against the right of a multiethnic state, the People's Republic of China, to maintain what it sees as its historical territorial integrity. Such disputes are difficult to resolve because there is no clear international consensus about the respective rights of nationalities and states. The U.N. Charter, for example, states that the purpose of the world body is to ensure friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination, but it also states that nothing contained in the charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. The ambiguity about when entities have the right to seek self-determination has made international opinion an important dimension of such disputes, and the struggle to control representations of history and current events is often as intense as the struggle to control territory. In the case of Tibet, both sides have selectively patched bits and pieces of the historical record together to support

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their viewpoints. The ensuing avalanche of charges and countercharges is difficult to assess, even for specialists.

ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

SINO-TIBETAN relations can be traced back almost 1,500 years, but the contemporary conflict is rooted in the chaotic religious and political disputes of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. During this period Tibet became a protectorate of Manchu-ruled China, although Tibet maintained its own language, officials, legal system, and army, and paid no taxes to China. China's loose control over Tibet weakened during the nineteenth century as China itself encountered more and more external and internal assaults, and by the turn of the century its protectorate was largely symbolic.

The overthrow in 1912 of the Qing Dynasty gave Tibetans the opportunity to expel all Chinese troops and officials. From then until 1951, Tibet functioned as a de facto independent nation, conducting all governmental functions without interference from China or any other country. Nevertheless, its international status remained unsettled. China continued to claim Tibet as part of its territory, and Western countries, including Britain and the United States, validated that viewpoint by refusing to recognize Tibetan independence.

The founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 quickly ended Tibet's de facto independence. The communists, like the previous Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek, claimed Tibet as part of China, but unlike that government they had the military power to impose their views. Nevertheless, China wanted more than the simple conquest of Tibet—it sought to secure the formal agreement of the Dalai Lama and his government to reunification. Tibet, however, refused, and China invaded Tibet's eastern province in October 1950 to force the Tibetan government to negotiate. After Tibet's army was quickly vanquished, the Chinese forces stopped their advance and again called for talks. When neither the Western democracies, neighboring India, nor the United Nations responded positively to Tibet's pleas for help, the Dalai Lama sent a negotiating team to Beijing. It reluctantly signed the 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet in May of 1951. This agreement granted Tibetan recognition of Chinese

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

BLACK STAR

What is up his sleeve?: the Dalai Lama, 1989

sovereignty over Tibet for the first time in history. It also recognized the right of the Dalai Lama's government to continue to administer Tibet, at least until the Tibetan people and leaders wanted reforms.

The 17-Point Agreement, however, proved difficult to implement, and after an eight-year period of coexistence, there was an uprising in Tibet. Despite CIA assistance, it was quickly quelled, and the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959, followed by about 80,000 Tibetans. China

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then abolished feudalism and serfdom and instituted communes in agricultural and pastoral areas. The vast monastic system was also dismantled, and during the Cultural Revolution, all religious activities were prohibited.

POST-MAO CONCILIATION

DENG XIAOPING's rise to power in 1978 produced a new initiative to resolve the Tibet question. Deng invited the Dalai Lama to send fact-finding delegations to Tibet and said that apart from the question of total independence all other issues could be discussed and settled. The Dalai Lama responded by sending three fact-finding delegations to Tibet in 1979-80, but contrary to what the Chinese had expected, these visits revealed impoverished conditions and strong feelings of Tibetan nationalism that bolstered the confidence of the exiles at a difficult time in their history.

Beijing's external strategy of trying to persuade the Dalai Lama to return was paralleled by a new internal conciliatory policy in Tibet. It had two main components. The first was an ethnic dimension—making the Tibet Autonomous Region (formally inaugurated in 1965) more Tibetan in overall character by fostering a revitalization of Tibetan culture and religion including reopening Buddhist monasteries, allowing recruitment of new monks, permitting more extensive use of written Tibetan, and replacing large numbers of Chinese cadre with Tibetans. Second was an economic dimension—rapidly improving the standard of living of individual Tibetans by temporarily eliminating taxes and below-market-price sales quotas and developing infrastructure to allow Tibet to grow.

While all this was was taking place, the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama held secret talks in Beijing, once in 1982 and again in 1984. However, these proved fruitless. The exiles were unwilling to accept a solution that did not allow Tibet to operate internally under a political system different from the rest of China, that is, under a Western-style democracy, and notwithstanding Deng's earlier comment, the Chinese were categorically unwilling to consider permitting any entity other than the Communist Party to run Tibet. Complicating matters was the exiles' demand for the creation of a Greater Tibet that

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would include not only the territory that had been political Tibet in modern times, but also ethnic Tibetan areas in western China, most of which Tibet had lost in the eighteenth century.

THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN

The Dalai Lama responded to the collapse of these negotiations by launching an international campaign in 1987 to secure increased political support and leverage in the United States and Europe. A key element in this new strategy was that the Dalai Lama for the first time traveled to the West as a political leader (previous visits had been as a religious leader). In speeches in the United States in 1987 and at Strasbourg in 1988, he argued that Tibet was illegally occupied by China and asserted that a Greater Tibet should become a self-governing democratic entity under a constitution that granted Western-style democratic rights. This enlarged political Tibet would have the right to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and Tibetans. China would remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy, although Tibet would maintain and develop relations through its own Foreign Affairs Office in nonpolitical fields like commerce, sports, and education. Although the proposal did not seek independence, it far exceeded the limited autonomy that could be observed within the Chinese political system, and it had already been rejected by China in the 1984 talks.

While the Dalai Lama was still in the United States in 1987, monks in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, demonstrated in support of his efforts there and in opposition to China's presence in Tibet. After the police made arrests of the protesting monks, a full-scale riot ensued in Lhasa. Although Beijing initially blamed the demonstration solely on the Dalai Lama, it soon moderated its rhetoric in an attempt to salvage its internal conciliation policy in Tibet. In a surprising turnaround, Beijing openly criticized the excessively "leftist" activities of its cadre in Tibet, publicly admitting that one cause of the riot was the failure of its own officials to implement the reform program correctly. Nevertheless, the months after the Lhasa riot saw more demonstrations by monks and nuns and a steady stream of antigovernment posters.

In the United States, more support for the Dalai Lama emerged when Congress added a "sense of the Congress" amendment to the

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Foreign Relations Authorization Act that was signed into law in December 1987. It stated that the United States should make the treatment of the Tibetan people an important factor in its relations with China, that China should respect internationally recognized human rights and end violations against Tibetans, and that the United States should urge China to release all political prisoners in Tibet and reciprocate the Dalai Lama's efforts to establish a constructive dialogue on Tibet's future.

Many Tibetans in Lhasa took the Dalai Lama's warm welcome and acts such as this legislation as evidence that America was now committed to helping the Dalai Lama against China. Not surprisingly, there were more monk-led protests in 1988, two of which led to serious riots. A fresh initiative to rekindle talks by inviting the Dalai Lama to visit China to participate in a religous ceremony in 1989 failed when the Tibetan exile leadership persuaded the Dalai Lama to decline because events were going well in their view. In retrospect, they lost a major opportunity to open a new dialogue. The situation in Tibet, meanwhile, unraveled further when a fourth riot broke out in Lhasa on March 5, 1989. At this juncture, Beijing decided Tibet was out of control and declared martial law.

THE HARD LINE AND THE OPEN DOOR

By 1989, therefore, Beijing's internal and external strategies for Tibet were in shambles. Unless China was willing to relinquish direct control in Tibet and accept the dominion status outlined in the Dalai Lama's 1998 Strasbourg speech, the exiles appeared bent on continuing their international campaign. The campaign was likely to encourage more demonstrations in Tibet and new accusations internationally. The Dalai Lama's international initiative had turned the tables on China, placing Beijing on the defensive both internationally and within Tibet.

In Beijing, it was hard for moderates to refute the contention that China had to stop coddling Tibetans before matters got completely out of hand. Many officials had always believed that liberalizing policy on religion and monasticism in Tibet would only increase nationalist and separatist sentiment, and their view now prevailed. Beijing's new hard-line policy developed more effective

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security measures and began limiting further religious and cultural liberalization. At the same time, it accelerated a program of rapid economic development.

One of the most important components of Beijing's rapid economic development strategy in Tibet was opening the door to the rest of China. That policy has resulted in a much-resented influx into Tibet of non-Tibetan Chinese entrepreneurs and laborers eager to get a share of the massive funds being poured into Tibet, and fostered a much closer economic integration of Tibet with the rest of China. And while these non-Tibetans are not colonists in the normal sense of the term, since their official place of residence is not Tibet and they are expected eventually to return home, at any given time their numbers are unprecedented. At least half of the several hundred thousand residents of Lhasa now appear to be non-Tibetan.

Beijing's economic development strategy has opened Tibet to the rest of China.

For well over a thousand years of recorded history, through wars, conquest, and external domination, Tibet remained the exclusive home of a people. Now Tibetans in Tibet and in exile see this condition being lost and are unable to stop it. Beijing has, in a sense, turned the tables back on the Dalai Lama, and the triumphs of the Dalai Lama's international campaign look more and more like Pyrrhic victories. The international initiative won significant symbolic gains for the exiles in the West and spurred Tibetans in Tibet to demonstrate their support for the Dalai Lama, but it did not compel China to yield and played a major role in precipitating the new hard-line policy that is changing the nature of Tibet.

Beijing now has little interest in discussions with the Dalai Lama. It feels he is not serious about making the kind of political compromises they could agree to and resents his supporters' anti-Chinese rhetoric and activities. Moreover, China believes that its policy of rapidly modernizing Tibet will solidify its position there regardless of what the Dalai Lama or nationalistic Tibetans think or do. Beijing's hope is that ultimately a new generation of Tibetans will emerge that will be less influenced by religion and that will consider Tibet being part of China to be in their interest. Moreover, even if such an orien-

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tation does not develop, the new policy will so radically change the demographic composition of Tibet and the nature of its economy that Beijing's control over Tibet will not be weakened. Beijing's integrationist policy is working well, their trust of the Dalai Lama is at an all-time low, and the absence of a credible U.S.-Europe-Japan threat of sanctions allows them to refuse talks with impunity.

THE DALAI LAMA'S OPTIONS

The Dalai Lama and his top officials, contending that Tibetan culture, religion, and language are endangered, are anxious to stop the influx of non-Tibetans into Tibet. The Dalai Lama is encouraging supporters in the West to urge Beijing to resume talks and has recently written President Jiang Zemin expressing a wish to make a religious visit to a Buddhist shrine in China, presumably to initiate a new round of discussions. China, however, has not agreed to a visit by the Dalai Lama, even one disguised as a religious pilgrimage. A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since Beijing asked the Dalai Lama to visit Beijing on a religious mission in 1989. Beijing does not believe that a new round of talks would be fruitful since the Dalai Lama continues to insist on his Strasbourg proposal's real political autonomy for Tibet and shows no sign of ceasing his attacks on China.

Nevertheless, not only is achieving a permanent solution in Tibet clearly in China's national interest, but the solidification of power by Jiang Zemin means there is now a leader in Beijing with the authority and stature to change direction on this issue. Many Chinese experts and moderates question whether the current policy will produce the long-term stability that China wants in Tibet because it is exacerbating the alienation of Tibetans, even young ones, intensifying their feelings of ethnic hatred and political hopelessness, and inculcating the idea that Tibetans' nationalistic aspirations cannot be met so long as Tibet is part of the People's Republic of China. Right now the hard-liners in China dominate, and they will continue to do so unless something intervenes to give more moderate elements new leverage. That something will have to be provided by the Dalai Lama. Calling off the pro-Tibet demonstrations in the United States during Jiang's recent visit there would have been the kind of signal that is needed.

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Thus the question facing the Dalai Lama and his circle of leaders is similar to the one they confronted in 1982 when their first delegation went to Beijing—how much less than Tibetan independence are they willing to accept? What is new, however, is the tremendous pressure China's hard-line policy is exerting on the Dalai Lama either to resolve the conflict quickly or to develop effective countermeasures that will prevent China from changing the ethnic and economic character of Tibet.

The Dalai Lama may not be able to prevent militant Tibetans from resorting to violence.

The Dalai Lama has several options. He can continue his current international campaign, keeping China on the defensive in the international arena while trying to persuade Washington and Europe to use their power to pressure China for concessions, all the while hoping that the flow of history will provide the victory he desires—that is, that communist China will soon disintegrate like the Qing Dynasty in 1912 and the Soviet Union more recently. Such a policy would generate sympathy and funds for Tibetan exiles in the West and make Tibetans and their supporters feel good. However, Tibet is being transformed in a manner the Dalai Lama and his followers abhor, and if that continues for any length of time, the transformation will likely be difficult to reverse. Consequently there is enormous pressure on the Dalai Lama to move in one of two directions.

The first is serious compromise—sending Beijing a clear and dramatic message that he is willing to accept less than political autonomy and cease attacking China internationally. Such a step, however, will be excruciatingly difficult since it will likely split the fragile unity of the exile community and discourage supporters and donors in the West. If such an initiative ultimately failed, the Dalai Lama could find himself left with political and financial chaos. Given his deep distrust of China and the lack of external guarantees, this option will be difficult for the Dalai Lama to choose.

An alternative direction is escalation—encouraging (or even organizing) violent opposition in Tibet as a means of exerting new leverage on China. Throughout the 1980s both sides have adjusted tactics to counter their opponent's initiatives, and a campaign of terrorist violence would be consistent with this pattern in that it would prevent China

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from pursuing business as usual in Tibet. Such a strategy would not seek to drive China out of Tibet but rather to pressure Beijing to adopt a more conciliatory line. If such a strategy was successful, it could help destabilize China, but even if only partially successful, it could curtail tourism, impede the growth of overseas investment, threaten the security of all non-Tibetans, and heighten international awareness of the seriousness of the problem. It would, in essence, seek to demonstrate to China the futility of the hard-line policy by showing that the ethnic sensibilities of Tibetans cannot be discounted. Even if China again resorted to martial law in Tibet, Tibetan militants could easily respond by shifting their attention to targets in neighboring provinces.

This option would also be extremely difficult for the Dalai Lama to sanction given his commitment to nonviolence, but it may be difficult for him to prevent, even if he personally opposed it. His own failure to force China to moderate its policies when the character of Tibet is so obviously being altered could lead more militant Tibetans to declare his civil disobedience approach a failure and turn to more violent approaches on their own. The crux of the matter is that Tibetans are unlikely to sit by for much longer watching Beijing transform their homeland with impunity. Nationalistic sentiment combined with desperation and anger make a powerful brew, and there are Tibetans, inside and outside Tibet, who favor a campaign of focused violence. There were three bombings in Lhasa in 1996, the last a large blast that damaged a government office building and neighboring hotels and shook buildings half a mile away.

AMERICA AND TIBET

TIBET REMAINED an obscure topic in U.S. foreign policy until the 1980s, when the Dalai Lama's international initiative began to garner strong popular sympathy as well as congressional support. Bill Clinton's inauguration in 1993 initially appeared to extend this momentum to the White House. As part of his policy of giving high priority to human rights issues in foreign affairs, President Clinton openly criticized China's actions in Tibet. When he announced on May 28, 1993, that the secretary of state would not recommend most favored nation trade status for China unless Beijing made significant progress on a series of

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human rights problems, he listed "protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage" as one of these areas. The United States for the first time appeared willing to use its muscle to try to force changes in Chinese policy toward Tibet. If MFN was denied China in part because of its policies in Tibet, Tibetan exiles would have attained precisely the kind of leverage they had been seeking. However, that did not come to pass. The United States' China policy shifted radically in 1994 when President Clinton announced he would not use economic sanctions to try to induce political changes in China, let alone Tibet. Tibetan exiles were thrust back to square one. It was a painful lesson.

U.S. China policy has once again placed political and economic interests ahead of human rights and democracy, carefully steering away from a public, confrontational style. In the 1994 State Department report on Tibet, Washington unambiguously reassured China that the United States accepts Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. The report stated that since at least 1966, U.S. policy has explicitly recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the People's Republic of China, and that this policy is consistent with the view of the international community, including all of China's neighbors. It also stated that because the United States does not recognize Tibet as an independent state, it does not have diplomatic relations with the self-styled Tibetan government-in-exile.

The dominant viewpoint in the U.S. foreign policy establishment is that the United States has no strategic interest in Tibet and should do nothing more than deplore human rights violations and privately suggest that Beijing open new talks with the Dalai Lama. The problem with this policy is that it is implicitly premised on the Sino-Tibetan relationship remaining as it now stands. However, if the conflict degenerates into serious bloodshed, U.S. national interests would be severely harmed. China would respond to violence in Tibet in a heavy-handed way that would create powerful domestic pressures in the United States to support the Tibetans. In turn, Beijing would perceive any such steps as a threat to its core strategic interests, and that would worsen the already fragile relations between China and the United States, potentially complicating the United States' entire Asia policy.

The United States, therefore, has a major strategic interest in Tibet—that of preventing the conflict from turning violent. The current U.S. policy, however, is not moving to bring about a peaceful resolution of the

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conflict, nor can it prevent the exiles or Tibetans in Tibet from turning violent. In fact, if we take into account the vocal support of Congress and others, the sum total of American involvement may actually be encouraging Tibet to reject compromise and oppose China. Of course, it can be argued that the Tibetans will not be able to organize and sustain a program of targeted violence against China, but it seems shortsighted for the United States to allow the situation to deteriorate to a state where that hypothesis will be tested. A more prudent strategy would commit the United States to facilitate a speedy resolution of the conflict. Such a policy would not only meet strategic concerns in America's Asia policy but would also fulfill core American humanitarian values on cultural survival and religious freedom.

ANATOMY OF A COMPROMISE

THE KEY to resolving the dispute is crafting a compromise that will ensure the preservation of a Tibetan homeland where ethnic Tibetans predominate and Tibetan language, culture, and religion flourish. Such a compromise is possible within the current political structure of China if both sides agree to a number of important concessions and work to set aside past hatred and distrust.

In the political sphere, the Tibet Autonomous Region would retain its current political system, but Beijing would move in stages to appoint reform-minded Tibetans to head all its party and government offices. After 10 years, the percentage of Tibetan officials would increase substantially from its current 60 to 70 percent to as high as 85 to 90 percent.

In the cultural sphere, a variety of measures would have to be implemented to enhance the degree to which Tibetan culture predominates. One of the most critical of these would be to shift the bilingual emphasis from Chinese to Tibetan and restore written Tibetan as the main language of the government of Tibet. A detailed plan for this reform was drawn up by a committee of Tibetan and Chinese reformers in 1987 and could readily be enacted. Other cultural measures such as eliminating restrictions on the number of monks in monasteries could be worked out by the parties and gradually phased in.

In the critical demographic and economic spheres, Beijing would have to take measures that would decrease substantially the number

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of non-Tibetans living in Tibet and reduce outside economic competition so that Tibetans become the main beneficiaries of economic development in the Tibet Autonomous Region. The current program of economic development would continue, but if need be at a slower rate and with prime consideration being given to the direct welfare of Tibetans. Since the overwhelming majority of non-Tibetans in Tibet are not legal residents, Beijing has no responsibility for their resettlement and reemployment and could accomplish this shift in priorities, although not without difficulty.

For Tibet to remain a homeland, the Dalai Lama must give up on political autonomy.

The end result of such a process would be a Tibet that was predominantly Tibetan in culture, language, and demographic composition. It would continue to modernize but would be run by Tibetans, albeit communist Tibetans. This kind of Tibet would probably meet with the approval of the overwhelming majority of Tibetans in Tibet if they felt external support for something more was not forthcoming. If China in time follows the path of Taiwan and evolves more democratic institutions such as multiple political parties, the political leadership in Tibet would similarly broaden its base. Transforming Tibet into a modern society is perfectly compatible with preserving its rich language, culture, and religion. It is in the interests of both sides to facilitate the preservation of such a Tibet as the homeland of a people.

One of the greatest stumbling blocks to achieving such a solution is the exiles' demand for the re-creation of a Greater Tibet. Such a formation would be extremely difficult for Beijing to accept, but could be handled by implementing parallel reforms in the ethnic Tibetan areas outside the Tibet Autonomous Region and by waiting to address the unification issue until the new program has been in operation for five or ten years—that is, until new relations of trust and respect are established. Beijing, however, with considerable justification, now considers that even an "ethnic" solution to the Tibet question would be a potential threat to its position given the strong anti-Chinese and separatist feelings of Tibetans. Consequently, to receive favorable consideration in China, a compromise

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plan would have to include components that clearly enhanced Beijing's sovereignty and control over Tibet.

Only the Dalai Lama can make such moves for Beijing, so he, rather than the exile government, is the key element in validating such a compromise. To win the above concessions from China, the Dalai Lama would have to return to China and Tibet, publicly accept Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, and work actively to create cooperative and harmonious relations between Tibetans and non-Tibetans. In particular, he would have to end international attacks on China and persuade Tibetans in Lhasa to stop disturbances—in essence to accept that a truly Tibetan Tibet is not incompatible with being part of China. He would have to use his enormous prestige and charisma to change the attitude of Tibetans toward being part of China. Once begun, it should be possible for such a process to be implemented over the course of a decade, even if most Tibetans in exile do not return. For China, this acceptance would resolve the Tibet issue since support for Tibetan independence in the West would end if the Dalai Lama accepted such a solution. For the Dalai Lama, it would preserve Tibet as a distinct homeland for his people and culture.

However, this kind of compromise is unlikely to occur without external assistance. There is no consensus in the exile community about the advantages of such a political compromise, let alone about the exclusion of the ethnic Tibetan areas outside the Tibet Autonomous Region, so the Dalai Lama would very likely have to decide to pursue this course without the unified support of his government-in-exile. It would not be an easy decision, and his tendency will be to resist compromise. Consequently, if China and the Dalai Lama are left to their own devices, a negotiated resolution of the conflict along the above lines is unlikely. There simply is too little trust and too many powerful reasons for not taking a risk.

If progress is to be made, therefore, a catalyst or facilitator is needed, and that is how the United States could play a constructive role, either through direct private diplomacy or through a proxy country. Given the deep distrust, the Dalai Lama would need strong reassurances from the United States that should China renege on its commitments once he returned to China, the United States would take strong action to protect him. On the other hand, the United

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States would certainly also want to assure Beijing privately that it will support the new arrangement vociferously regardless of what hard-line critics in Congress or elsewhere in the West may say. Moving in that direction would entail some risk for the United States given China's extreme sensitivity to intervention in its internal affairs and because congressional critics might well accuse the administration of selling out the Dalai Lama to the communists. But if done discreetly, and with the agreement of the Dalai Lama, these risks would be minimal. The death of Deng Xiaoping, the solidification of the position of Jiang Zemin, and the appointment of a special coordinator for Tibetan affairs in the United States offers an unusual concatenation for moving in this direction.

The Dalai Lama will be central to any compromise. At 63, he must be thinking about how best to preserve his people and their way of life in his remaining years. He may decide to continue to stand on the sidelines, hoping that external forces will destroy his enemy, but it is more likely that he will soon feel compelled to adopt an active approach, moving to preserve Tibet either by accepting a major compromise, or more likely by tacitly and reluctantly accepting a new tactic of countering Chinese policies in Tibet through organized violence. It seems clearly in the interests of the United States and Tibetans to develop a strategy that will ensure that he and his leaders choose the former over the latter.

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Fixing the Other Asia

Bruce Koppel

KEEPING THE MIRACLE ALIVE

ASIA'S ECONOMIC miracle is in trouble. Last summer Thailand, famed for its economic growth and macroeconomic stability, witnessed an epidemic of plunging currencies and stock prices—called bahtulism by some—that is now spreading throughout the region. The crisis has forced Thailand, as well as Indonesia and South Korea, three of the Asian miracle's brightest stars, to seek multibillion dollar bailouts from the International Monetary Fund. Even Japan has taken a hit. Long the vanguard of Asian economic growth, in December 1997 it was forced to allow the shutdown of two of its largest financial institutions, which were tens of billions of dollars in debt, sparking fears that the contagion of economic distress would lead to further failures among that country's troubled banks and destroy its halting attempts at economic reform. Headlines roared, "Thunder Over Asia" and "Asian Economies: More Myth Than Miracle?" as commentators sharpened their pencils, preparing to write the miracle's epitaph.

But while recent events in Asia are certainly more than mere "glitches in the road," as President Bill Clinton has called them, the Asian miracle is not necessarily over. The region's economic troubles indicate only that the easy part of its economic transformation has ended. Asian leaders have guided their countries through rapid economic growth over the last two decades, privatizing state assets, attracting foreign investment, increasing savings, and strengthening exports, but now they must face a more difficult second generation of challenges. These include

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deepening economic reform, combating corruption, widening political and social inclusiveness, and assuming greater environmental responsibility. These new challenges are primarily those of the "other Asia"—that large, excluded sector of the region that has not uniformly benefited from the economic expansion of the Asian miracle. This is where most Asians live: it is rural and poor and suffers from the traditional economic and social problems of the Third World, and it is where policymakers must focus their energies and resources. Bringing the other Asia into the mainstream of growth will require difficult choices—choices that will determine whether historians decide that what happened to Asia in the latter half of the twentieth century indeed was a miracle or merely a myth.

A MIRACLE DENIED

THE SLIGHTEST mention of Asia conjures up images of skyrocketing growth, abundant wealth, and little poverty. While economic development has definitely brought about a decline in absolute poverty in Asia, the rate of decline has only been slightly greater than the rate of population growth, so the number of poor remains very large. Today, half of Asia's population—1.5 billion people—makes less than $500 per year.

Asia's poverty can be linked to the traditional problems of its rural areas: high population growth, low labor and land productivity, land shortages, and deteriorating natural resources. But there are also new forms of poverty. People are being displaced by the loss of forest and agricultural land to development projects, there are increasing numbers of migrant agricultural workers, and unemployment even among the more educated is rising. In Asia's major cities, where 40 to 60 percent of residents lack adequate housing, poverty is spreading. Poor women are suffering the most, often unable to find employment in anything but low-wage jobs in retail trade or in prostitution. While there are growing numbers of women holding factory jobs, they are systematically subject to wage discrimination. And children from poor households are being drawn away from primary education into unsafe employment, such as making matches and fireworks, at very low wages.

Education, health, and social services are not provided to the poor to the same extent as they are to wealthier segments of the population.

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Five hundred eighty-five million Asians do not have access to health care, and the average level of education ranges from two years for South Asian women to eight years for Filipino men. Each year, nearly 7 million Asian children die before their 5th birthday, and close to 300,000 women die in childbirth, with an additional 9 million incurring injuries, infections, and disabilities during pregnancy. Child malnutrition is more prevalent in South Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa (51 percent versus 31 percent in 1996). While the lot of Asia's people has improved over the last three decades, the continent's poor record reveals a picture considerably different from what one would expect from a region positioning itself to be a competitive player in the global economy.

Child malnutrition is greater in Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa.

The historical experiences of the United States and Western Europe are frequently raised to argue that Asia's poverty and excessive inequality will ultimately be solved by continued economic growth. But this analogy is not entirely appropriate. In the West, economic development proceeded slowly enough so that traditional social problems such as high infant and maternal mortality, rampant infectious diseases, short life expectancy, limited access to primary education and health services, and female exclusion from education were reduced before modern problems such as urban unemployment, cardiopulmonary diseases, lack of access to higher education, family instability, and questions of social security and aging emerged on a large scale. Few people were exposed to both kinds of social problems at the same time, and governments did not need to make fundamental choices between committing resources to address modern problems or using them to solve traditional ones.

Asia presents a very different picture. Large numbers of people are exposed to both traditional and modern problems. This is especially true of the urban poor, who experience health and education problems comparable to those faced by the rural poor but who are also increasingly exposed to problems specific to the contemporary urban environment—unsafe water, inadequate sanitation, and exposure to high levels of pollutants such as lead and carbon monoxide. Middle-class urbanites who want sophisticated hospitals, universities, mass transit, and a cleaner environment find themselves pitted against the

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rural and urban poor who share many of those aspirations but who also need investment in basic heath care, education, social services, and affordable housing. Asia's leadership faces difficult choices.

A DIFFERENCE THAT MATTERS

THE HUMAN costs of economic growth have been greater in Asia than they were in the West because Asia's economies have evolved differently. It is common to think of economic development as proceeding through a transition from the predominance of primary (agriculture, fisheries, forests) to secondary (construction and manufacturing) to tertiary (retail, financial, education) enterprises. But Asia's economy has followed this pattern only in part. Since 1975, as expected, the share of agriculture in GDP has declined. The share of industry in GDP has risen, also as expected. But contrary to expectations, the share from services has risen even more rapidly. This trend would not be so alarming if the proportions of the labor force involved in each of these enterprises followed these growth patterns, but they have not. In fact, 60 percent of the labor force remains in the agricultural sector, while only 10 to 11 percent is employed in manufacturing. The service sector claims another 25 percent of the work force, the majority of which is involved not in the lucrative, male-dominated, white collar services jobs like banking and finance, but in non-wage employment such as street commerce, transportation services, and casual labor. This part of the service sector exhibits a predominance of women and children, low education, pay, and job security, and is growing, accounting for the sharp growth of the service sector as a whole.

In addition to the limited structural change, productivity has declined. In India, for example, between 1977 and 1991 productivity as a percentage of the national average decreased in the primary sector from 59 percent to 49 percent, and in the services sector, it fell from 204 percent to 191 percent. Only in the manufacturing sector did productivity rise—from 198 percent to 231 percent, but this increase was largely based on worker exploitation, low wages, restrictions on labor activism, and rampant corruption. In fact, throughout Asia the manufacturing sector has exhibited a high degree of "casualization," as laborers work on a day-to-day basis without reliable employment, insurance benefits, or minimum wage coverage. In the Philippines' Mactan Export Processing Zone,

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for example, employment increased by 12 percent during 1996, from 29,000 to almost 33,000 manufacturing jobs. However, at the same time over 28,000 workers in small manufacturing enterprises outside the zone lost their jobs because of shutdowns and retrenchments. Analysts of the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam call this "jobless growth."

It is clear that Asia's substantial economic gains have been squeezed from minimal structural change. The region's leaders must now invest in the human resources and infrastructure needed to improve productivity across the entire economy, particularly in the agricultural and services sectors that employ 85 percent of the work force. As the experience of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan suggests, increased agricultural productivity and consumption lay the foundation for a successful industrial growth strategy, since productive rural households have more cash to purchase agricultural equipment, invest in their children's education, and purchase consumer goods. The result is sustainable growth driven not only by exports, but by healthy, domestic demand.

THE CORRUPTION ERUPTION

CORRUPTION IS a serious and growing problem throughout Asia. As many observers have noted, the low transparency and extreme centralization of economic policymaking have created an environment where corruption can thrive. In the past, officials in charge of licensing and permit decisions found their positions ideal for soliciting bribes and discovered that there was a lot of money to be made from smuggling. With liberalization and economic diversification, the opportunities for corruption have grown. Today it is tied to the movement of large amounts of investment funds (through kickbacks and bribes), the allocation of land and facilities for industrial parks or golf courses, and the assurance of labor stability (by clamping down on unions and labor activism). For families living in upland and forest areas, workers trying to organize to protect their rights, and entrepreneurs trying to start and sustain small enterprises, corruption remains a fact of life.

In China, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea public suspicion about the large fortunes amassed by powerful politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats has tested the stability of regimes, the credibility of reform programs, and the patience of foreign investors. In Asia those

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ARCHIVE PHOTOS

Those the miracle left behind: Thailand, 1997

with political power are also those who own the banks, real estate development firms, and mining operations. For example, many of Indonesia's largest banks are owned by relatives of President Suharto, and in South Korea, the economy has long been anchored by large, secretive, family-run businesses called *chaebols*, which government regulators permitted to take on excessive debt without disclosure to investors. There has traditionally been no challenge to the elites' stranglehold over the economy. While this is certainly changing, especially in domestic markets for consumer goods, there is considerably less room for competition in the more vital industries that drive economic growth. Without competition, there is no incentive to increase efficiency, invest in research and development, upgrade technology, or train the labor force. Enhancing competition and reducing corruption requires challenging the upper echelons of Asia's elites, which will be difficult. South Korean President Kim Young Sam has already taken the first step in his country by instituting a rule requiring bank depositors to maintain accounts in their own

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names, in an effort to help his country's financial institutions regain some much-needed credibility. But as long as the economic and political landscape is so seriously unbalanced, there will be little opportunity for the other Asia to join in the economic miracle.

ENVIRO-RESPONSIBILITY

THE THICK haze that hung over much of Southeast Asia during the summer and fall of 1997 created a sense of environmental crisis. However, the real crisis did not begin with forest fires in Indonesia—it was a slowly accumulating consequence of high population growth, rapid urban development, and industrialization. For years, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) throughout Asia have been confronting governments and corporations for misappropriating, misusing, and destroying critical forest, water, and land resources. Environmental degradation has put the sustainability of Asia's economic transformation increasingly at risk—in terms of economic costs, human health, and continued access to the basic resources required for economic development.

Consider Cebu, the booming industrial city in the central Philippines. In the watershed above the city, few trees remain. Although large parts of the watershed are supposedly protected by the state, land rights are still bought and sold by powerful business and political interests for luxury residential developments, golf courses, and industrial parks. Today, Cebu faces a water crisis, not so much because of expanded demand, but rather because of diminished supply due to the destruction of the watershed. Flooding on the streets of the city, never a problem before except in the worst typhoons, is now a common occurrence after rain because the watershed simply cannot hold water. With flooding comes problems for health and business—rising incidence of infectious diseases, enterprise shutdowns, property destruction, and lost jobs. What is happening in Cebu—the undermining of the environmental requisites of urban-industrial development—can be seen in many other places, from Bandung to Chiang Mai to Bangalore. And it is the poor and powerless—in the cities and in the surrounding uplands—who pay the highest price.

It is not just the urban areas that are suffering from environmental degradation. Rural environments are being torn between popular demands for more agricultural land and a variety of commercial pressures

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to take land out of agriculture and use it for industrial and real estate projects. The result is not only the degradation of agricultural lands, but also the destruction of forest areas and watersheds. Many of the fires in Indonesia are the result of burning off virgin forest land to develop export-oriented palm oil plantations. And in India, Thailand, and Vietnam, mangrove forests are being rapidly destroyed to develop commercial prawn exports. The mangroves are the natural nurseries for many edible aquatic species, including those that poorer people rely on for nourishment. These kinds of changes affect the security of the food supply and exacerbate unemployment as landless farmers are forced to join roaming troops of migrant workers in search of employment at abysmal wages.

Environmental degradation hampers Asia's development.

Asia's economic growth has not only been rapid, it has been poorly regulated. Factories and roads were built with little regard for the environmental havoc they would wreak on the surrounding urban areas. Toxic wastes and emissions from industry and motor vehicles have made Asia's cities some of the most polluted in the world. In combination with the tenuous supply of basic resources—notably safe water and reliable power—many questions arise about what it will cost to maintain Asia's cities as sites for the industries of the next century. In Bangalore, India, there is a sign of what may be coming. Led by investors from Singapore, several major industrial parks are being built outside the city that are completely self-contained in terms of housing, water, communications, and electricity. This will be fine for the software companies in these parks and the families of their employees, but where does that leave the four million people in the Bangalore area, many of whom lack reliable access to safe water and power?

EXPANDING DEMOCRACY

As PRESSURES from the other Asia mount, especially as economic growth begins to slow, there is a danger that corporate, bureaucratic, and military elites will see their own interests threatened and will justify repression in the interest of preserving stability. In fact, the identification of pluralism with instability and insecurity is already a well-known

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practice throughout Asia. For example, the July 1996 political protests in Jakarta, Indonesia, described as the country's worst civil disorder in a decade, were met with an aggressive military response, including an order that rioters be shot on sight. Such developments are problematic for Asia's economic growth since they tend to reinforce the traditional politics of privilege, as besieged elites move to further consolidate their control over power and resources at the expense of the rest.

The precious little democracy that does exist in Asia is becoming increasingly partisan, and politicians are mobilizing support along ever narrower lines of political identity. As in the electoral victories of the Hindu extremist Bharatiya Janata Party in India in 1996, there is a growing danger that populist and even chauvinist appeals will resonate with the excluded masses. Class differences are at play as well, as the poor find themselves pitted against the middle and upper classes in a competition for scarce resources. For example, in Southeast Asia and India, the burgeoning urban middle classes are demanding reduced government corruption, greater transparency in policymaking, and political stability. At the same time laborers, farmers, women, and minorities are clamoring for a greater share of Asia's growth, with demands for asset reform (such as agricultural land reform, certification of ancestral or community property rights in forest areas, urban land reform for housing) to various political reforms (such as voting at their place of work rather than their place of residence and expanding women's representation in government). Different interest groups and varying political views are being brought into increasing confrontation. Those trying to clean up corruption confront the advocates of traditional patronage politics. Those trying to maintain political stability confront demands for political reform from the disenfranchised. Those who believe economic growth requires strong political leadership may be impatient with the advocates of broader democratization. As can be seen in China, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, even where there is rising income, perceptions of a significant imbalance between who benefits from and who pays for economic growth can converge with other fault lines in the political landscape and become the source of significant frustration and instability. Democracy is not always strong enough to withstand these differences.

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GETTING THE QUESTION RIGHT

THERE ARE many who argue that growth begets growth, that Asia need only continue its current level of economic development for the problems of the other Asia to go away. East Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are proposed as models because they were able to achieve economic growth with a measure of social equity. But that view is more hopeful than realistic, since the scale of the problems in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and China is qualitatively different from what was encountered in East Asia. The rest of Asia has bigger, faster-growing populations, lower levels of education and health care, and poorly distributed agricultural land, and faces an international environment that encourages export-oriented development at the expense of domestic demand. The question is not whether the existing growth trajectories can be continued, but rather what happens if these trajectories are continued.

The 1997 Asian Development Bank report, *Emerging Asia*, concluded that if the future relationship between economic growth and poverty "resembles that of the past, the poverty in Asia will continue to fall." The percentage of the total population that lives in poverty may very well decline, but it is important to keep in mind that Asia's population, and hence the absolute number of its poor, will continue to grow—40 percent by 2020. Moreover, while reducing the proportion of the population below some minimal poverty line is certainly important, it is hardly an adequate measure of social progress and economic inclusion.

In Asia, poverty still appears to be accepted far more than it is questioned. Policymakers focus too much on the brightest parts of the economy, too little on the poor and excluded and their problems. For example, property development in the Philippine cities of Manila and Cebu is booming, yet an estimated four million Filipinos must find work overseas—mostly in services and construction—because there is not enough work at home to go around. Policymakers confidently predict that these workers' remittances will prevent a current account deficits problem, but at the same time they argue that issues of poverty have to wait until the economy's takeoff is assured. The Filipino poor who cannot find overseas employment are caught in the

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middle. Other economies have comparable problems of imbalance: Thailand's growth and investment is heavily concentrated in the Bangkok area, China's in the coastal provinces.

The relationship between economic growth and social improvement needs to do considerably more than just resemble the past if sustainable, high quality growth is to result. The fundamental problem with resembling the past is that it maintains the false premise that the issues of the other Asia are simply transitional difficulties. They are not.

FINDING THE LEADER

ARGUMENTS THAT the other Asia's predicament is simply a transitional phase absolve policymakers from responsibility for focusing on many of the problems directly: they need only ensure growth, and poverty and exclusion will disappear. Addressing the second-generation challenges of the Asian miracle is primarily a political problem. Leadership must focus on how to broaden participation in growth, not simply as a serendipitous consequence of what they are already doing, but as a necessary condition for continued growth.

First, leaders must recognize that while growth matters, what matters even more is the type of growth. For example, focusing on the share of export manufactures in GDP can divert attention from the fundamental point that far more can be gained by strengthening productivity in agriculture and services than by attracting a few more computer assembly plants. Economic growth may generate jobs, but it does not necessarily generate the political will to improve access to education, health, and social services. So far, Asia's economic development has revealed the region's infrastructure problems far more than it has generated the commitment to solve them.

Under recent economic and administrative reforms in the region, there has been significantly less reliance on central planning to confront key issues, and increased dependence instead on market forces. In the resulting vacuum, a new kind of politics is evolving. It is characterized by heightened labor, media, and judicial activism, entry into electoral politics by women, minorities, and in some instances former insurgents, and the concerns of the middle class. Their agendas vary, of course, but they share strong commitments to sustainable

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development, job creation, and greater opportunities for women. They support government decentralization but seek increased roles for community organizations and NGOs. For example, the Philippines' Citizens Action Party and a number of NGO consortia in India and Thailand are encouraging women and the poor to compete for local electoral positions. However, it remains to be seen whether this type of leadership can ascend from local to national arenas.

As Asia's population grows, so will the number of its poor.

Whatever kinds of politics are in place, what is needed is a new social contract between politics and society that establishes a clear understanding of how the costs and benefits of growth will be shared. Since labor is abundant, it is often argued that the region's policymakers should concentrate on developing labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing industries. But this effort will only result in low-wage, unskilled or marginally skilled employment. It may work for the short term, but it is useless as a long-term strategy; a large unskilled labor force cannot be the basis for a technologically advancing society. While Asia's leaders trumpet their economies' high GDP growth rates, what is often not emphasized is that in many instances these rates are substantially higher than the growth in literacy. And it is arguably the latter that is a more accurate indicator of overall, sustainable development.

Will more widespread and consistent leadership emerge at both the national and local level that is oriented to national growth rather than simply economic growth? These are pivotal times throughout Asia, with issues of succession and turnover arising in national political leadership over the next few years, but also in terms of ideas about the exercise of leadership.

Will the organizations of civil society—notably NGOs, the media, legal professions, labor organizations, chambers of commerce, and education—take responsibility for encouraging political investment in the national good? Or will they merely continue the politics of grievance that leave underlying problems essentially untouched? While there may be strong support for the idea of more open economies, there is considerably less agreement about the desirabil-

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ity and even the meaning of more open politics. That does not bode well for the difficult choices of the second-generation challenges.

Established trends will not be good enough for Asia's future, however attractive they were in the past. Hard choices need to be made, but by rather than simply for the people who will have to live with the outcomes of those choices. That is why addressing the second-generation challenges of Asia's economic transformation depends upon the quality of politics and leadership within Asia. The prerequisites for making these hard choices are to recognize that there is an other Asia, that the only future for national growth that is sustainable and fair lies with the other Asia becoming a beneficiary, and that the costs of bringing this about must be clearly understood. Until Asia's leadership understands these requirements, the promise and the reality of Asia's economic growth will continue to diverge for the majority of its people.

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

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Commonsense Drug Policy

Ethan A. Nadelmann

FIRST, REDUCE HARM

In 1988 Congress passed a resolution proclaiming its goal of "a drug-free America by 1995." U.S. drug policy has failed persistently over the decades because it has preferred such rhetoric to reality, and moralism to pragmatism. Politicians confess their youthful indiscretions, then call for tougher drug laws. Drug control officials make assertions with no basis in fact or science. Police officers, generals, politicians, and guardians of public morals qualify as drug czars—but not, to date, a single doctor or public health figure. Independent commissions are appointed to evaluate drug policies, only to see their recommendations ignored as politically risky. And drug policies are designed, implemented, and enforced with virtually no input from the millions of Americans they affect most: drug users. Drug abuse is a serious problem, both for individual citizens and society at large, but the "war on drugs" has made matters worse, not better.

Drug warriors often point to the 1980s as a time in which the drug war really worked. Illicit drug use by teenagers peaked around 1980, then fell more than 50 percent over the next 12 years. During the 1996 presidential campaign, Republican challenger Bob Dole made much of the recent rise in teenagers' use of illicit drugs, contrasting it with the sharp drop during the Reagan and Bush administrations. President

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Clinton's response was tepid, in part because he accepted the notion that teen drug use is the principal measure of drug policy's success or failure; at best, he could point out that the level was still barely half what it had been in 1980.

In 1980, however, no one had ever heard of the cheap, smokable form of cocaine called crack, or drug-related HIV infection or AIDS. By the 1990s, both had reached epidemic proportions in American cities, largely driven by prohibitionist economics and morals indifferent to the human consequences of the drug war. In 1980, the federal budget for drug control was about $1 billion, and state and local budgets were perhaps two or three times that. By 1997, the federal drug control budget had ballooned to $16 billion, two-thirds of it for law enforcement agencies, and state and local funding to at least that. On any day in 1980, approximately 50,000 people were behind bars for violating a drug law. By 1997, the number had increased eightfold, to about 400,000. These are the results of a drug policy overreliant on criminal justice "solutions," ideologically wedded to abstinence-only treatment, and insulated from cost-benefit analysis.

Imagine instead a policy that starts by acknowledging that drugs are here to stay, and that we have no choice but to learn how to live with them so that they cause the least possible harm. Imagine a policy that focuses on reducing not illicit drug use per se but the crime and misery caused by both drug abuse and prohibitionist policies. And imagine a drug policy based not on the fear, prejudice, and ignorance that drive America's current approach but rather on common sense, science, public health concerns, and human rights. Such a policy is possible in the United States, especially if Americans are willing to learn from the experiences of other countries where such policies are emerging.

ATTITUDES ABROAD

AMERICANS ARE not averse to looking abroad for solutions to the nation's drug problems. Unfortunately, they have been looking in the wrong places: Asia and Latin America, where much of the world's heroin and cocaine originates. Decades of U.S. efforts to keep drugs from being produced abroad and exported to American markets have failed. Illicit drug production is bigger business than ever before. The

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opium poppy, source of morphine and heroin, and *cannabis sativa,* from which marijuana and hashish are prepared, grow readily around the world; the coca plant, from whose leaves cocaine is extracted, can be cultivated far from its native environment in the Andes. Crop substitution programs designed to persuade Third World peasants to grow legal crops cannot compete with the profits that drug prohibition makes inevitable. Crop eradication campaigns occasionally reduce production in one country, but new suppliers pop up elsewhere. International law enforcement efforts can disrupt drug trafficking organizations and routes, but they rarely have much impact on U.S. drug markets.

Drug policy should reduce the damage to users and the society around them.

Even if foreign supplies could be cut off, the drug abuse problem in the United States would scarcely abate. Most of America's drug-related problems are associated with domestically produced alcohol and tobacco. Much if not most of the marijuana, amphetamine, hallucinogens, and illicitly diverted pharmaceutical drugs consumed in the country are made in the U.S.A. The same is true of the glue, gasoline, and other solvents used by kids too young or too poor to obtain other psychoactive substances. No doubt such drugs, as well as new products, would quickly substitute for imported heroin and cocaine if the flow from abroad dried up.

While looking to Latin America and Asia for supply-reduction solutions to America's drug problems is futile, the harm-reduction approaches spreading throughout Europe and Australia and even into corners of North America show promise. These approaches start by acknowledging that supply-reduction initiatives are inherently limited, that criminal justice responses can be costly and counterproductive, and that single-minded pursuit of a "drug-free society" is dangerously quixotic. Demand-reduction efforts to prevent drug abuse among children and adults are important, but so are harm-reduction efforts to lessen the damage to those unable or unwilling to stop using drugs immediately, and to those around them.

Most proponents of harm reduction do not favor legalization. They recognize that prohibition has failed to curtail drug abuse, that it is responsible for much of the crime, corruption, disease, and death

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associated with drugs, and that its costs mount every year. But they also see legalization as politically unwise and as risking increased drug use. The challenge is thus making drug prohibition work better, but with a focus on reducing the negative consequences of both drug use and prohibitionist policies.

Countries that have turned to harm-reduction strategies for help in alleviating their drug woes are not so different from the United States. Drugs, crime, and race problems, and other socioeconomic problems are inextricably linked. As in America, criminal justice authorities still prosecute and imprison major drug traffickers as well as petty dealers who create public nuisances. Parents worry that their children might get involved with drugs. Politicians remain fond of drug war rhetoric. But by contrast with U.S. drug policy, public health goals have priority, and public health authorities have substantial influence. Doctors have far more latitude in treating addiction and associated problems. Police view the sale and use of illicit drugs as similar to prostitution—vice activities that cannot be stamped out but can be effectively regulated. Moralists focus less on any inherent evils of drugs than on the need to deal with drug use and addiction pragmatically and humanely. And more politicians dare to speak out in favor of alternatives to punitive prohibitionist policies.

Harm-reduction innovations include efforts to stem the spread of HIV by making sterile syringes readily available and collecting used syringes; allowing doctors to prescribe oral methadone for heroin addiction treatment, as well as heroin and other drugs for addicts who would otherwise buy them on the black market; establishing "safe injection rooms" so addicts do not congregate in public places or dangerous "shooting galleries"; employing drug analysis units at the large dance parties called raves to test the quality and potency of MDMA, known as Ecstasy, and other drugs that patrons buy and consume there; decriminalizing (but not legalizing) possession and retail sale of cannabis and, in some cases, possession of small amounts of "hard" drugs; and integrating harm-reduction policies and principles into community policing strategies. Some of these measures are under way or under consideration in parts of the United States, but rarely to the extent found in growing numbers of foreign countries.

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STOPPING HIV WITH STERILE SYRINGES

THE SPREAD of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, among people who inject drugs illegally was what prompted governments in Europe and Australia to experiment with harm-reduction policies. During the early 1980s public health officials realized that infected users were spreading HIV by sharing needles. Having already experienced a hepatitis epidemic attributed to the same mode of transmission, the Dutch were the first to tell drug users about the risks of needle sharing and to make sterile syringes available and collect dirty needles through pharmacies, needle exchange and methadone programs, and public health services. Governments elsewhere in Europe and in Australia soon followed suit. The few countries in which a prescription was necessary to obtain a syringe dropped the requirement. Local authorities in Germany, Switzerland, and other European countries authorized needle exchange machines to ensure 24-hour access. In some European cities, addicts can exchange used syringes for clean ones at local police stations without fear of prosecution or harassment. Prisons are instituting similar policies to help discourage the spread of HIV among inmates, recognizing that illegal drug injecting cannot be eliminated even behind bars.

These initiatives were not adopted without controversy. Conservative politicians argued that needle exchange programs condoned illicit and immoral behavior and that government policies should focus on punishing drug users or making them drug-free. But by the late 1980s, the consensus in most of Western Europe, Oceania, and Canada was that while drug abuse was a serious problem, AIDS was worse. Slowing the spread of a fatal disease for which no cure exists was the greater moral imperative. There was also a fiscal imperative. Needle exchange programs' costs are minuscule compared with those of treating people who would otherwise become infected with HIV.

Only in the United States has this logic not prevailed, even though AIDS was the leading killer of Americans ages 25 to 44 for most of the 1990s and is now No. 2. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that half of new HIV infections in the country stem from injection drug use. Yet both the White House and Congress block allocation of AIDS or drug-abuse prevention funds for needle exchange, and virtually all state governments retain drug paraphernalia laws, pharmacy regulations, and

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other restrictions on access to sterile syringes. During the 1980s, AIDS activists engaging in civil disobedience set up more syringe exchange programs than state and local governments. There are now more than 100 such programs in 28 states, Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico, but they reach only an estimated 10 percent of injection drug users.

Prejudice and political cowardice are poor excuses for allowing AIDS to spread.

Governments at all levels in the United States refuse to fund needle exchange for political reasons, even though dozens of scientific studies, domestic and foreign, have found that needle exchange and other distribution programs reduce needle sharing, bring hard-to-reach drug users into contact with health care systems, and inform addicts about treatment programs, yet do not increase illegal drug use. In 1991 the National AIDS Commission appointed by President Bush called the lack of federal support for such programs "bewildering and tragic." In 1993 a CDC-sponsored review of research on needle exchange recommended federal funding, but top officials in the Clinton administration suppressed a favorable evaluation of the report within the Department of Health and Human Services. In July 1996 President Clinton's Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS criticized the administration for its failure to heed the National Academy of Sciences' recommendation that it authorize the use of federal money to support needle exchange programs. An independent panel convened by the National Institute of Health reached the same conclusion in February 1997. Last summer, the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, and even the politicized U.S. Conference of Mayors endorsed the concept of needle exchange. In the fall, an endorsement followed from the World Bank.

To date, America's failure in this regard is conservatively estimated to have resulted in the infection of up to 10,000 people with HIV. Mounting scientific evidence and the stark reality of the continuing AIDS crisis have convinced the public, if not politicians, that needle exchange saves lives; polls consistently find that a majority of Americans support needle exchange, with approval highest among those most familiar with the notion. Prejudice and political cowardice are poor excuses for allowing more citizens to suffer from and die of AIDS, especially when effective interventions are cheap, safe, and easy.

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METHADONE AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES

THE UNITED STATES pioneered the use of the synthetic opiate methadone to treat heroin addiction in the 1960s and 1970s, but now lags behind much of Europe and Australia in making methadone accessible and effective. Methadone is the best available treatment in terms of reducing illicit heroin use and associated crime, disease, and death. In the early 1990s the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine stated that of all forms of drug treatment, "methadone maintenance has been the most rigorously studied modality and has yielded the most incontrovertibly positive results . . . Consumption of all illicit drugs, especially heroin, declines. Crime is reduced, fewer individuals become HIV positive, and individual functioning is improved." However, the institute went on to declare, "Current policy . . . puts too much emphasis on protecting society from methadone, and not enough on protecting society from the epidemics of addiction, violence, and infectious diseases that methadone can help reduce."

Methadone is to street heroin what nicotine skin patches and chewing gum are to cigarettes—with the added benefit of legality. Taken orally, methadone has little of injected heroin's effect on mood or cognition. It can be consumed for decades with few if any negative health consequences, and its purity and concentration, unlike street heroin's, are assured. Like other opiates, it can create physical dependence if taken regularly, but the "addiction" is more like a diabetic's "addiction" to insulin than a heroin addict's to product bought on the street. Methadone patients can and do drive safely, hold good jobs, and care for their children. When prescribed adequate doses, they can be indistinguishable from people who have never used heroin or methadone.

Popular misconceptions and prejudice, however, have all but prevented any expansion of methadone treatment in the United States. The 115,000 Americans receiving methadone today represent only a small increase over the number 20 years ago. For every ten heroin addicts, there are only one or two methadone treatment slots. Methadone is the most tightly controlled drug in the pharmacopoeia, subject to unique federal and state restrictions. Doctors cannot prescribe it for addiction treatment outside designated programs. Regulations dictate not only security, documentation, and staffing requirements but maximum doses,

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admission criteria, time spent in the program, and a host of other specifics, none of which has much to do with quality of treatment. Moreover, the regulations do not prevent poor treatment; many clinics provide insufficient doses, prematurely detoxify clients, expel clients for offensive behavior, and engage in other practices that would be regarded as unethical in any other field of medicine. Attempts to open new clinics tend to be blocked by residents who don't want addicts in their neighborhood.

In much of Europe and Australia, methadone treatment was at first even more controversial than in the United States; some countries, including Germany, France, and Greece, prohibited it well into the 1980s and 1990s. But where methadone has been accepted, doctors have substantial latitude in deciding how and when to prescribe it so as to maximize its efficacy. There are methadone treatment programs for addicts looking for rehabilitation and programs for those simply trying to reduce their heroin consumption. Doctors in regular medical practice can prescribe the drug, and patients fill their prescriptions at local pharmacies. Thousands of general practitioners throughout Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada (notably in Ontario and British Columbia) are now involved in methadone maintenance. In Belgium, Germany, and Australia this is the principal means of distribution. Integrating methadone with mainstream medicine makes treatment more accessible, improves its quality, and allocates ancillary services more efficiently. It also helps reduce the stigma of methadone programs and community resistance to them.

Many factors prevent American doctors from experimenting with the more flexible treatment programs of their European counterparts. The Drug Enforcement Administration contends that looser regulations would fuel the illicit market in diverted methadone. But the black market, in which virtually all buyers are heroin addicts who cannot or will not enroll in methadone programs, is primarily a product of the inadequate legal availability of methadone. Some conventional providers do not want to cede their near-monopoly over methadone treatment and are reluctant to take on addicts who can't or won't commit to quitting heroin. And all efforts to make methadone more available in the United States run up against the many Americans who dismiss methadone treatment as substituting one addictive drug for another and are wary of any treatment that does not leave the patient "drug free."

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CORBIS - BETTMANN

Just say maybe: Nancy Reagan at an antidrug rally, 1986

Oral methadone works best for hundreds of thousands of heroin addicts, but some fare better with other opiate substitutes. In England, doctors prescribe injectable methadone for about 10 percent of recovering patients, who may like the modest "rush" upon injection or the ritual of injecting. Doctors in Austria, Switzerland, and Australia are experimenting with prescribing oral morphine to determine whether it works better than oral methadone for some users. Several treatment programs in the Netherlands have conducted trials with oral morphine and palfium. In Germany, where methadone treatment was initially shunned, thousands of addicts have been maintained on codeine, which many doctors and patients still prefer to methadone. The same is true of buprenorphine in France.

In England, doctors have broad discretion to prescribe whatever drugs help addicted patients manage their lives and stay away from illegal drugs and their dealers. Beginning in the 1920s, thousands of English addicts were maintained on legal prescriptions of heroin, morphine, amphetamine, cocaine, and other pharmaceutical drugs. This tradition flourished until the 1960s, and has reemerged in response to AIDS and to growing disappointment with the Americanization of

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British prescribing practices during the 1970s and 1980s, when illicit heroin use in Britain increased almost tenfold. Doctors in other European countries and Australia are also trying heroin prescription.

The Swiss government began a nationwide trial in 1994 to determine whether prescribing heroin, morphine, or injectable methadone could reduce crime, disease, and other drug-related ills. Some 1,000 volunteers—only heroin addicts with at least two unsuccessful experiences in methadone or other conventional treatment programs were considered—took part in the experiment. The trial quickly determined that virtually all participants preferred heroin, and doctors subsequently prescribed it for them. Last July the government reported the results so far: criminal offenses and the number of criminal offenders dropped 60 percent, the percentage of income from illegal and semilegal activities fell from 69 to 10 percent, illegal heroin *and* cocaine use declined dramatically (although use of alcohol, cannabis, and tranquilizers like Valium remained fairly constant), stable employment increased from 14 to 32 percent, physical health improved enormously, and most participants greatly reduced their contact with the drug scene. There were no deaths from overdoses, and no prescribed drugs were diverted to the black market. More than half those who dropped out of the study switched to another form of drug treatment, including 83 who began abstinence therapy. A cost-benefit analysis of the program found a net economic benefit of $30 per patient per day, mostly because of reduced criminal justice and health care costs.

The Swiss study has undermined several myths about heroin and its habitual users. The results to date demonstrate that, given relatively unlimited availability, heroin users will voluntarily stabilize or reduce their dosage and some will even choose abstinence; that long-addicted users can lead relatively normal, stable lives if provided legal access to their drug of choice; and that ordinary citizens will support such initiatives. In recent referendums in Zurich, Basel, and Zug, substantial majorities voted to continue funding local arms of the experiment. And last September, a nationwide referendum to end the government's heroin maintenance and other harm-reduction initiatives was rejected by 71 percent of Swiss voters, including majorities in all 26 cantons.

The Netherlands plans its own heroin prescription study in 1998, and similar trials are under consideration elsewhere in Europe, including Luxembourg and Spain, as well as Canada. In Germany, the federal

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government has opposed heroin prescription trials and other harm-reduction innovations, but the League of Cities has petitioned it for permission to undertake them; a survey early last year found that police chiefs in 10 of the country's 12 largest cities favored letting states implement controlled heroin distribution programs. In Australia last summer, a majority of state health ministers approved a heroin prescription trial, but Prime Minister John Howard blocked it. And in Denmark, a September 1996 poll found that 66 percent of voters supported an experiment that would provide registered addicts with free heroin to be consumed in centers set up for the purpose.

Switzerland, attempting to reduce overdoses, dangerous injecting practices, and shooting up in public places, has also taken the lead in establishing "safe injection rooms" where users can inject their drugs under secure, sanitary conditions. There are now about a dozen such rooms in the country, and initial evaluations are positive. In Germany, Frankfurt has set up three, and there are also officially sanctioned facilities in Hamburg and Saarbrücken. Cities elsewhere in Europe and in Australia are expected to open safe injection rooms soon.

REEFER SANITY

CANNABIS, in the form of marijuana and hashish, is by far the most popular illicit drug in the United States. More than a quarter of Americans admit to having tried it. Marijuana's popularity peaked in 1980, dropped steadily until the early 1990s, and is now on the rise again. Although it is not entirely safe, especially when consumed by children, smoked heavily, or used when driving, it is clearly among the least dangerous psychoactive drugs in common use. In 1988 the administrative law judge for the Drug Enforcement Administration, Francis Young, reviewed the evidence and concluded that "marihuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to man."

As with needle exchange and methadone treatment, American politicians have ignored or spurned the findings of government commissions and scientific organizations concerning marijuana policy. In 1972 the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse—created by President Nixon and chaired by a former Republican governor, Raymond Shafer—recommended that possession of up to one

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ounce of marijuana be decriminalized. Nixon rejected the recommendation. In 1982 a panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences reached the same conclusion as the Shafer Commission.

Between 1973 and 1978, with attitudes changing, 11 states approved decriminalization statutes that reclassified marijuana possession as a misdemeanor, petty offense, or civil violation punishable by no more than a $100 fine. Consumption trends in those states and in states that retained stricter sanctions were indistinguishable. A 1988 scholarly evaluation of the Moscone Act, California's 1976 decriminalization law, estimated that the state had saved half a billion dollars in arrest costs since the law's passage. Nonetheless, public opinion began to shift in 1978. No other states decriminalized marijuana, and some eventually recriminalized it.

Between 1973 and 1989, annual arrests on marijuana charges by state and local police ranged between 360,000 and 460,000. The annual total fell to 283,700 in 1991, but has since more than doubled. In 1996, 641,642 people were arrested for marijuana, 85 percent of them for possession, not sale, of the drug. Prompted by concern over rising marijuana use among adolescents and fears of being labeled soft on drugs, the Clinton administration launched its own anti-marijuana campaign in 1995. But the administration's claims to have identified new risks of marijuana consumption—including a purported link between marijuana and violent behavior—have not withstood scrutiny.[1] Neither Congress nor the White House seems likely to put the issue of marijuana policy before a truly independent advisory commission, given the consistency with which such commissions have reached politically unacceptable conclusions.

In contrast, governments in Europe and Australia, notably in the Netherlands, have reconsidered their cannabis policies. In 1976 the Baan Commission in the Netherlands recommended, and the Dutch government adopted, a policy of separating the "soft" and "hard" drug markets. Criminal penalties for and police efforts against heroin trafficking were increased, while those against cannabis were relaxed. Marijuana and hashish can now be bought in hundreds of "coffeeshops" throughout the country. Advertising, open displays, and sales to minors are prohibited.

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[1]Lynn Zimmer and John P. Morgan, *Marijuana Myths, Marijuana Facts: A Review of the Scientific Evidence,* New York: Lindesmith Center, 1997.

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Police quickly close coffeeshops caught selling hard drugs. Almost no one is arrested or even fined for cannabis possession, and the government collects taxes on the gray market sales.

In the Netherlands today, cannabis consumption for most age groups is similar to that in the United States. Young Dutch teenagers, however, are less likely to sample marijuana than their American peers; from 1992 to 1994, only 7.2 percent of Dutch youths between the ages of 12 and 15 reported having tried marijuana, compared to 13.5 percent of Americans in that age bracket. Far fewer Dutch youths, moreover, experiment with cocaine, buttressing officials' claims of success in separating the markets for hard and soft drugs. Most Dutch parents regard the "reefer madness" anti-marijuana campaigns of the United States as silly.

Dutch coffeeshops have not been problem free. Many citizens have complained about the proliferation of coffeeshops, as well as nuisances created by foreign youth flocking to party in Dutch border cities. Organized crime involvement in the growing domestic cannabis industry is of increasing concern. The Dutch government's efforts to address the problem by more openly and systematically regulating supplies to coffeeshops, along with some of its other drug policy initiatives, have run up against pressure from abroad, notably from Paris, Stockholm, Bonn, and Washington. In late 1995 French President Jacques Chirac began publicly berating The Hague for its drug policies, even threatening to suspend implementation of the Schengen Agreement allowing the free movement of people across borders of European Union (EU) countries. Some of Chirac's political allies called the Netherlands a narco-state. Dutch officials responded with evidence of the relative success of their policies, while pointing out that most cannabis seized in France originates in Morocco (which Chirac has refrained from criticizing because of his government's close relations with King Hassan). The Hague, however, did announce reductions in the number of coffeeshops and the amount of cannabis customers can buy there. But it still sanctions the coffeeshops, and a few municipalities actually operate them.

Notwithstanding the attacks, in the 1990s the trend toward decriminalization of cannabis has accelerated in Europe. Across much of Western Europe, possession and even minor sales of the drug are effectively decriminalized. Spain decriminalized private use of cannabis in 1983. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court effectively sanctioned a

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cautious liberalization of cannabis policy in a widely publicized 1994 decision. German states vary considerably in their attitude; some, like Bavaria, persist in a highly punitive policy, but most now favor the Dutch approach. So far the Kohl administration has refused to approve state proposals to legalize and regulate cannabis sales, but it appears aware of the rising support in the country for Dutch and Swiss approaches to local drug problems.

In June 1996 Luxembourg's parliament voted to decriminalize cannabis and push for standardization of drug laws in the Benelux countries. The Belgian government is now considering a more modest decriminalization of cannabis combined with tougher measures against organized crime and heroin traffickers. In Australia, cannabis has been decriminalized in South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory (Canberra), and the Northern Territory, and other states are considering the step. Even in France, Chirac's outburst followed recommendations of cannabis decriminalization by three distinguished national commissions. Chirac must now contend with a new prime minister, Lionel Jospin, who declared himself in favor of decriminalization before his Socialist Party won the 1997 parliamentary elections. Public opinion is clearly shifting. A recent poll found that 51 percent of Canadians favor decriminalizing marijuana.

WILL IT WORK?

BOTH AT home and abroad, the U.S. government has attempted to block resolutions supporting harm reduction, suppress scientific studies that reached politically inconvenient conclusions, and silence critics of official drug policy. In May 1994 the State Department forced the last-minute cancellation of a World Bank conference on drug trafficking to which critics of U.S. drug policy had been invited. That December the U.S. delegation to an international meeting of the U.N. Drug Control Program refused to sign any statement incorporating the phrase "harm reduction." In early 1995 the State Department successfully pressured the World Health Organization to scuttle the release of a report it had commissioned from a panel that included many of the world's leading experts on cocaine because it included the scientifically incontrovertible observations that traditional use of coca leaf in the Andes causes little

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harm to users and that most consumers of cocaine use the drug in moderation with few detrimental effects. Hundreds of congressional hearings have addressed multitudinous aspects of the drug problem, but few have inquired into the European harm-reduction policies described above. When former Secretary of State George Shultz, then–Surgeon General M. Joycelyn Elders, and Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke pointed to the failure of current policies and called for new approaches, they were mocked, fired, and ignored, respectively—and thereafter mischaracterized as advocating the outright legalization of drugs.

In Europe, in contrast, informed, public debate about drug policy is increasingly common in government, even at the EU level. In June 1995 the European Parliament issued a report acknowledging that "there will always be a demand for drugs in our societies . . . the policies followed so far have not been able to prevent the illegal drug trade from flourishing." The EU called for serious consideration of the Frankfurt Resolution, a statement of harm-reduction principles supported by a transnational coalition of 31 cities and regions. In October 1996 Emma Bonino, the European commissioner for consumer policy, advocated decriminalizing soft drugs and initiating a broad prescription program for hard drugs. Greece's minister for European affairs, George Papandreou, seconded her. Last February the monarch of Liechtenstein, Prince Hans Adam, spoke out in favor of controlled drug legalization. Even Raymond Kendall, secretary general of Interpol, was quoted in the August 20, 1994, *Guardian* as saying, "The prosecution of thousands of otherwise law-abiding citizens every year is both hypocritical and an affront to individual, civil and human rights . . . Drug use should no longer be a criminal offense. I am totally against legalization, but in favor of decriminalization for the user."

One can, of course, exaggerate the differences between attitudes in the United States and those in Europe and Australia. Many European leaders still echo Chirac's U.S.-style antidrug pronouncements. Most capital cities endorse the Stockholm Resolution, a statement backing punitive prohibitionist policies that was drafted in response to the Frankfurt Resolution. And the Dutch have had to struggle against French and other efforts to standardize more punitive drug laws and policies within the EU.

Conversely, support for harm-reduction approaches is growing in the United States, notably and vocally among public health professionals

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but also, more discreetly, among urban politicians and police officials. Some of the world's most innovative needle exchange and other harm-reduction programs can be found in America. The 1996 victories at the polls for California's Proposition 215, which legalizes the medicinal use of marijuana, and Arizona's Proposition 200, which allows doctors to prescribe any drug they deem appropriate and mandates treatment rather than jail for those arrested for possession, suggest that Americans are more receptive to drug policy reform than politicians acknowledge.

But Europe and Australia are generally ahead of the United States in their willingness to discuss openly and experiment pragmatically with alternative policies that might reduce the harm to both addicts and society. Public health officials in many European cities work closely with police, politicians, private physicians, and others to coordinate efforts. Community policing treats drug dealers and users as elements of the community that need not be expelled but can be made less troublesome. Such efforts, including crackdowns on open drug scenes in Zurich, Bern, and Frankfurt, are devised and implemented in tandem with initiatives to address health and housing problems. In the United States, in contrast, politicians presented with new approaches do not ask, "Will they work?" but only, "Are they tough enough?" Many legislators are reluctant to support drug treatment programs that are not punitive, coercive, and prison-based, and many criminal justice officials still view prison as a quick and easy solution for drug problems.

The lessons from Europe and Australia are compelling. Drug control policies should focus on reducing drug-related crime, disease, and death, not the number of casual drug users. Stopping the spread of HIV by and among drug users by making sterile syringes and methadone readily available must be the first priority. American politicians need to explore, not ignore or automatically condemn, promising policy options such as cannabis decriminalization, heroin prescription, and the integration of harm-reduction principles into community policing strategies. Central governments must back, or at least not hinder, the efforts of municipal officials and citizens to devise pragmatic approaches to local drug problems. Like citizens in Europe, the American public has supported such innovations when they are adequately explained and allowed to prove themselves. As the evidence comes in, what works is increasingly apparent. All that remains is mustering the political courage.

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Reviews

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Jawaharlal Nehru raises the new flag for India, 1947

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Review Essay

E Pluribus, India

Is Indian Modernity Working?

Shashi Tharoor

The Idea of India. BY SUNIL KHILNANI. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1997, 263 pp. $22.00.

Amid the popular ferment that forged an Italian nation out of a congeries of principalities and statelets in the nineteenth century, the novelist Massimo Taparelli d'Azeglio memorably wrote, "We have created Italy. Now all we need to do is to create Italians." Oddly enough, when the British pulled down the Union Jack in 1947, no Indian nationalist succumbed to the temptation to express the same thought—"we have created India. Now all we need to do is to create Indians."

Such a sentiment would not have occurred to the preeminent voice of Indian nationalism, Jawaharlal Nehru. India's first prime minister would never have spoken of "creating" India or Indians, merely of being the agent for the reassertion of what had always existed but had been long suppressed. Nonetheless, the India that was born in 1947 was in a very real sense a new creation: a state that made fellow citizens of the Ladakhi and the Laccadivian for the first time, that separated Punjabi from Punjabi for the first time, that asked the Keralite peasant to feel allegiance to a Kashmiri Pandit ruling in Delhi, also for the first time. Creating Indians was, in fact, what the nationalist movement did.

After all, this was the India that Winston Churchill had once dismissed as "a geographical expression"—a land that was "no more a single country than the Equator." Churchill was rarely right about India, but it is true that no other country in the world embraces the extraordinary mixture of ethnic groups, the profusion of mutually incomprehensible languages, the varieties of topography and climate, the diversity of religions and

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cultural practices, and the range of levels of economic development that India does. The Indian nation is not united by a shared ethnicity (it incorporates almost every conceivable racial type), a common language (it has at least 17, according to the constitution, or 35, if one counts all languages spoken by more than a million people), or a single religion (India is home to every faith known to mankind, and Hinduism, the majority religion, itself reflects the country's diversity).

And yet India is more than the sum of its contradictions. It is a country held together, in the words of Nehru, "by strong but invisible threads . . . a myth and an idea, a dream and a vision, and yet very real and present and pervasive." That nebulous quality is what the analyst of Indian nationalism is ultimately left with. It is an idea—the idea of India. But what is that idea? Nehru articulated it as pluralism vindicated by history, seeing the country as an "ancient palimpsest" on which successive rulers and subjects had inscribed their visions without erasing what had been asserted previously. A generation of nationalist historians echoed him, making "unity in diversity" the most hallowed of independent India's self-defining slogans.

In the 1950s and 1960s came the skeptics, almost all based abroad, who began to take scalpels to this sanctified idea of India. Nirad Chaudhuri, the iconoclastic author of *The Continent of Circe* and other volumes of largely autobiographical social commentary, excoriated India's nationalist presumptions and what he saw as its civilizational inadequacies. V. S. Naipaul, a descendant of Indian indentured laborers in the Caribbean, visited his ancestral homeland and chronicled his disappointment in *An Area of Darkness* and the even more savagely negative *India: A Wounded Civilization*. A host of Western writers portrayed the problems and limitations of India's modernization as portending the imminent breakdown of the nation and the inevitable collapse of its political institutions. Despite the doomsayers—and there were many who predicted India's disintegration well before the twentieth anniversary of its independence from British rule—the country survived, withstanding political, military, and economic challenges. By 1990 Naipaul was writing in celebration of the "million mutinies" through which Indian diversity was working to transform the democratic society he had so recently been prepared to write off.

How did India preserve and protect a viable idea of itself in the course of the last 50 years, while it grew from 370 million people to 970 million, reorganized its state structures, and sought to defend itself from internal and external dangers, all the while remaining democratic? Explaining this is central to the task taken on by Sunil Khilnani, the author of *The Idea of India*, a title probably borrowed from Amartya Sen's celebrated lecture at Oxford in 1993. "Reflective and incisive nonfictional interrogations of India's distinctive modernity have yet to be produced," Khilnani claimed recently, setting the stage for his own work. This comment was—as I informed the editor who offered me this review—in a dismissive notice of my own book, *India: From Midnight to the Millennium*. Though I mention this to declare an interest, I rather like Khilnani's slender volume, an amiable disquisition on Indian modernity structured as four

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essays on democracy, political economy, urbanization, and Indian identity.

RETELLING TALES

"This book," Khilnani tells us in his introduction, "is an initial venture into the task of retelling the political history of independent India." The qualification is necessary; Khilnani competently organizes a series of reflections on well-worn themes, and despite the occasional lapse into the turgid prose that afflicts all political scientists, generally does so with style. Style is central to both the pleasures and the pitfalls of his narrative. Khilnani is charmingly self-indulgent, fond of sweepingly colorful generalizations. (The Government's Planning Commission is a "retirement home for the socially benevolent," whatever that may mean.) His penchant for sweeping one-liners is fetching in an academic—who can resist a chapter that begins with the sentence "India in the 1950s fell in love with the idea of concrete"?—but he cannot resist an epigram, even when it is more witty than wise. "Like the British empire it supplanted, India's constitutional democracy was established in a fit of absent-mindedness," he declares, ignoring the overwhelming weight of evidence to the contrary in nationalist literature.

Khilnani tells us he is working on a biography of Nehru, and he is sound on the lasting contributions made to the Indian state by that remarkable man, whose extemporization of Indianness remains an enduring legacy to so many Indian liberals. A highly self-aware scholar, Khilnani ends his book with an assertion of the value of Western political theory and a useful if contentious bibliographical essay that students of Indian politics will appreciate. But the unwary should be warned that Khilnani's glibness sometimes trips him up. Any reader of Mahatma Gandhi's autobiography knows that he did not "discover" vegetarianism in Holborn; Nehru was never a head of state; Chandigarh is not "400 kilometers north of Delhi," which would put it in Kashmir; the Mughals entered India in 1526, not 1528 (this would be like a British historian placing the Battle of Hastings in 1068). This sort of carelessness is disconcerting, for it undermines the reader's willingness to take some of the author's more esoteric suggestions seriously. For instance, Khilnani attributes the existence of "less stark inequalities" in the Indian state of Kerala to its "own cultural forms of matrilineal property inheritance"—a dubious proposition at best, since not all Kerala communities are matrilineal and inheritance per se has few redistributive implications, but one made worse by being wholly unsubstantiated.

THE FAILURES

More important, Khilnani's exegesis on Indian modernity inadequately examines its failures. Nehru's legacy to India was a mixed one. It consisted of four major pillars—democratic institution–building, staunch secularism, nonalignment, and socialist economics. The first two were indispensable to the country's survival; the third (not examined by Khilnani) preserved its self-respect and enhanced its international standing, though without bringing any concrete benefits to the Indian people; the fourth was disastrous, condemning the Indian people to poverty and stagnation and engendering inefficiency, red-tapism, and corruption on a scale rarely rivaled elsewhere.

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In the five decades since independence, Indian democracy has failed to create a single Indian political community. Instead, we have become more conscious than ever of what divides us: religion, region, caste, language, ethnicity. The Indian political system has become looser and more fragmented. Politicians mobilize support along ever-narrower lines of political identity. It has become more important to be a "backward caste" Yadav, a "tribal" Bodo, or a sectarian Muslim than to be an Indian. This is particularly ironic because one of the early strengths of Nehruvian India—the survival of the nationalist movement as a political party, the Congress Party serving as an all-embracing, all-inclusive agglomeration of the major political tendencies in the country—led to this situation by undermining the evolution of a genuine multiparty system. Had the nationalist movement given birth to, say, three parties—one right of center, one social democrat, one communist—a culture of principled and ideological contestation might have evolved in India's polity.

Instead the Congress Party's dominance stifled this process, and opposition to it (with a few honorable exceptions, like the pro–free enterprise Swatantra Party between 1959 and 1974) was largely based on the assertion of identities to which the Congress was deemed not to have given full expression—regional, religious, or caste-based. With the increasing weakness of the Congress, politicians have been tempted to organize themselves around identities other than party (or to create parties to reflect a particularist identity).

A distinctive feature of the Nehruvian legacy was its visionary rejection of India's assorted bigotries and particularisms. The Nehrus—displaced Kashmiris—were, by upbringing and conviction, completely secular. Not only did Indira Gandhi marry a Parsi, but her daughters-in-law were an Italian Christian and a Punjabi Sikh. The one strand of political opinion Nehru and his offspring abhorred was that of Hindu religious revivalism. Nehru himself was an avowed agnostic, as was his daughter until she discovered the electoral advantages of public piety. All four generations of Nehrus in public life remained secular in outlook and conduct. Their appeal transcended caste, region, language, and religion, something impossible to say of any other leading Indian politician. There could be no starker indication of the end of Nehruvianism than the fact that, 50 years after partition and independence, religion has again become a key determinant of political identity. Demolishing a mosque they say stands on a Hindu holy site, denouncing what they decry as the appeasement of minorities, clamoring for office and power for their "saffron brigades," Hindu revivalists have assertively attempted to convert the religion of the "majority" into a badge of Indian identity.

If the Nehruvian version of democracy is discredited, democracy itself is not. Amid India's myriad problems, it is democracy that has given Indians of every imaginable caste, creed, culture, and cause the chance to break free of their lot. There is social oppression and caste tyranny, particularly in rural India, but Indian democracy offers the victims a means of escape, and often—thanks to the determination with which the poor and oppressed exercise their franchise—of triumph. The significant changes in the social composition of India's ruling class since independence, both in politics

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and in the bureaucracy, are proof of democracy at work, but the poor quality of the country's democratic political leadership in general offers less cause for celebration. India's rulers increasingly reflect the qualities required to acquire power rather than the skills to wield it for the common good. Pluralist democracy is India's greatest strength, but its current manner of operation is also the source of its major weaknesses.

These new developments are ensuring a dramatic transformation of Indian society, but they imply another idea of India than the one in which the Nehruvians rejoice. The workings of Indian democracy have served to create and perpetuate India's various particularisms. The Hindu-Muslim divide is merely the most visible, but that within Hinduism, between caste Hindus and the former "untouchables," and now between the upper castes and the lower intermediate castes known as the "backwards," is actually transforming Indian society in ways the founding fathers did not anticipate. Caste, which Nehru and his ilk abhorred and believed would disappear from the social matrix of modern India, has not merely survived and thrived, but has become an instrument for highly effective political mobilization. Candidates are picked by their parties with an eye toward the caste loyalties they can call upon; often their appeal is overtly to voters of their own caste or sub-caste, urging them to elect one of their own. The result has been the growth of caste-consciousness and casteism throughout Indian society. In many Indian states, caste determines educational opportunities, job prospects, and governmental promotions; all too often, India's unique brand of affirmative action means you cannot go forward unless you're a "backward." Whether through elections or quotas, political mobilization in contemporary India has asserted the power of old identities, habits, faiths, and prejudices, which suggests a more complex form of "modernization" than that implicit in Khilnani's essays.

SOCIALISM, INDIAN STYLE

In economics, too, the Indian idea described by Khilnani is fading. Self-sufficiency and self-reliance were the twin mantras of Nehruvian India, which shackled itself to statist controls that emphasized distributive justice above economic growth, stifled free enterprise, and discouraged foreign investment. The Government's reasons were embedded in the Indian freedom struggle: since the British had come to trade and stayed on to rule, Indian nationalists were deeply suspicious of foreign investment. (One of the lessons history teaches us is that history often teaches us the wrong lessons.) "Self-reliance" thus became a slogan: it guaranteed both political freedom and freedom from economic exploitation. The result was that for most of the five decades since independence, India pursued an economic policy of subsidizing unproductivity, regulating stagnation, and distributing poverty. We called this socialism.

Socialism, Indian style, was a compound of nationalism and idealism. It was the conviction that items vital for the economic well-being of Indians must remain in Indian hands—not the hands of Indians seeking to profit from such activity, but the disinterested hands of the state, the father and mother to all Indians. In this kind of thinking, performance was not a relevant criterion for

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judging the utility of the public sector: its inefficiencies were masked by generous subsidies from the national exchequer, and a combination of vested interests—socialist ideologues, bureaucratic management, self-protective trade unions, and captive markets—kept it beyond political criticism.

The "permit-license-quota" culture of statist socialism allowed the ruling politicians to use politics as a vehicle for self-gratification. Over the years India has overflowed with the sort of professional politicians the educated middle classes have come to despise, sanctimonious windbags clad hypocritically in homespun who spouted socialist rhetoric while amassing uncountable—and unaccountable—riches. Of all this, there is very little in Khilnani's book. His admiration for the Nehruvian project is boundless: Rajiv Gandhi, the impatiently modernizing prime minister, is mentioned precisely three times, whereas P. C. Mahalanobis, the socialist advisor to Nehru's Planning Commission, gets a fulsome seven pages, including the titles of the "technically striking but intellectually rather listless" papers he published as a statistician in the 1930s and 1940s.

In fact, India's misfortune, in Jagdish Bhagwati's famous aphorism, was to be afflicted with brilliant economists. And clamorous politicians: for every group claimed a larger share of a national economic pie that decades of protectionist economic policies prevented from growing. It is sadly impossible to quantify the economic losses inflicted on India over four decades of entrepreneurs frittering away their energies in queuing for licenses rather than manufacturing products, paying bribes instead of hiring workers, wooing politicians instead of understanding consumers, and getting things done through bureaucrats rather than doing things for themselves. The penny, or rather the paisa, finally dropped in the major financial crisis of 1991, which forced the Government to let sweeping dogmas die and to adopt new policies. India's economic liberalization since then has often seemed hesitant, but its essential repudiation of Nehruvianism now seems irreversible.

INEVITABLE DIVERSITY

"The idea of India," Khilnani concludes, "has been constituted through struggles to balance contrary pulls in a coherent political project, to respect the diversities of culture with a commitment to a common enterprise of development." This unexceptionable proposition rests on an idea of India as, in essence, an ever-ever land, the product of a long history, a wide geography, and a short memory. This India is a plural nation, where diversity is as natural as sunshine and there is no alternative to democratic coexistence. The stresses and strains of competing identities are real. In pluralist India, it is essential that each citizen feels secure in his or her identities. But Indians have come to understand that while they may be proud to be Muslims or Marwaris or Mallahs, they are secure in these identities only because they are also Indians. It is their larger national identity that gives them the framework within which to work, trade, compete, and coexist with other members of the broader society, contend for political office, and feel safe behind defensible borders.

So the only idea of India that can work is that of one land embracing many. It is the idea that a nation may endure

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differences of caste, creed, color, culture, cuisine, costume, and custom, and still rally around a democratic consensus—on how to manage without consensus. It is an India open to the contention of ideas and interests within it and unafraid of the power or the products of the outside world.

Our founding fathers wrote a constitution that gave passports to their ideals. Where Freudians note the distinctions that arise out of "the narcissism of minor differences," in India we celebrate the commonality of major differences. If America is a melting pot, then India is a *thali*, a selection of sumptuous dishes in different bowls. Each tastes different, and does not necessarily mix with the next, but they belong together on the same plate, and they complement each other in making the meal a satisfying repast. Khilnani's four essays do not culminate in quite so direct an explication of his title. Yet his somewhat uneven, decidedly partial, but intelligent and readable book reveals that he belongs in a congenial camp, among those who cherish an idea of India as a land that safeguards the common space available to a medley of identities—an India that remains safe for diversity.

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Review Essay

The Ultimate Lagging Indicator

David J. Rothkopf

The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World. BY DANIEL YERGIN AND JOSEPH STANISLAW. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998, 352 pp. $25.00.

Eighteen years after Margaret Thatcher's victory, Paul Volcker's assumption of the Federal Reserve chairmanship, and Deng Xiaoping's initiation of reforms in China, seventeen years after Ronald Reagan was elected President, twelve years after the introduction of glasnost and perestroika, and eight years after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Pulitzer Prize-winner Daniel Yergin and his coauthor, Joseph Stanislaw, make an unassailable case that big government has fallen out of fashion and markets are more powerful than ever before.

Yergin, whose masterful saga of the petroleum industry, *The Prize*, was acclaimed for both its rendering of history and its insights, is a reporter of formidable gifts. In this book, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that Is Remaking the Modern World,* he and his coauthor tell with sweep and style of the rise and fall of active government intervention in national economies. They find the drama and human elements in each of their stories, depicting economists and government officials with an eye for color.

Even students of the economic upheavals recounted in this book cannot help but be drawn into what in other hands might be very dry material. Take, for example, the image of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed—now disaffected with global electronic markets after the beating his country's currency has taken—sitting not too long ago at his desk in Kuala Lumpur viewing the world through four computer screens

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while contemplating the establishment of a Malaysian city of tomorrow called Cyberjaya.

Yergin and Stanislaw take the reader on a whirlwind world tour several times over. But detail is their book's greatest blessing—and its greatest curse. Again and again the authors tell gripping tales of big government gone bad. Again and again they emphasize the same points about governments' shortcomings and markets' strengths. But after all, Yergin and Stanislaw are attempting to chronicle a global transformation, taking readers through the parallel revelations of national leaders and their advisers who watched as local experiments in market intervention produced unwanted results in the face of the emerging market reality the book describes.

Such complaints, however, are carping given the richness of the authors' reporting and the quality of their analysis of how the marketplace forced the reluctant retreat of government from core economic activities that Lenin called "the commanding heights" of national economies. The book is a unique resource for students and an excellent survey for businesspeople and others seeking to understand how the world came to regard markets as the primary regulators of economic interaction.

BUSINESS WITHOUT BUSINESSPEOPLE?

The heroes here are economists, central bank governors, finance ministers, and the occasional head of state. Indeed, reading the book is very much like visiting the joint annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank without the ice sculptures—or the bankers. In fact, it is odd how much credit for the rise of the markets the authors give to government officials and their advisers, and how little to the men and women of the markets themselves. The book devotes precious little space to businesspeople—a couple of pages to the man who privatized Italy's oil company, a couple to a Russian vodka manufacturer, a few to an American telecommunications entrepreneur, and so on. While the book suggests that the growth of global markets has been made possible by a simultaneous revolution in information and transportation technology, it fails to delve into the chicken-and-egg arguments that underlie those developments.

Yes, Ronald Reagan made compelling speeches about rolling back big government and letting the markets work their magic, but if American business had not responded to the challenges of the 1970s and 1980s, if Chrysler had not come out of the bailout a winner, if the American airline industry had turned the air traffic controllers' strike into the plot of a disaster movie, would we be talking about the primacy of market forces today? If Japanese business had not been stultified by the system that created it, wouldn't we be seeing more books like those in the early 1990s prescribing Asian interventionist medicine for the U.S. economy? More of the credit is certainly due those who made markets work, who created the technologies that linked them, who made closed societies impossible, who in many cases—as in the creation of global foreign exchange markets—actually wrested power from governments.

But while the book underplays the significance of market leaders, it makes up for it with its in-depth coverage of the people of the policy world. Friedrich von Hayek and Jeffrey Sachs, Keith Joseph

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and Manmohan Singh, Domingo Cavallo and Milton Friedman, Yegor Gaidar and Kim Jae-Ik—each is described not so much as an economist or government official as a crusader. Readers hear of the tragedy of Kim Jae-Ik's assassination, the burden young Gaidar faced living in the shadow of his hero-of-the-revolution-children's-book-writing grandfather, the eccentricities of Keith Joseph, and the courage of Finance Minister Singh, who took on some of India's most powerful special interest groups. It is the triumph of the econogeeks, the technocratic class educated at Harvard, MIT, Chicago, Oxford, and Cambridge who drew up the plans for the dismantlement of bloated state apparatuses that in many cases their teachers or their teachers' teachers had conceived. Recognition of this admirable group and others such as Alejandro Foxley of Chile, Pedro Aspe of Mexico, Sanchez de Lozada of Bolivia, Vaclav Klaus of the Czech Republic, and Leszek Balcerowicz of Poland is well deserved and provides plenty of dramatic stories of new-generation leaders battling entrenched powers.

MORE OF THE SAME?

As a work of economic history, *The Commanding Heights* has considerable value. No other book describes so thoroughly the scope of the world's economic transformation over the last half century. But the book is also sufficiently good that it demonstrates conclusively to the reader that history is a dialectic, moving like a pendulum—for every swing in one direction, there is a swing back. In the 1890s and the first years of this century, the world enjoyed a golden age of open trade and laissez-faire government. But after that period's excesses, there was a backlash that led to the rise of theorists advocating a greater role for the state: the Fabians in Britain, Lenin in Russia, and the French communists who trained Deng and Ho Chi Minh. Depression supported the arguments of everyone from the National Socialists in Germany to the New Dealers in the United States. After World War II, communism entered its period of greatest success—the 1950s and 1960s—and Western governments vacillated over their economic role as the colonial era came to an end and the first wave of development theories argued for protectionism, deficit spending, and import substitution. Then came the oil shocks of the 1970s, the debt shock of the 1980s, and the collapse of communism. With these three death blows, statism expired and markets became ascendant. For now.

But even as people recognize that markets are progressively more global, in virtually every country there is a backlash against the perceived inadequacies of the market as a custodian of social values. This set of concerns, as Yergin and Stanislaw correctly point out, is what led to the rise of statist models in the first place. These concerns, framed in the book's last few pages, are the fulcrum on which economic history will turn. While a return to systems in which governments control all or most of the economy seems impossible, the degree to which the people of any one country will demand protection from the market remains an open question.

For all the talk about the "end of history" and the adoption of liberal democracy and open markets, it seems clear that the question that divided the world during the Cold War will be the same one that divides it in the decades ahead: how does

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society ensure the just distribution of its wealth? In the next ten years, between 1 billion and 1.5 billion people will enter the world's work force. They will make $10 to $15 a day and they will be about 80 percent as productive as much better paid workers in the developed world. Will we leave it to the markets to decide whether to keep them out or let them in? Current sentiment in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere in the developed world makes that seem unlikely. But if we resist where markets take us, how will those who are kept out of the world economy react? Already in Latin America, Asia, and the former Soviet Union, economic disparities are producing political turbulence. There is no great swell of support for the idea of the people retaking the commanding heights of the economy, but there is a sense that issues of social equity must be better addressed, that the advocates of shock therapy have failed to acknowledge political realities, and that economic development is truly an interdisciplinary endeavor that should not be left to economists alone.

Some questions the book only touches on. New technologies have challenged the state's command of key areas of economic control, such as taxation. Because more and more transactions take place somewhere in cyberspace, it will become increasingly difficult for government agencies to rake in revenue from traditional sources. Furthermore, globalization has caused economies to spill over borders, and created regional economic entities that do not correspond to political boundaries. While these factors argue for the further decline of the state, two of the three basic building blocks of economics—labor and land—still reside within borders and will require that states exist to serve their interests in ways markets cannot.

All this suggests that the subtitle of Yergin and Stanislaw's book, *The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World*, is apposite. The book frames the stakes of the battle quite well. Unfortunately, it does not give much insight into how this battle is likely to unfold. Perhaps that is to be expected of pure economic history, but this book through its title and cover language promises to do more. Instead, it leaves the reader with the reminder that economic history is the ultimate lagging indicator, telling us where we have been, but not necessarily where we are going.

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Review Essay

Runaway Diseases

And the Human Hand Behind Them

Laurie Garrett

Epidemics and History: Disease, Power, and Imperialism. BY SHELDON WATTS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, 400 pp. $35.00.

Viruses, Plagues, and History. BY MICHAEL B. A. OLDSTONE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 203 pp. $25.00.

In the wake of Richard Preston's 1994 thriller *The Hot Zone,* a best-seller in 26 countries, the publishing industry has released a torrent of books about emerging disease threats. Nearly every major fighter of the Ebola virus has published a memoir, several scientists have produced warning missives, and fiction writers from Stephen King to Tom Clancy have made microbes prominent plot devices.

Amid the plethora of paranoia-inducing publications, barely a handful offer insights that could guide public policy, particularly from a global point of view. And practically speaking, the only relevant point of view for microbial issues is global, since bacteria, parasites, and viruses exploit appropriate ecospheres wherever they find them, regardless of national boundaries.

Despite the chatter on everything from "mad cow disease" to mutant strains of the Ebola virus, there are serious causes for concern. The Clinton administration has formally designated emerging infectious diseases as a national security issue. That has drawn big political players such as the CIA, the National Security Council, the Defense and State Departments, and the U.S. Agency for International Development into an arena that before the mid-1990s was the province of scientists.

LAURIE GARRETT, winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 1996, is a science and medical writer for *Newsday* in New York and author of *The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance.*

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The most recent entrants in the debate on emerging diseases are the historian Sheldon Watts of American University in Cairo and the virologist Michael Oldstone of the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, California. Watts, who has spent his career in Nigeria and Egypt, sees humanity's relations with the microbes from the side of the victims of European imperialism. In his analysis—which is indebted to William McNeill's 1976 landmark *Plagues and Peoples*—most of the scourges of the last millennium are direct results of Christian or European cultural and colonial practices. In contrast, Oldstone, a prominent American laboratory scientist, pays only cursory attention to the socioeconomic foundations of disease transmission, focusing his optimistic work on the triumphs of Western science. His book consciously emulates Paul De Kruif's gem, *Microbe Hunters,* although it is not nearly as strong.

Both Watts' and Oldstone's books leave a great deal to be desired, although their shortcomings are different. Watts is didactic, while Oldstone condescends. As for content, it is doubtful the authors could find much on the subject on which they could agree. Of the two, Watts sounds the more profound challenge to contemporary health policy. His perspective is stridently anti-development, anti-colonialist, and critical of Christianity. In temper it resembles much of the writing by contemporary African intellectuals. And as is typical of that body of work, it draws from an awesome trove of historical evidence. Watts' scouring of Europe's and the Islamic world's ancient databases has resulted in a demanding work that compels readers to take his southern hemisphere–centric arguments seriously.

THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL SCIENCE

The bulk of the world's remaining literature on infectious disease, including Oldstone's *Viruses, Plagues, and History,* has a highly American or European point of view. "The obliteration of diseases," Oldstone writes, " . . . is a regal yardstick of civilization's success, and those who accomplish that task will be among the true navigators of a brave new world." The way to reach that world, he believes, is primarily through development of a broader range of vaccines, particularly against HIV (his personal area of research). That will require "the best efforts of scientists in medical research . . . not inhibited by political or religious interests, but supported by the full resources of governments and industry with conscientious participation by the general public worldwide."

Unfortunately, Oldstone doesn't discuss the enormous economic and legal barriers to vaccine production. With fewer than a dozen companies still in the business, and with the current profits for all vaccine sales combined less than those for a single patented anti-ulcer drug, there is little corporate interest in developing products that target diseases found mainly in poor countries. Moreover, consumer litigation so envelops the industry in the industrialized nations that budgets must include as much money for legal defense and insurance as for actual vaccine distribution.

Oldstone's heroes are the giants of vaccinology, and of the eight he discusses at length, only Carlos Finlay, a Cuban, was from the South. The history Oldstone recounts is one of scientific inquiry and success of men from the North, often in response to diseases that arose in the South. The social factors that turn sporadic cases of disease into epidemics are noted

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only in passing, usually drawing on nineteenth-century North American examples.

Western science, Oldstone argues, has triumphed over the world's biggest infectious killers, and there are only five significant foes left: AIDS, Lassa fever, the diseases caused by the hemorrhagic fever viruses (such as Ebola), mad cow disease, and hantaviruses. It's a curious list, for the first four are amenable to well-understood preventive measures (in order: condoms and clean syringes, rat control, sterile hospital and funeral procedures, and proper livestock and meat production practices). Further, Lassa can be cured with proper use of the antiviral drug ribavirin.

The only disease on Oldstone's list that is currently responsible for a significant share of the world's premature death toll is AIDS—the U.N. AIDS Programme in Geneva says that HIV, the AIDS virus, has infected more than 40 million people so far, 30 million of whom are alive today, and will have orphaned 40 million children by 2010. The real scourges today and probably well into the next century are not terribly vulnerable to vaccinology: malaria, tuberculosis, AIDS, childhood respiratory disease, infant measles, antibiotic-resistant bacterial diseases, cholera, dysentery. Moreover, the last six years have seen a resurgence in the former Soviet Union of vaccine-preventable diseases that Oldstone declares controlled or nearly eradicated: diphtheria, whooping cough, typhoid fever, and polio. Epidemics of other vaccine-preventable disease have broken out all over the globe in the 1990s—notably, the West African meningococcal meningitis pandemic of 1996-97. These outbreaks point up the main problem with vaccines: invention is one thing, timely and proper use quite another.

Scientific discovery is only step one. Next, and more difficult, is appropriate disease prevention and distribution of the vaccine. On that point Watts has much to say in *Epidemics and History: Disease, Power, and Imperialism.* For failing to develop a vaccine or a cure for HIV, Watts denounces Western scientists as "incompetent braggarts, parading under false colors." He grudgingly applauds the World Health Organization's eradication of smallpox in 1977, but immediately adds that "niches emptied are soon refilled" and children killed by other microbes.

RAGE OF THE SOUTH

Watts blames Europeans for most of the world's infectious disease problem. Although plague killed large numbers of people on the steppes and in the cities of Central Asia well before it got to Europe, Watts' analysis picks up only with its arrival in Italy in 1346. However, he presents what is arguably one of the best portrayals of life in Europe and the Islamic world during the medieval Great Plague, focusing on the social, religious, and political activities that spread the disease, and on the economic fallout.

Similarly, he chronicles in rich detail the fourteenth-century European campaigns against leprosy, the use of disease as a tool of conquest in the Americas, the role of slavery in the spread of microbes, blatantly racist colonial practices in India and Africa that assumed indigenous populations were genetically inferior and so would not benefit from medical treatment, and Britain's often bizarre notions of cholera control during the Raj in India. Far less convincing are his assertions that the European syphilis epidemic of the seventeenth through nineteenth

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centuries resulted from Christian opposition to masturbation; that malaria may not have been indigenous to Africa; that French development policies spread yellow fever across West Africa; that smallpox inoculation was invented not by Britain's Edward Jenner but centuries earlier by African villagers. Yet Watts offers solid, stunning examples of Western idiocy that created superhighways for once-obscure microbes, leading to horrendous epidemics. His descriptions of the devastation, sometimes extinction, that European disease brought on the peoples of Mesoamerica after 1492 are emotionally difficult to read. Watts' rage seems reasonable in a historical context, but becomes less well grounded as he nears late-twentieth-century developments. Nevertheless, his is a perspective that Western, particularly Caucasian, policymakers would do well to comprehend.

Clearly there is need for a middle ground that allows candid communication between North and South, scientists and historians, empiricists and social activists. Science alone cannot defeat any emerging disease. Nor does the rage of the South advance its cause, no matter how justified by the historical record and current Northern practices—for example, the apparent unwillingness to find cost-effective ways to share expensive anti-HIV treatments with the estimated 26 million infected poor of the world.

All sides should remember the crucial lesson of Zaire's two Ebola epidemics: it is impossible to anticipate or prevent isolated cases of infection, but outbreaks and epidemics require an amplifier. And this is almost always an event created by, and under the control of, human beings. E. coli 0157:H7, a potentially lethal mutant form of the ubiquitous bacterium, has been amplified by modern livestock and meat processing practices. In recent years hepatitis C has come out of obscurity to become one of the world's leading diseases and killers; the amplifier is use of nonsterile syringes. Typhoid fever became epidemic last year in Tajikistan, claiming at least 22,000 lives, because of the collapse of water and sewage infrastructures after Moscow's withdrawal and the ensuing civil war. In Asia and Eastern Europe, HIV is exploding because of the international traffic in prostitution and the slave trade in women.

Oldstone makes the fatal mistake of ignoring the amplifiers. Watts details their role in history, but by way of finger-pointing at Europeans. After all, when the Ebola virus emerged in Kikwit in 1995, the amplifier was Zairean corruption and public health collapse, driven by hospital workers—African hospital workers—who failed to respect the most minimal health standards. As dispassionately as possible, international health policy should concentrate on the amplification phases of epidemics—whether the amplifier is European or African, Northern or Southern—as the most cost-effective place to stop microbial culprits.

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Retrogressive Little Wars

Honor Forgotten

David Fromkin

The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. BY MICHAEL IGNATIEFF. New York: Henry Holt, 1998, 224 pp. $24.95.

The last half of the twentieth century has been an era of civil wars in Africa, the Middle East, Central America, East and Southeast Asia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. From the Greek civil war of 1944-49 until recently, most such conflicts were proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union. For Americans, the life-or-death issues involved in the Cold War were overriding, often causing them to lose sight of the interests and objectives of the local parties to the conflict. Today many in America seem surprised that the forest fires of war continue to flame out of control around the world. Communism is discredited and the Soviet Union has vanished; the United States sails an untroubled sea under a cloudless sky; so why are these people killing each other?

What Americans find not only surprising but shocking are the atrocities that peoples who were neighbors, friends, even members of the same family commit against each other. Similar gruesome episodes occurred in wars in which the United States participated—for example, in Central America. But Americans felt that these were isolated episodes, and believed hopefully that they were not sanctioned by the U.S. government. Besides, the other side, they were told, did things that were as bad or worse. As for family members battling one another, terrible though it was, it was comprehensible. After all, the central episode in American history was a civil war animated on both sides by the belief that brother must kill brother if the cause be just and of sufficient importance. So Americans of the 1990s are struck less by the spectacle of various peoples on other continents driven from their homes, starved, mutilated, and slaughtered than by the apparent absence of any cause that might justify such brutality.

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A FIVE-PART SERIES

Michael Ignatieff, who has journeyed to the battlefields of some of today's mini-wars, has made them the focus of his inquiries. In an earlier work, *Blood and Belonging* (1994), he compared six trouble spots: the former Yugoslavia, Ireland, Kurdistan, Germany, Ukraine, and French Canada. In his slender new volume, *The Warrior's Honor,* he returns to what was once Yugoslavia, but also reports from Afghanistan and Central Africa and refers to insurgencies in Sri Lanka, Algeria, Chechnya, and elsewhere. About 50 such wars are being waged today, he says—in what Americans regard as a world at peace.

Ignatieff is not only a writer but a broadcaster. Indeed, *Blood and Belonging* was also a six-part BBC television series, each part devoted to a particular trouble spot. The book and series had much of interest and value to say. Their weakness was the lack of a common theme, gamely though the author tried to discover or invent one. *The Warrior's Honor* has similar strengths and weaknesses. It is less a coherent book than five essays circling around various aspects of the civil wars of the 1990s. To the illumination of dark deeds on the killing fields Ignatieff brings a poetic sensibility and a lyrical style that many will find beguiling. His individual insights often succeed brilliantly. His leaps at synthesis, however, usually fall short. He is impressionistic rather than systematic, suggestive rather than explicit. What eludes him is the unifying vision, the explanation that makes sense of it all. It may not exist.

TELEVISION CREDITS (AND BLAME)

Ignatieff introduces *Warrior's Honor* by asking anew the much-discussed questions of why, when, and how Americans and other peoples of the West should involve themselves in today's mini-wars. "My concern here," he writes, "is with [our] moral obligation" to the alien peoples caught up in these struggles and with "that impulse we all feel to do something when we see some terrible report on television from Bosnia or Rwanda or Afghanistan. Why exactly do some of us feel that these strangers are our responsibility?" The feeling of responsibility began, in his opinion, with our shame over the century's mass murders and evictions of entire peoples. No ties of family, business, or class, we realize, sufficed to save the victims. What happened to them could have happened to anyone, to you or me.

Television, Ignatieff suggests, is the "privileged modern medium" for conveying this sense. But the medium has built-in contradictions and ambiguities. Television trivializes history's triumphs and tragedies, giving them equal time with gossip, fashion news, sports, the weather, and elections to the local school board. Television captures the imagination, bringing the world into viewers' living rooms and bedrooms with an air of immediacy and urgency. It can have the impact of a blow to the stomach, but then it moves off in another direction, tugging our attention with it. Ignatieff writes, "The medium's gaze is brief, intense, and promiscuous. The shelf life of the moral causes it makes its own is brutally short." To embattled causes in need of publicity, television gives and television takes away. Insofar as Ignatieff draws a conclusion, it is that television journalism ought to be more responsible and show more respect for the dimensions of the dramas it sometimes has an opportunity to portray.

Television as a medium is better suited to conveying images than thoughts. Simply

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and graphically, it shows the suffering of the losers, but it tends to be less effective at inquiring into causes. That, according to Ignatieff, makes the audience watching reports of a conflict impatient with the issues at stake; none of them, we feel, justifies the horrors we see on the screen. We come to believe that all causes are fraudulent or worse. In Ignatieff's view, we are eventually so angered by both sides that we turn against the victims too, on the grounds that they are fighting under banners every bit as bloodstained as their oppressors'. He urges us not to give way to this reaction.

IS THE HOUSE HAUNTED?

The case of the former Yugoslavia seems to engage Ignatieff most. It is in his discussion of the violent breakup of that country in the early to mid-1990s that he poses the question of how people who grew up and lived amicably side by side can end up killing one another. One explanation—powerfully expressed by Rebecca West in *Black Lamb and Gray Falcon* (1941) and taken up much later by Robert D. Kaplan in *Balkan Ghosts* (1993)—is that these are blood feuds, centuries old, that haunt the Balkans and may do so until the end of time. But it is with Samuel Huntington, he of "clash of civilizations" fame, that Ignatieff chooses to cross swords, appointing the eminent Harvard political scientist spokesman for all who, for one reason or another, trace today's civil wars to the distant past.

There are many old fault lines that one can claim run through the former Yugoslavia. Constantine split the Roman Empire roughly a millennium and a half ago into a Latin-speaking west and a Greek-speaking east. Today's Serbs and Croats are heirs to rival civilizations: Serbia is Greek Orthodox and uses the Cyrillic alphabet, while Croatia is Roman Catholic and uses the Latin alphabet. The peoples of the western empire have had about 1,500 years to restructure their state system, reassemble along national lines, and agree in the main on which states should appear on the map—a process completed only a little more than a century ago with the birth of Italy and Germany. But the peoples of the east, mostly transferred from one multinational empire to another, from Byzantine to Ottoman to (in some cases) Hapsburg rule, having just started on the path of self-determination, have had only about 80 to 170 years in which to sort out their national identities and frontiers—which may not have been enough time. Finally, with the wars of religion following the Reformation, Western Europe underwent a profound experience that the Balkans did not. In ending those wars, the countries of the West learned to live as a single multistate community despite differences in religious beliefs. The former Yugoslavia did not have the benefit of that lesson.

Nonetheless, the current hatreds in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia have not welled up out of the past, Ignatieff says. The Yugoslav peoples, he argues persuasively, cannot have been engaged in a clash of civilizations, since the South Slavs of today, lacking a classical education, know nothing of the western or eastern empire in which their ancestors lived. Those empires were divided by language, but Serbs and Croats, ignorant of Latin and Greek, came to speak a common language, Serbo-Croat. It is not civilization that divides them, nor language. Neither is it creed: educated for decades by an atheist

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

ART RESOURCE

Ignatieff's Freudian slip

communist dictatorship, these are peoples, says Ignatieff, on whom religion has little hold. Nor is it nationalism, the bogey of the modern world, or ethnicity, by which he seems to mean the same thing. The subtitle of *Blood and Belonging* described contemporary mini-wars as embodying "the new nationalism"; in the subtitle of *Warrior's Honor,* Ignatieff categorizes the mini-wars as "ethnic war." In fact, most cannot properly be described by either term. The Hutu-Tutsi wars in Africa are tribal, while in Northern Ireland the natives are fighting a war of religion. But Ignatieff is on target when he depicts nationalism (or ethnicity) as a vision summoned up by a group of terrified individuals seeking a group to protect them. He dubs it a "fantasy."

In chronicling the South Slav war, Ignatieff begins with the death of Tito in 1980 and the consequent disintegration of the Yugoslav state. As Ignatieff tells the story, the demagogue Slobodan Milošević, in a grab for power, successfully appealed to Serbs' fears. This terrified Croatia, which took measures that further frightened Serbia, and before long the politics of paranoia were in full swing. It was mutual fear more than mutual hate, asserts Ignatieff, that drove the belligerents to torture, mutilation, rape, and massacre. The fear was there to exploit, he says, because of the Tito regime's failure to face not the distant but the immediate past of World War II, during which Yugoslavs betrayed and massacred one another. The Tito government functioned by promoting the lie that Yugoslavia had united as one nation against the Nazi invaders. Yet parents told the forbidden story to children, so everyone was haunted by a dread, the more powerful for having to be kept quiet, that some dark night the past would come alive and vengeance would be exacted for the crimes of the 1940s. There was no ghost in the house, but there was a skeleton in the closet.

Like so many answers in history, however, the one above provides no resting point. Let's say that the Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and other Yugoslavs betrayed, tortured, mutilated, raped, and slaughtered in the 1990s because they did so in the 1940s, but why did they do so in the

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1940s? Ignatieff does not confront that question, and indeed takes a wrong turn here in his discussion. He follows a theory of Freud's that must have struck him as a brilliant, if paradoxical, revelation. Freud wrote that "it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike" that cause hostility between them—"the closer . . . the more hostile." Conversely, the greater the differences between people, the less hostility they feel.

Alas, that Freudian theory is not the key to understanding; if anything, it locks the door. Consider conflicts where differences are conspicuous, where hostility, according to Freud, should be least: for example, those between blacks and whites. Can anyone believe that race riots are characterized by a lack of bitterness? Is racial hatred never intense?

History shows that a war between brothers, such as the American Civil War, can be a war to the death, and that a war between peoples totally unalike, such as Genghis Khan's Mongols or Tamerlane's Turkic tribesmen and the civilizations they burned to the ground, also can be a war to the death. Indeed, tens of millions of strangers, looking strikingly different, speaking foreign languages, and worshipping gods of their own, were slaughtered by these savage nomads from the Eurasian steppes. It is not *because* differences are small that conflicts are bitter, but *despite* the fact that differences are small. The size of the difference does not matter.

IGNORANT ARMIES

Efforts have been made to mitigate the harshness of warfare. Medieval Christendom had its chivalric code. The nineteenth century saw the founding of the Red Cross and the birth of a humanitarianism that takes no sides but helps all victims—developments of which Ignatieff writes sympathetically and with admiration. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 codified the rules of war, setting up an international legal code that professionals were meant to observe.

Somehow these accomplishments are being undone today. One of Ignatieff's purposes in writing this book, he tells us, was to inquire into this retrogressive trend. "What is happening to make the world seem so dangerous and chaotic? Who are the new architects of postmodern war, the paramilitaries, guerrillas, militias, and warlords who are tearing up the failed states of the 1990s?" A partial answer is that a warrior's sense of honor no longer dominates the battlefield because today's battles, in lands where states have collapsed and government has disintegrated, are not being fought by professional soldiers. All too often, Ignatieff reports, it is irregulars and private gangs who wield the weapons. Often these are made up of teenagers in the grip of alcohol and of adolescent fantasies of violence and dominance. A warrior's honor is neither to be expected nor found among these armies of the night.

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Review Essay

The Secret of Genscher's Staying Power

Memoirs of a 'Slippery Man'

Josef Joffe

Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir. BY HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER. New York: Broadway Books, 1998, 752 pp. $40.00.

If we don't count Bismarck, the Reich chancellor who was always his own foreign policy man, Hans-Dietrich Genscher is good for at least two superlatives. With 18 years at the helm of the Foreign Ministry, he was the longest-serving German foreign minister of all time. And he was probably the smartest of them all—more intelligent than the Kaiser's minions Holstein and Bülow, Hitler's diplomatic hustler Ribbentrop, or the men who came before and after him in the Bonn republic.

Was Genscher also the greatest? No, that accolade must go to Gustav Stresemann, the foreign minister of the Weimar Republic. Within three years, from 1923 to 1926, this brilliant manipulator had turned Germany the pariah into the road master of European diplomacy. He got the French occupiers out of the Rhineland, and he separated them from their wartime British allies. He wheedled the Dawes Plan out of the Americans, which lightened a crushing reparations burden and also helped distance the United States from the vengeful French. While securing Germany's western borders through the Locarno Pact, he set up a revisionist game in the East. Finally, he drew Soviet Russia into the German orbit: in the Treaty of Berlin, each country undertook not to join in Western combinations against the other. By 1926, Stresemann had vastly improved the strategic position of the Reich. For he had broken the encirclement

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

CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

by France, Russia, and Britain that had proved the Kaiser's downfall.

Stresemann was the master strategist, but Genscher was the master tactician—so much so that Richard Burt, the U.S. ambassador in the early 1980s, would end up calling him a "slippery man." The compliment was hardly misplaced, for Genscher was indeed hard to pin down. What did he want, and where did he want to take his country? From his rhetoric, it was usually impossible to tell.

He loved to wrap himself in the fog of *bienpensant* oratory. Genscher, the diplomat's diplomat, was an exemplar of political correctness before PC was even a gleam in a deconstructionist's eye. His favorite shibboleths were "bloc-transcendence," "peace order," "responsibility," "cooperation." He would drive his Western allies to distraction by drenching them with verbiage, and before the stuff was translated into halfway comprehensible English, he was off on yet another trip to yet another capital where the nuances of his démarches were ever so slightly different. He probably spent more time in the air than in his office on Bonn's Adenauerallee.

Did he say one thing and do another, as the Americans and the British always suspected? Such an indictment would hardly hold up in a court of law because Genscher's discourse was so voluble and so cloudy as to flummox even the most

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hardened prosecutor. To do an interview with him meant transcribing 6,000 words and then whittling them down to about 1,200—and usually without the benefit of a single memorable quote.

BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS

Do his memoirs help ex post facto? In 1992 Genscher abruptly resigned from office after 18 years, during which he had survived 6 American secretaries of state. Three years later he published his memoirs in German, a tome that weighed in at 1,030 pages of pure text (plus glossary and index). Mercifully, the English translation encompasses only 752 pages total, and the type is bigger too. But reading through them will hardly crack the enigma. Was he a soft-spoken nationalist draped in a European flag? Was he a compulsive schemer who set up a new game every day—or a cold-eyed calculator who wanted to rearrange the chessboard permanently in favor of Germany?

Genscher the author is hardly more crisp than was Genscher the foreign minister—though in private, he is one of the wittiest and most amusing interlocutors this reviewer has ever encountered. "Discretion" was and remains Hans-Dietrich's middle name. So what made him tick?

A good place to start is at the beginning, in 1974, when he moved to the head of the Foreign Ministry. "After a few months spent familiarizing myself with the tasks of the German foreign minister, I began to immerse myself with the tasks of the German foreign minister, I began to concern myself with the question of how Germany's voice could make itself heard within the Western Alliance." This was the leitmotif: Genscher as Voice of Germany—a game that would elevate the man and the country. Plus, not to forget, his Free Democratic Party (FDP), which, though the holder of the electoral balance that had made and broken many a government, was always struggling for survival.

The FDP, which Genscher led from 1974 to 1985, has been an extraordinary force in German electoral politics. With one exception (1966-69), it has always been part of the governing coalition. Making and unmaking chancellors, it helped Konrad Adenauer rule from 1949 to 1963, when it forced him to resign in favor of Ludwig Erhard. In 1969 it abandoned its traditional Christian Democratic partner to throw its support to the Social Democrat Willy Brandt. In 1982 it toppled Brandt's successor, Helmut Schmidt, by switching to the Christian Democrats, putting Helmut Kohl into the chancellor's office. In all these maneuvers, Genscher played a decisive role.

How was Genscher to amplify the country's voice? West Germany, merely a half-nation, was both pivot and victim of the global conflict between the superpowers. While bound to the West, it was also drawn to the East—to the threat and the promise that was the Soviet Union. Moscow's best divisions, backed up by plenty of nuclear weapons, were encamped just across the border, and the Kremlin held the key to the barbed-wire and concrete gates between the two German states.

EUREKA

Genscher's task was to conduct a more assertive foreign policy on a stage where the roles and the script were written by mightier players. *Schaukelpolitik*—jockeying for advantage between East and West—in the ways of Stresemann was out for a

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country tied to the West by treaty, affinity, and necessity. Hence Genscher would have to speak softly and move subtly. It was judo rather than boxing. Genscher would have to manipulate others to do for his country what he dared not do himself.

A good example was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as "Star Wars," which President Reagan began to hawk to his allies in early 1985. (This is one of the important stories that was excised from the English translation.)[1] Genscher was afraid that too large a German role would provoke the Soviets. But a plain "no" would anger his American patrons. So he lured in the French. On April 13, 1985, Genscher recalls, he gave a speech extolling the need for a European high-tech project. Paris, always eager to take a swipe at Washington, was only too happy to oblige. "Only 30 hours later, on Sunday afternoon, Roland Dumas [the French foreign minister] called me." The speech had been reported to him; he had already talked to President François Mitterrand. On Monday Dumas "would propose a European initiative by the name of EUREKA."

With quiet triumph, Genscher notes: "And so it happened." As instigator of the purely civilian EUREKA (European Research Coordination Agency), France would draw the arrows of Reaganite resentment while allowing the Germans to avoid Soviet retribution. And yet, this was too clever by half. A masterful tactician, Genscher did not grasp the strategic impact of "Star Wars." Though EUREKA soon fizzled, SDI grew into a dreadful monster in Gorbachev's mind. Convinced that he could not afford another arms race, he must have decided right then to call it quits in the Cold War.

RELAXATION THROUGH REASSURANCE

But formal surrender (Gorbachev accepted reunification in the summer of 1990) was still five years away. In the meantime, Genscher still had to make the best of a bad script in order to bolster Germany's voice on the bipolar stage. How? The one-word answer was "détente."

As Genscher puts it: "Again and again, I tried . . . to make clear that we Germans in particular would draw no benefit from confrontation in Europe. By promoting the process of détente, we could only win." The logic of wrapping a hard national interest in the cotton wool of peace-minded sentiment was simple.

The hotter the Cold War, the worse West Germany's dependence on the West—and the slimmer its room for maneuver. Also, only a climate of détente would allow Bonn to pursue its chosen strategy toward East Germany—call it "relaxation through reassurance" or "killing through kindness." Lulled into a sense of safety, the regime would lower its guard, loosen its totalitarian grip at home, and soften the rigors of partition. In the end, the two blocs—the Ur-cause of Germany divided—would wither away in favor of pan-European security and cooperation.

Ironically, this is exactly how the tale ended in 1990, but not because of Genscher; Gorbachev simply closed up shop and capitulated. In the meantime, though, the "subversive" logic of Ostpolitik regularly collided with the demands of

[1]For a review of *Erinnerungen,* the 1995 German edition of Genscher's memoirs, see my "Détante über alles," *The Times Literary Supplement,* October 13, 1995, pp. 6-7.

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Westpolitik. Hence American and British exasperation with "Genscherism," hence the "slippery man" tag. "Genscherism" entailed a Germany that was in and of the West, but not always with the West. The more Reagan turned up the heat on Brezhnev and his successors, the more Genscher sought to keep a separate détente alive, one that would shelter the East German-West German relationship and subtly—never disloyally—propitiate the Soviet Union.

Genscherism meant giving to Peter (Russia) without taking from Paul (the West), and there was profit in the giving, too. By leaning ever so slightly toward Moscow in the name of peace, détente, and "responsibility," Bonn could acquire leverage over Western policy and garner IOUs in the Kremlin.

DOUBLE ZERO

Still, Genscher was no Weimar-type *Schaukelpolitiker,* no matter how inclined to maneuver and balance. An escapee from East Germany, and committed to liberal principles, he felt no affection for the Soviet Union. And he was far too intelligent to fancy, as did Social Democratic nationalists like Egon Bahr, that Germany and Russia in tandem could manage Europe's fate. Weimar had played East against West because it belonged to neither and feared both. But Bonn's biggest asset was the Western alliance, which is why Genscher "risked his political life," as he notes (in the German edition), to fight the Euromissile battle all the way to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in 1983.

As desperately eager as he was to entice Moscow into negotiating away its SS-20 missiles in exchange for NATO's non-deployment, he had no illusions about the underlying Soviet game. The issue, he recalls, was "whether the Soviet Union would gain political power in Western Europe through military superiority, and whether it would succeed in separating Western Europe from the United States." There was a reason why he bolted from the coalition with Helmut Schmidt in 1982 to reemerge as Helmut Kohl's foreign minister. He was convinced that the Social Democrats, by then thoroughly infected with pacifism and anti-Americanism, would no longer stay the course of NATO's "dual track" decision: mutual disarmament if possible, counter-deployment if necessary. The Soviets conceded the game only in 1987 when Gorbachev accepted the "double-zero" deal proffered by NATO eight years before: neither SS-20s nor Pershings.

The West *was* home to Genscher, but more as a safe harbor whence to sally forth in search of opportunity. If the United States and Britain backed Iraq against Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, Genscher remained on good terms with Tehran—as did his successor Klaus Kinkel with his fabled "critical dialogue." Adroitly, Genscher also managed to stay good friends with both Israel and the Arabs. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Genscher reflexively went for cover, emerging alongside the United States and Britain only after Thatcher had talked Bush ("now, don't go wobbly on me, George") into a hard line against Iraq.

But in his memoirs, he can't resist taking a swipe at both. He, Genscher, had always understood that Saddam wanted "hegemony in the region" while "some of our important allies had supported [his] regime for years with arms shipments . . ."

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Having scored his point, he explains why Bonn could not commit armed forces to the allied cause. The army "was not prepared"; there was a constitutional ban on out-of-area operations (which the Constitutional Court has since declared nonexistent); there was the "fragile Two-plus-Four [reunification] process" with the Russians, who had, after all, been "close" Iraqi allies.

Seeking to avoid damage and to maximize their influence, brokers never commit completely to either side—that is the essence of their game, and Genscher was a virtuoso at it. Thus he took the same approach in the next post–Cold War crisis that erupted in Yugoslavia in 1991. True to instinct and style, Genscher avers, "It was important to me to keep in touch with *all* parties to the conflict."

BOSNIA AND REUNIFICATION

So why did Bonn strong-arm the rest of the European Union (EU) into recognizing Croatia and Slovenia in the winter of 1991-92? The French and the British suspected a German (and Austrian) plot. By currying favor with these two former Hapsburg possessions, Bonn and Vienna were purportedly going for a "Teutonic bloc" in the Balkans. A better explanation is German domestic politics, where anti-Serbian sentiments ran high, stoking the pressure for early recognition. But in fact, as his cabinet colleagues have intimated, Genscher was the lone voice that opposed precisely such a power play as foreordaining the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Yet as elsewhere in the memoirs, the horse's mouth remains closed, leaving the reader frustrated. "*What* power play?" Genscher seems to say with an ingénue's intonation. Bonn, Genscher wants us to believe, was not pushing, just tagging along with the EU; "the decision was made by the Twelve." So "what is there to criticize?" After all, recognition by the EU "ended the first war for which Belgrade was responsible." Alas, this repartee is doubly dubious. The Slovenian war was over in the summer of 1991, long before recognition by the EU in January 1992. And the free-for-all between Croats, Muslims, and Serbs began in earnest later in the year.

The reunification process—November 1989 to October 1990—rates only one chapter in the English translation, and one that is about half as long as in the original. But the loss to the English reader is minimal. Again, it is meeting by meeting, démarche by démarche—slow slogging, hard reading, and with no eye-openers. There are two reasons for this dour assessment; one is named "Kohl," the other "Genscher."

To Genscher's undying chagrin, Kohl grabbed the wheel almost immediately after the fall of the wall, jealously hogging all the crucial contacts with the two key players, the United States and the Soviet Union. That is why the most interesting account of the reunification saga on the German side is still *329 Tage* (329 days) written in 1991 by Horst Teltschik, who served as Kohl's security adviser. A more exhaustive treatment from an American perspective is *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* written in 1995 by Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, two Bush administration National Security Council staffers.

But Genscher the author must be blamed too. Throughout the book he remains unwilling either to "show and tell" or to captivate the reader with a

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well-crafted account of a breathtaking drama. Page after page, his memoirs read like Foreign Ministry files stitched together by assiduous, faceless assistants. There is no plot and no philosophy; in vain do we look for sharply etched portraits of key players or gripping insights into the high drama of international politics. One wishes that Genscher's amply expressed admiration for Henry Kissinger had extended to the latter's literary skills. Instead it is "I talked with . . . flew to . . . received . . . met . . . met again . . ." Or: "After my return . . . ," "a few days later . . . ," "I examined the request," "pondered . . . ," "considered . . ." Those who know how brilliant a storyteller Genscher can be are rightly puzzled and frustrated.

THE NEXT 1,000 PAGES

Why did Genscher suddenly resign in the spring of 1992? His answer, "democracy means a regular transfer of responsibility," does not quite persuade. But it is not hard to second-guess. After the self-dismemberment of the U.S.S.R. on Christmas Day 1991, Genscher must have grasped instinctively that the stage on which he had maneuvered so masterfully had collapsed. Bipolarity was dead, and there was no market left for this restless impresario. With one of the two dueling giants gone, so was the demand—and the profit—for a compulsive broker and détente-monger.

As he watched Americans and Russians kiss and make up, Genscher must have felt like Bismarck at the Berlin Congress of 1878, which he had convened as an honest broker only to find that Britain and Russia had already settled their quarrels without him. So Genscher did the natural thing. He retired and went home to pen his memoirs. He wrote a long book, not a great book. But let's not count him out. It is a safe bet that the muted applause of the German reviewers has piqued his ample vanity and ambition. Also, enigmatically as always, Genscher has all but announced a sequel—in the first paragraph of his preface. "This is not . . . an attempt to describe and explain every aspect of eighteen years of German foreign policy. Not enough time has passed to undertake such an assessment." Look for another thousand pages soon.

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Response

The General's Folly

Old Thinking for a New Military

Stephen A. Cheney

Far from a desire to transform the U.S. military, William E. Odom's comments represent a nostalgia for a Cold War military more suited to the 1950s than to the next millennium ("Transforming the Military," July/August 1997). The future will be an age of uncertainty, with rapid economic growth, increased competition for resources, massive population increases, particularly along the world's coastlines, and rising urbanization, especially in the Third World. This chaotic state will present new challenges, and will require changes in why, where, and how U.S. forces are employed.

The Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review faced the difficult task of maintaining and developing forces that could simultaneously shape the current security environment, respond rapidly to emerging threats, and prepare for the long term, which to almost everyone except Odom remains uncertain. The review upheld the Marine Corps' role as the nation's force in readiness and approved plans to sharpen this instrument of national power. The military strategy outlined in the review called for "flexible and multi-mission capable" forces to respond to a full range of crises, not just those at the high end of the conflict spectrum. Furthermore, it stressed the need for forces capable of participating in multiple small-scale operations, while retaining the ability to move rapidly from one end of the spectrum to the other. Odom's tanks and bombers cannot meet these demands.

ON THE RIM

Odom decries the Pentagon's planning efforts for not setting regional priorities, but he does not present or defend his own. In fact, he only mentions yesterday's flash points—areas of Cold War–era

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importance such as the Fulda Gap, northern Japan, and the Korean Demilitarized Zone. Although Europe and the Middle East remain important to the United States because of its allies and energy requirements, the keys to America's future economic growth and national security lie in Asia.

Speaking before a group of Asian scholars and businessmen, Secretary of Defense William Cohen acknowledged the critical importance of this region when he noted, "The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past. The Atlantic is the ocean of the present. And the Pacific is the ocean of the future." He later elaborated his concerns about Asia's future if U.S. forces were withdrawn or could not operate throughout the region. This would be "a frightful future, a future in which the Asia-Pacific region would be known not for its promise but its perils . . . where America could no longer claim to be a Pacific power and lose its influence to shape its destiny."

The Pacific Rim is of great importance to U.S. national security interests. Indeed, by the year 2000, the United States' trade with Asia will be twice the volume of its trade with Europe. Instability in Asia, fed by resource shortages, territorial disputes, or ethnic clashes, will adversely affect the United States' economy and citizens. The best way for the United States to protect these vital interests is to remain politically, economically, and militarily engaged. But since America cannot afford to be everywhere, all the time, the key to this engagement is an agile naval force capable of flexible forward presence.

BEING THERE

The United States will continue to be the critical guarantor of regional political stability through its forward deployment of combat power. But it cannot continue to conduct business as it has in the past, as Odom argues, with land-based forces. America's regional allies rely on it to provide military forces to maintain stability and security, but they are coming under increasing pressure to reduce the numbers of American land-based personnel and their support infrastructure, as has happened in the Middle East, the Philippines, Japan, and Europe. The same economic and political factors will shape the United States' presence along the Pacific Rim. The United States must be able to project its strength with a force whose basing posture is acceptable to its allies. Naval forces can best provide this kind of flexibility and acceptability—they leave a less intrusive political footprint, and are not formally tied to a single mission. Designed to operate from both land and sea bases, naval forces are like a rheostat: they provide a tailorable, on-the-scene team that can deter threats to stability, conduct assistance operations, or participate in major conflicts.

Land-based forces offer a tremendous degree of war fighting capability and a strong show of American commitment, but they are costly, less flexible, and more diplomatically constrained. Odom's suggestion to base 100,000 American soldiers and their families in Hokkaido, Japan, is a classic example of Cold War thinking. Such a multibillion-dollar investment would only be warranted if the United States were defending northern Japan from a Russian invasion. Equally untenable is Odom's suggestion that the United States disengage from critical regions and rely on strategic

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airlift to bring heavy forces into presumably targeted airfields and ports.

THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW

Despite what Odom says, traditional systems like heavy tanks and self-propelled artillery systems—no matter how souped-up—are not the answer. The United States has no copyright on technologies and strategies, which are easily subject to diffusion and proliferation. The next "bad guy" will be smarter—he will not play to the United States' strengths and fight it tank to tank, plane to plane. He will study its tactics and find its Achilles' heel: its reliance on fixed ports and airfields and its rear area supplies and communications. Odom misses the deadly implications of the potential use of ballistic missiles, armed with weapons of mass destruction, against his large land force as it deploys into an airport or major port facility. There is no better recipe for disaster.

But Odom's views are by no means those of the entire army. Indeed, within the army, young, forward-looking officers are calling for changes within their service that depart significantly from his Cold War–era ideas. For example, Colonel Douglas MacGregor has been highly critical of the army's current doctrine, programs, and hierarchical force structure. In his book, *Breaking the Phalanx*, he proposes that the army restructure itself into modularly organized, highly mobile, self-contained, combined arms teams that look extraordinarily like the Marine Corps' Air Ground Task Forces.

In another example, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters recently expressed the need for the army to think past its current armor-intensive forces, observing that "we are preparing for the war we want to fight someday, not for the conflicts we cannot avoid." These conflicts will involve U.S. forces operating in crowded urban slums, in chaotic and often ambiguous situations, giving little justification for the sort of force that Odom advocates. "There is not one compelling reason to buy a single additional bomber, submarine or tank today," Peters argues, until the military steps back and conducts the painful, rigorous analysis necessary to employ technology properly in shaping a joint force that fits the times.

The United States needs strong land-based ground forces. They remain a key element of any war-winning force. However, they are not as adaptive or as flexible as naval forces for the multi-dimensional missions joint commanders will face in the future. That is why the single service remedies Odom offers are ill-suited to an era where the necessity for joint approaches is so clear.

The American military must be able to master all types of crisis and conflict, and the forces designed today for the day after tomorrow must be right for a range of operating environments, from open deserts to densely populated urban centers. Large armored forces might be invaluable in defeating an opponent like Iraq in 1991, but they will offer little when confronting the next adversary. It would be an ironic strategic mistake to lock into Odom's short-sighted architecture for the future. At the cusp of a revolutionary era, new mental molds and military paradigms are needed. The military should use the strategic breathing space offered today to think hard about preparing for tomorrow's challenges.

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Letters to the Editor

Richard Holbrooke on Serb Radio;
Tetsuya Kataoka & Philip Trezise on Huntington;
Alexey Pushkov on Russia; and others

MEPHISTOPHELEAN MEDIA

To the Editor:

Jamie Metzl has correctly identified one of the most critical issues in the post–Cold War world—the use of mass media to disseminate myths masquerading as history, which then heighten or create ethnic and religious tensions ("Information Intervention," November/December 1997). It is ironic that half a century after Goebbels, the democratic powers permit punk versions of Nazi propaganda to foment racial, tribal, or ethnic hatred. Yet this is precisely what has happened in Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere. For example, NATO wavered over whether or not to close down the television transmitters of Pale in the Serb portion of Bosnia for 16 months before finally acting. The media in Bosnia was a vital part of the process by which a multiethnic society was destroyed, and the closing down of these transmitters was essential. Yet some argued that this action was a violation of the Serb right to freedom of expression. This argument was backward: in fact, the Bosnian Serbs had ruthlessly suppressed all media except their own.

Metzl's recommendations to create a "specialized international force to counter incendiary communications" is creative, but in the real world—where the international community can hardly get its act together on the most blatant challenges to its own declared values—it is unlikely to be seriously considered. As for jamming, it carries so many Cold War memories that it is difficult to engender much enthusiasm for it.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Europe

DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

To the Editor:

Samuel Huntington suggests that the United States show "restraint" in the international arena so that it will be prepared "at some point in the future," when "the combination of security threat and moral challenge will require Americans once again to commit major resources . . ." ("The Erosion of American National Interests," September/October 1997). He wants a "lowering [of] American involvement in the world" that will fabricate a new purpose and a "de novo mobilization." That is to say, having conceded the disappearance of an enemy, Huntington now wants to find a new one.

While pretending to uphold the American creed, Huntington is preparing to abandon it. For to refuse to defend the world order the United States has built, when there is ample means of doing so, can only mean that America no longer

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believes in the principles for which it built it in the first place. If America disengages now for Huntington's reasons, the rest of the world will surely unite to prevent it from finding new "purposes." Even more likely, the American people, realizing that all those who died in this nation's twentieth-century wars died in vain, will never again support foreign entanglements. America will cease to be America.

TETSUYA KATAOKA
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution

To the Editor:

In writing that the Council on Foreign Relations' May 1996 conference on Defining the National Interest was the "ultimate symbol of the triumph" of ethnicity over national interests, Huntington offends those of us who participated in it.

Diaspora interests have always been part of the national interest. Within two decades, the United States' population will be split 50-50 along ethnic lines. For the vociferous right, the barbarians are at the gates. As far back as 1956, none other than George Kennan wrote that ethnic groups seeking to intervene in foreign policy—"Jews, Negroes, and immigrants," were "maladjusted." Forty years later, the reversal of this kind of attitude was the goal of the council's conference.

The United States is heading for a clash, not of civilizations, but of two conflicting worldviews—one that is traditional, ethnocentric, and seeks to preserve the status quo, and another that is pluralistic, led by the search for opportunities and equality. Whether Huntington likes it or not, the sheer power of demographic and material change is dictating that the latter will prevail. After all, in May 1997, salsa outstripped ketchup as the highest selling condiment in the United States. It is too late for tears.

JUAN M. GARCIA PASSALACQUA
President, Analisis Incorporado

To the Editor:

Huntington complains that President Clinton "may well be spending more time" promoting exports than "doing anything else in foreign affairs." But all postwar American presidents have been committed economic internationalists. All have championed open markets and the rule of law in the international economy. President Clinton is very much in that mainstream and deserves cheers rather than sneers.

History is likely to judge that his most important contributions in foreign affairs were securing the North American Free Trade Agreement and helping conclude the Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations, which gave birth to the World Trade Organization, an institution that makes the goal of global free trade attainable during the next few decades.

All of this serves domestic interests—multinational corporations, large banks and insurance companies, Boeing, George Soros, and so on. The Clinton administration has acted with admirable vigor to carry forward a national policy that since 1946 has helped improve the lives of hundreds of millions of people in the United States and throughout the world. If there is an identifiable and enduring national interest, this is it.

PHILIP TREZISE
Former Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

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FINESSING ISLAM'S FAILINGS

To the Editor:

Ali A. Mazrui's long overdue attempt to burnish the image of Islamic society is commendable, but his efforts to dismiss or rationalize the mass killings and brutality of many regimes in the Islamic world do his cause a disservice ("Islamic and Western Values," September/October 1997).

Mazrui's points concerning Western scorn for Islam are, if anything, understated. For instance, Muslims, particularly Arabs, are the only ethnic group against whom racism is still considered acceptable in American popular culture. In a society consumed with political correctness, the American media continue to trot out derogatory stereotypes of Muslims as unshaven fanatics or lascivious oil sheiks, even though similarly offensive portrayals of "little black Sambo," the servile coolie, or the greedy, hooknosed Jew would cause a furor. Certainly there are Jewish, Asian, and African-American characters who are not portrayed as paragons of virtue, but we bend over backward to make clear that such individuals should not be seen as representative of their ethnic group—a sensitivity still lacking in most depictions of Arabs and Muslims.

Unfortunately Mazrui goes too far in his claim that Islamic society is free of the horrors of genocide and totalitarian terror. Indonesia's efforts to exterminate the East Timorese, the mass slaughter of Armenians at the hands of the Turks, and Saddam Hussein's *Anfal* campaign against the Kurds may or may not meet one's technical definition of genocide, but if they do not, it can only be a case of splitting hairs. Hafez al-Assad's massacre of the Muslim Brotherhood at Hama in 1982 was no less bloodthirsty than Hitler's suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1944. Similarly, Iraqi society under Saddam Hussein, described so chillingly by Kanaan Makiya and other writers, is just as Stalinist as Stalinist Russia itself.

Mazrui is right to point out that Western society needs to be more conscious of its failings, but this should not give license to Islamic society or other cultures to ignore their own.

KENNETH M. POLLACK

Research Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

RELEGATING RUSSIA

To the Editor:

Zbigniew Brzezinski is correct to stress the importance of Eurasia as "the world's axial supercontinent," but he sells short Russia's role in the region ("A Geostrategy for Eurasia," September/October 1997).

In Brzezinski's analysis Russia clearly loses to China as the United States' top priority in Eurasia. This is understandable. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union and China is a nascent superpower with growing influence in East Asia. Besides, Russia's foreign policy is undermined by its present weakness. However, Moscow remains the key power in Eurasia and is central to peace, stability, and U.S. interests in this most important region of the world.

Moscow's impact is considerable. If it pursues a nationalist foreign policy, it could result in serious tensions with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, China, and Japan. Should it remain a constructive force in Eurasia, however, it would exert a positive influence from Europe to the Far East.

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Russia's recent successful diplomatic efforts to compel Iraq to allow U.N. inspectors to continue working are but one example of such influence.

Brzezinski thinks that the United States should engage China as a natural ally, while Russia should be watched with suspicion and potentially contained again. But China is the only major power in the world still ideologically antagonistic to the United States. Russia, on the contrary, is a developing political democracy, however immature, with a mass media and a growing acceptance of democratic values. Besides, unlike China, Russia is not building up its military and nuclear might; in fact it is cutting it.

Finally, Brzezinski argues that Russia should evolve into a loose confederation "composed of European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far Eastern Republic." He suggests that "a decentralized Russia would be less susceptible to imperial mobilization." But this is a recipe for disaster. It would unleash the dormant nationalism of Central Russia's Muslims (Tatars, Bashkirs, and others) and could even result in a civil war comparable to Bosnia's. At the same time, the autonomous peoples in the south of Asiatic Russia (Tuva, Buryats, and others) would fall under Chinese dominance—something Brzezinski seems to welcome, allowing China to "project more overt influence in the Russian Far East . . ." Such a scenario would not serve U.S. interests in Eurasia, let alone peace and stability in the region.

ALEXEY K. PUSHKOV
Director of Foreign Affairs, Russian Public Television

IN DEFENSE OF THE STATE

To the Editor:

Though Anne-Marie Slaughter says "there is no substitute for the state," she proceeds to denigrate its role in world politics ("The Real New World Order," September/October 1997). She cannot have it both ways.

Slaughter's claims that "transgovernmentalism offers answers to the most important challenges facing advanced industrial countries," that "information technology will transform the globe," and that these new developments provide "a blueprint for the international architecture of the 21st century," evoke the views of other utopian thinkers who disparaged the state and were unhappy with the human situation. Karl Marx predicted the state would wither away, and Woodrow Wilson wanted to supersede it with a new international order.

Peace and freedom are maintained not by establishing a new world order that belittles the state, but by maintaining a propitious balance of power among states. The never-ending temptation to replace power politics and the untidy state system with new schemes recalls Reinhold Niebuhr's warning in *Foreign Affairs* in 1949, "We may have pity upon but can have no sympathy with those who flee to the illusory security of the impossible from the insecurities and ambiguities of the possible."

ERNEST W. LEFEVER
Senior Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center

PROJECTING PAROCHIALISM

To the Editor:

William Odom's suggestion that U.S. armed forces' power projection requirements can be met by airlift operations is

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seriously flawed ("Transforming the Military," July/August 1997). It is true that fighters, bombers, and transports can fly around the globe, but such operations are not sustainable for long periods of time. Aircraft need maintenance and their crews need rest. In addition, advances in technology continue to enhance the capabilities of amphibious forces to execute maneuvers from the sea and to conduct sustained operations on land. Marines will never slog their way ashore on the battlefields of the future.

To meet the challenges of the future, the United States needs the combined capabilities that each of the services brings to the table. In the words of General John Shalikashvili, ". . . we shouldn't believe that all our gains in jointness are chiseled in stone, and that the path is clear. There are still strident voices for parochialism, who would like to slow the progress of jointness in the force, and even those who want to turn the clock back." To maintain an American military that is second to none, we need to move beyond the parochial issues raised in Odom's article and continue to jointly identify the means needed to achieve our future ends.

GEORGE J. FLYNN
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

STRATEGY, NOT SUBSIDY

To the Editor:

The administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), James G. Speth, implies that foreign aid is the prime engine of poor countries' economic development ("Letters to the Editor," July/August 1997). In fact, it is only of secondary importance.

For development aid to work, the recipient country's government must have a clear development strategy, for which there must also be widespread popular support. This is what made the Marshall Plan successful. Western European aid recipients observed the right priorities, their peoples duly cooperated, and after only four years the region was back on its feet.

Development is not so much a matter of how much financial aid is available, as of how much drive and conviction responsible leaders are able and willing to put behind well-conceived development policies. The management of development is more critical than the financing it requires.

JAN H. LUBBERS
Former President, UNDP Governing Council, 1968

ERRATUM

The publisher for *The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century* by Christopher Lingle has been changed from Ashgate Publishing to Asia 2000 in Hong Kong ("Recent Books on International Relations," November/December 1997).

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